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Abstract 
 
This thesis seeks to explore which structural factors that move member states into compliance 
with International Environmental Agreements (IEAs). The research question is: “under what 
conditions do members to an international environmental agreement comply with their 
commitments?” 
 
Previous conducted studies on environmental accords have focused mainly on institutional 
treaty characteristics when explaining variance in compliance. The interest in regime factors 
has led to a focus on overall compliance more than on understanding member state 
compliance records. This lack of attention to the importance of extralegal factors to member 
state compliance with environmental agreements has been a motivation for this thesis. 
 
As this thesis is exploratory by nature, the theoretical framework takes a broad approach, 
introducing country-specific determinants that are hypothesised to influence a state’s 
environmental record. To test the hypotheses, an event history analysis of signatory state 
compliance with the Montreal Protocol is conducted. 154 member states’ event histories 
between 1989 and 2008 are analysed and compared. The results show that as a signatory 
state’s length of protocol membership increases, regional compliance records improve and its 
general welfare rises, the associate has significantly better chances of experiencing 
compliance with the Montreal Protocol than a member state not inhabiting such features. 
Nonetheless, a powerful member state is significantly less likely to adhere to the Montreal 
accord obligations. From these findings, the effect of regional compliance is especially 
intriguing as it is poorly theorised in the literature. Furthermore, the analysis shows that 
several of the most theorised covariates fail to affect the propensity for compliance on the 
Montreal Protocol. Most surprising is the finding that neither political regime nor the scope of 
active ENGOs affects compliance rates significantly. 
 
The results from this analysis indicate that one can not fully understand the variation in 
compliance with the Montreal Protocol without taking factors external to the environmental 
accords into consideration.  
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“The political science literature to date has focused on how regimes influence the environmental 
behaviours of states, but it could benefit by framing the question as what explains variation in the 
environmental behaviour of states? This subtle shift directs our attention to the many nonlegal drivers of 
environmental behaviours that are often arrayed against international environmental agreements but 
sometimes facilitate their efforts (Mitchell 2003:449).  
 
“Questions of compliance – to what extent do states comply, which states are likely to comply, what 
patterns of compliance exist within and across areas of regulation? – have not been extensively 
investigated and remain poorly understood” (Haas 1998:17). 
 
1. Introduction 
The last century has been characterised by a pronounced increase in international regimes of 
cooperation. Since the 1970s, a growing concern with the impact industrial progress and 
human activity has on the environment has led to the establishment of a series of International 
Environmental Agreements (IEAs). One of the most well-known traits of supranational 
regimes is that they do not impede state sovereignty. As IEAs lack the efficient regulator 
means that a state inhabits, international agreements do not have the power to force members 
to act. Why, then, do states follow international environmental law? This puzzle has provoked 
this thesis’ research question; under what conditions do members to an international 
environmental agreement comply with their commitments? 
 
Environmental issues are typical commons issues. As states cannot seal their borders from 
environmental degradation, and many problems affect what international law considers 
commons areas, states cannot privatize economic or social damages resulting from pollution, 
deforestation or depletion of the ozone layer. Hence, international collaboration is 
necessitated to enable changes. Nonetheless, the development of IEAs is a recent 
phenomenon, and their success at changing state behaviour is heavily discussed (see for 
example:Chayes and Chayes 1993; 1995; Checkel 2001; Downs et al. 1996; Haas et al. 1993; 
Mitchell 1994; Simmons 1998). In my contribution to this discussion, I focus on member state 
compliance. Compliance is a notion reflecting behavioural change among members to an 
agreement in legal terms. Exactly this thesis’ interest in actual change is what lies behind the 
choice of focus1.   
                                                 
1
 A more thorough definition and discussion of the concept is introduced in section 3.1. 
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When describing differences in IEA outcomes, scholars within the International 
Relations (IR) school tend to focus on the framework of agreement in their analyses, treating 
nation-specific indicators as constants. The use of enforcement and management mechanisms 
has been thoroughly covered. However, several influential studies done on this field end up 
discussing factors external to the agreement, and how they might matter (Brown Weiss and 
Jacobson 1998; Cameron et al. 1996; Haas 1998; Mitchell 2003). It is from such discussions 
my thesis departs. 
 In the process of answering my research question, the Montreal Protocol on 
Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (henceforth referred to as the Montreal Protocol) 
was chosen as the case under scrutiny. To be able to study member states’ behaviour to the 
Protocol, a statistical analysis labelled event history analysis is applied. Three different 
models are run, followed by the construction of a final model visualising the variables most 
successful at explaining the variance in associate compliance seen in the Montreal accord. 
 
1.1 Theoretical relevance and scientific contribution 
International Relations theorists have emphasized the importance of the regimes’2 institutional 
design when considering state compliance. This is connected with a scholarly focus on 
responses to non-compliance (coercion, institutional compromise and social learning) rather 
than understanding which mechanisms drive compliance (Haas 2008:xvii). Consequently, 
most of the literature on the mixed success of environmental governance has been considered 
an institutional problem rather than a structural one. However, recent empirical research point 
to the importance of factors external to the treaty, such as strong civil engagement, democracy 
and effectiveness of the bureaucracy (Bernhagen 2008; Binder and Neumayer 2005; 
Neumayer 2002, 2003; Roberts et al. 2004; Simmons 2000; Perkins and Neumayer 2007). I 
find this partition intriguing, and wish to search deeper for an understanding of which 
extralegal mechanisms influence the chance of reaching compliance. Thus, this thesis is an 
attempt to shed new light on what explains compliance based on an approach focusing on 
structures (like government autonomy, political regime and legal origin) and processes (like 
economic development and integration in the world economy) characterising the member 
states.  
                                                 
2
 This thesis will only use the designation ‘regime’ in the context international environmental regime, and not in 
the sense of a political system or synonymous with state. This is done to avoid confusion. 
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Moving the focus from treaty-induced explanatory variables to more structural 
covariates, the natural choice of units of analysis also changes. In most of the literature on 
IEA compliance and effectiveness, researchers are preoccupied with overall compliance. Thus, 
little attention has been given to state-specific behaviour within the framework of IEAs, and if 
this focus has been present, it has been restricted to a focus on behaviour among the most 
powerful states (see for example: Breitmeier et al. 2006). Hence, I argue that my thesis brings 
new insights to the literature by shifting the focus to member states and examining the 
processes driving compliance and defiance at the national level.  
The original goal of this thesis was to compare two international environmental 
regimes and see whether the same determinants played a significant role in making member 
states comply. Two datasets were created, but because of the limited time and scope of a 
master thesis, as well as methodological issues connected with the second dataset, I decided to 
analyse determinants’ effect on compliance with the Montreal Protocol alone. This prevents 
me from comparing the importance of different determinants between IEAs. However, as 
Mitchell (2004:128-131) argues, comparability is questionable in the case of international 
agreement, because of the heterogeneity of existing agreements as well as in regime goals and 
in the difficulty of inducing actual change. Thus, a motivation is to point out which 
determinants improve the chances of a country moving into compliance with the Montreal 
Protocol. This will provide increased knowledge about which structural factors play a role in 
such complex ‘two-level’ processes linking international and national politics (Putnam 1988).  
There are serious obstacles presented when wishing to evaluate the outcome of 
international environmental accords. First, most agreements are so recent that estimating their 
effects are premature. Secondly, older protocols may inhabit important information, but the 
data are often neither consistent nor reliable and trustworthy results are thus hard to obtain 
(Ringquist and Kostadinova 2005). Thirdly, it is hard to decide when a state has changed its 
behaviour sufficiently to be labelled a complier. Following Brown Weiss and Jacobson 
(1998:2):  “(…) compliance occurs across a scale of shades of grey”. Such challenges have 
made qualitative approaches the dominant method when conducting research on the outcome 
of IEAs. Thus, when I apply a statistical method to answer the research question, this should 
represent a valuable contribution to the predominantly qualitative literature characterising the 
paradigm. As such, this study has an exploratory nature. 
 
 3 
1.2 Structure of the thesis 
The Montreal Protocol making up the framework for analysis is not familiar to everyone. 
Thus, chapter two discusses the historical development of IEAs and gives an introduction to 
the Montreal Protocol. Then, chapter three presents the theoretical framework for the thesis. 
Here, different theories are presented and made measureable through clearly stated 
hypotheses. Thereafter, chapter four introduces event history analysis, which is the 
methodological framework chosen for this thesis. Furthermore, in chapter five the data 
material is discussed and the operationalisation of hypothesis into variables is introduced. 
Chapter six reports the results that can be inferred from the statistical analysis divided into 
three models. Based on the findings here, a synthesis model is established to summarize the 
statistically significant results. Finishing off, the regression results are discussed in light of the 
hypotheses set out in the theory chapter. Finally, chapter seven concludes the research 
question by summarizing the findings and discussing the implications of this analysis.   
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2. The development of IEAs and the Montreal Protocol 
After the Second World War, an explosion in mutual commitment through international 
agreements has occurred. Cross-national green agreements, focusing on the environmental 
damage seen as the industrial West advanced, had been present from the onset of the 20th 
century, but not to the extent and comprehension witnessed from 1970 and onwards. Today, 
there exist approximately 225 active international environmental accords in the world (Barrett 
2003). This chapter first includes a review of the development and structuring of international 
environmental regimes. Then, the history of the IEA under scrutiny in this thesis, the 
Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer3 is presented and discussed.  
 
2.1 The development of International Environmental Regimes 
In this thesis, an international environmental regime is understood as “one that is primarily 
focused on some aspect of the relationship between human society and nature and that 
involves three or more nation state parties” (Meyer et al. 1997:636). As displayed in Figure 1, 
the establishment of environmental commitment across states is a rather new phenomenon.  
 
Figure 1: Cumulative counts of international environmental activities, 1870-1990 
 
The figure is taken from Meyer et al. (1997:625) 
                                                 
3
 A thorough treatment of case selection and operationalisations is introduced in chapters 4 and 5. 
 5 
 
The first international agreements were formed between European states and were mainly 
motivated by one of two objectives. Either, an understanding of nature as a resource for 
allocation was behind mutual commitments. For instance, the first international environmental 
convention was signed in 1900 and included protection of animals, birds and fish in Africa. 
Of course, the treaty was initiated by the colonial powers who wanted to secure the stock of 
wild animals for their own hunters. Or, some agreements were based on a sentimental view on 
some aspects of nature, like the 1933 Convention Relative to the Preservation of Fauna and 
Flora in their Natural State (Andresen et al. 2008:22-23; Meyer et al. 1997). In the period up 
until World War II few new IEAs were established. Nonetheless, this period saw increased 
nongovernmental associational activity, although in a decentralised vein.  
 A crucial happening for the modern IEAs was the establishment of the United Nations 
(UN) in 1945. Suddenly, there was an arena for questions of an international character, like 
human rights, security and defence, trade and environment. Furthermore, the structural frame 
of the UN served as an inspiration for the institutionalisation of environmental commitment. 
Despite such advances, the bulk of international treaties seen in the 1950s were related to 
security and trade issues, and environmental damage was given little attention. This improved 
in the 1960s as an increased public involvement in environmental issues culminated in the 
1972 UN Conference on the Human Environment (the Stockholm Conference), where 120 
states participated. The conference was a breakthrough for environmental cooperation with 
the establishment of the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) as well as 
important principles with regard to environment and development. UNEP is today the single 
most important world organisation concerned with the environment, and is a secretariat to 
several of the biggest IEAs (Andresen et al. 2008:23-25).  
In the wake of the conference, a sharp increase in IEAs were seen, quite a few of them 
becoming global in their reach. Examples are Convention on Long-range Transbounday Air 
Pollution (CLRTAP) (1979), United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982), the 
Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer (1985) and the International 
Tropical Timber Organisation (1986) (Andresen et al. 2008). Nevertheless, nature did not 
fully enter the international agenda until the discovery of the ‘ozone hole’ over the Antarctic 
and the devastating Chernobyl disaster in the mid-1980s. This coincided with the UN report, 
Our Common Future, which established the notion sustainable development4 and concluded 
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 The meaning behind the term is that nature and development needs to be jointly considered (Andresen et al. 
2008:24). 
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that ‘the polluter pays,’ leaving the main responsibility for environmental cleanup with the 
developed countries. This acknowledgement made the developing countries involve 
themselves to a much greater degree than what had been previously seen. The last twenty 
years has not seen too many new IEAs as new environmental challenges are included into the 
structures of the already existing conventions5. Despite few new IEAs being seen, overall 
international environmental activity has increased substantially in this period (Meyer et al. 
1997:638). 
What explains the sudden explosion in environmental commitment after 1960s, as 
visualised in Figure 1? Environmental degradation has been occurring for several centuries 
without collective action being initiated. Examples are the fishery collapses seen during the 
period of Hanseatic League or the quadrupling of crop land from 1700 to 1920 leading to 
enormous losses to biodiversity (Meyer et al. 1997:637-638). Meyer et al. (1997:629-639) 
argue that there are two dramatic changes in world society explaining the rise of 
contemporary environmental regimes. First, the increased prominence of scientific analyses of 
the nature that was able to define and codify environmental degradation and communicate 
these findings to a global audience, thus creating collective mobilisation and action. As the 
massive expansion seen in scientific activity established a notion of an interdependent 
ecosystem which sustains the very possibility of life, a frame for international activity was 
created. Secondly, the creation of a broad world organisational structure, most importantly 
through the United Nations, was important because it provided an international arena that 
encouraged mobilisation around issues transcending state borders. 
To sum up, Meyer et al. (1997:637) gives a good description of the change seen in 
IEAs’ structure and focus over time.  
 
“Early treaties tended to be specific, signed by limited numbers of developed countries, and concerned 
with the management of specific international dependencies” whereas “(…) more recent treaties (…) 
emphasize regional and global interdependencies, and they are rooted in a broad and universalistic 
scientific conception of nature as an ecosystem with which human society must come into balance”.  
 
It is the latter type of agreement described here this thesis will work with. 
                                                 
5
 Notable exceptions are the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCC) (1992) and the linked 
Kyoto Protocol as well as Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) (1992). 
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2.2 The Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone 
Layer. 
The observation of a continued weakening of the ozone layer, and especially the discovery of 
the enormous ‘ozone hole’ over the Antarctic in 1985, led to renewed attention to the causes 
and effects of the depletion of the ozone layer. Since the 1970s, uncertainty had existed with 
regard to how severe the effect of Chlorofluorocarbon (CFC) and halon gases was on the 
ozone layer. Despite the fact that the chemists who discovered the destructive effect of CFC 
gases on the ozone layer received the Nobel Price in chemistry for their work, powerful 
chemical companies worked against this recognition, dismissing it as mere science fiction 
(Andresen et al. 2008:56). However, with the disclosure of the Antarctic ‘ozone hole,’ 
international scientific agreed that the problem was real and necessary to counteract. 
Reducing CFC and halon gas production was vital in combating the reduction of the earth’s 
ozone layer. Yet, this was seen as a great challenge, as use of both CFC and halon gases had 
become widespread as important components in refrigerators and freezers, spray cans, cellular 
plastics, solvents, dry cleaners and fire-extinguishers (Andresen et al. 2008: 56-60).  
 Previous to the groundbreaking findings, international cooperation had been initiated. 
Notwithstanding, as a reflection of the uncertainty and the market situation with Europe and 
North America being the largest consumers and producers, the first international agreement, 
named the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, did not oblige the 
countries to specific reductions. Thus, the negotiations of a new protocol to the Vienna 
convention were tough, with the EU being split in two between the countries who followed 
the US in their fight for a more radical goal of stabilisation in the short run and full stop in the 
long run and those favouring more moderate actions. The negotiation round ended with the 
EU giving in to the demands of the more ambitious side. Thus, 24 countries and the EU 
agreed on the Montreal Protocol in 1987. It was ratified in 1988 and entered into force on 
January 1st 1989, as a supplement to the Vienna convention.  
 The Protocol objective was a 50 percent reduction of the production and consumption 
of CFCs and halons in the industrialised member states by 1999, the baseline year being 1986. 
UNEP served as the secretariat to the agreement. Developing countries were given a ten year 
postponement to reach the same goal (referred to as Article 5- members in this thesis)6. 
                                                 
6
 According to the Protocol text: “Any Party that is a developing country and whose annual calculated level 
of consumption of the controlled substances is less than 0,3 kilograms per capita on the date of the entry into 
force of the Protocol for it, or any time thereafter within ten years of the date of entry into force of the Protocol 
shall, in order to meet its basic domestic needs, be entitled to delay its compliance with the control measures set 
out in paragraphs 1 to 4 of Article 2 by ten years after that specified in those paragraphs” (Benedick 1991:235-
236). 
 8 
Despite this, pulls towards an even more radical regime ended in changes in the original 
objective of the non-article 5 members. Fifteen months after the Montreal Protocol had been 
agreed on, the US and the EU urged for introducing a stricter regime requiring full stop in the 
production and use of CFC and halon gases by January 1st 2000. The more ambitious plan was 
formally accepted by all parties on the second meeting of the Parties in London in 1990. Later 
on, the non-article 5 group decided on even more radical phase-out plans, pushing the 
deadline forward to 1996 and 1994 for CFCs and halons respectively. At this point in time, 
there were 58 Parties to the Montreal Protocol, making up 90% of the world’s production and 
consumption of ozone reducing substances. As of November 26th 2009, 196 countries had 
ratified the Montreal Protocol (The Ozone secretariat 2010). 
 New amendments were added to the Convention, expanding the area of responsibility 
and enhancing deeper cooperation on the issue of Ozone Depleting Substances (ODS). The 
London Amendment added the Annex B substances carbon tetrachloride, methyl chloroform 
and other halogenated CFCs to the Protocol. The Copenhagen Amendment added the Annex 
C substances hydrochlorofluorocarbons (HCFCs), and hydrobromofluorocarbons (HBFCs), as 
well as the Annex E substance methyl bromide to the original treaty (Andresen et al. 2008:61). 
This thesis does not consider these amendments any further. 
Among scientists working on the field of IEAs, it is well known that the Montreal 
Protocol is described as the success story in the (rather short) history of international 
environmental cooperation. Thus, choosing this as my case, I am aware that this might strike 
the reader as both biased and not thoroughly thought through. Nonetheless, my focus is not on 
whether member states comply, but rather on understanding which factors drive compliance 
with IEAs. This difference, although subtle, is crucial to the thesis and defends the choice of 
the Montreal Protocol as the case of departure.      
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3. Theoretical framework 
Compliance with the Montreal Protocol is, strictly defined, a legal question. Still, this thesis 
argues that the process towards compliance is too complex to be properly understood without 
taking extralegal features inherent to each state into account. Policy-makers are confined by 
economical, political, social and cultural structures in society, as much as by the public will 
and their own personal convictions. This chapter will discuss the definition of compliance, 
and implement it in a broader clarifying discussion of the important distinction between 
compliance, implementation and effectiveness in the international regime literature. 
Furthermore, theories and previous studies are included in a discussion making up the 
background for the hypotheses that this thesis aims to test empirically. To structure this 
examination, three prominent compliance approaches in the IR literature have been used as a 
frame of reference. 
  
3.1 Defining compliance  
The term compliance is commonly used when comparing behaviour to specific treaty 
provisions, a treaty’s broader spirit and principles, implicit international norms and informal 
agreements (Mitchell 1996:5). The different ways of understanding compliance reported here 
are manifested in different definitions presented by scholars. Chayes and Chayes (1993:4) 
operate with a rather abstract definition. They argue that compliance is successful when states: 
“(…) alter their behaviour, their relationships, and their expectations of one another over time 
in accordance with its terms.” Young (1979:3) moves close to Chayes and Chayes’ 
understanding in his classical work on compliance. According to his definition:  
 
“compliance can be said to occur when the actual behaviour of a given subject conforms to prescribed 
behaviour, and non-compliance or violation occurs when actual behaviour departs significantly from 
prescribed behaviour.”  
 
These definitions offer a broad understanding of compliance, not only confining it to de jure 
compliance, but to an internalisation of the normative basis for international environmental 
cooperation. Following this line of argument, perfect compliance is exceedingly hard to 
achieve and even harder to measure. Therefore, these scholars further argue that substantial 
compliance is what should be sought by the treaty makers. The judgment of what substantial 
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compliance actually signifies is left to the researcher, allowing considerable subjectivity into 
an analysis.  
A more tangible definition is offered by Brown Weiss and Jacobson (1998:4), who 
define compliers as the member states who: “adhere to the provisions of the accord and to 
implementing measures that they have instituted.” Mitchell (1996:5) acknowledges that 
treaties may induce positive change in behaviour among the actors involved, but chooses to 
exclude the notion of compliance with the norms underlying the agreement. He thus offers an 
even more narrow definition where compliance is regarded as: “an actor’s behaviour that 
conforms to a treaty’s explicit rules.”  
All four definitions introduced share a focus on subject behaviour. This adds an 
important qualification to the compliance issue, demonstrating that when doing research on 
compliance, actual behaviour of subjects needs to be the focus, not intentions and attitudes. 
This means that intentions shown through membership and positive attitudes towards an IEA 
does not help move a country into compliance unless action is taken at the national level 
through policy changes that materialise in actual changes in society. 
The definitions presented above show a lack of consensus among scholars with regard 
to what should be included in the concept compliance. It is natural that such an understanding 
varies with how the definition is used in a study. Chayes and Chayes (1993:176) argue that 
the treaty regime should be measured as a level of overall compliance, considering the treaty’s 
scope and goals. Mitchell (1996:6), on the other hand, argues that measuring overall 
compliance with an accord is likely to lead to useless inferences, calling for an empirical 
measuring of compliance directed against treaty provisions. As this thesis is based on a 
statistical approach, two things are particularly important; first, that the concepts utilized are 
not biased and second, that they can be further operationalised into tangible measures 
susceptible to empirical testing. Based on this, it naturally follows that the narrow definitions 
presented by Brown Weiss and Jacobson and Mitchell are most suitable for my analysis.  
 
3.1.1. Implementation, compliance, effectiveness 
The term compliance is used somewhat inconsistently in the existing literature on IEAs, 
making it easy to confuse with related terminology such as implementation and effectiveness. 
To avoid confusion, I carefully distinguish these terms from each other as they refer to 
different aspects of the political and legal cooperation process (Axelrod et al. 2005: 163-164)  
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Following Young (1979) and Brown Weiss and Jacobson (1998:4-6), I differentiate 
between implementation and compliance. Implementation refers to the measures that 
governments take to translate international accords into domestic law and policy. The focus 
here is on the procedures decided upon by the national authorities to secure compliance 
further along the line. Compliance, then, goes beyond implementation, and is harder to 
measure. As mentioned in the previous section, compliance is a matter of whether and to what 
extent member states concur to the provision of the agreement. Thus, domestic policy must 
translate into action that helps reaching the stated goals of the agreement. To illustrate the 
difference, one can say that a member state that is successful at implementing the Montreal 
Protocol is a state that effectively incorporates the laws put forward by the accord into the 
national legal system. Yet, to be a good complier to the Montreal Protocol, this legal system 
must be enforced on all CFC and halon polluters, and actual action must be taken to reduce 
the emission levels to the level agreed upon, within the deadline set by the Ozone Secretariat.  
Furthermore, it is important to clarify the distinction between the terms compliance 
and effectiveness. Both concepts are considered to evaluate the outcome of a process. The 
difference then, is what they emphasise when evaluating a regime. As Underdal (1998:6) 
points out, the level of compliance, together with the stringency of regime injunctions and 
side effects, make up the functions that together can work as a measure on effectiveness. 
Accordingly, level of compliance can partly explain level of effectiveness. Compliance 
considers the legal aspect of the outcome; whether the member states adhere to the rules it has 
bound itself to adhere to. Effectiveness looks at the broader consequences, for example 
whether changes can be traced in the environment due to the policies initiated by an IEA. 
Such causal connections are hard to verify. Thus, as Brown Weiss and Jacobson (1998) 
underline, even though signatory states are in compliance with a treaty, it does not mean that 
the treaty is effective in fighting the problems it addresses. Closely connected to this argument, 
Underdal (1998:6) asserts that;  
 
“(…) maximizing compliance is not necessarily a good design principle if the ultimate goal is to 
enhance regime effectiveness. The regimes that are most easily complied with are those that require 
little or no change of behaviour.” 
 
3.2 Understanding compliance – the point of departure 
The compliance debate first became salient in the IR literature in the 1970s. It derived from 
the literature on international arms control which was the main field of research during the 
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Cold War. Following the fall of the Iron Curtain, the focus on compliance was transferred into 
other areas of international cooperation. After a few years with an extensive literature being 
produced on IEAs and compliance in the first half of the 1990s, Mitchell  (1996:4) concluded 
that: “the number of and variety of proposals to improve international environmental treaties 
suggest (…) that we still lack a solid understanding of what factors facilitate, and which 
impede, compliance with a treaty”. Today, 20 years after the debate accelerated, the 
compliance literature is still factionalised. 
The compliance paradigm originated as a debate between the realist enforcement 
school emphasizing the importance of sanctions, and the managerial school focusing on the 
importance of capacity building for securing compliance. Eventually, the constructivists also 
included themselves in the discussion of what makes states comply, introducing the 
importance of norms and legitimacy into the discourse. As Börzel et al. (2007) state, these 
theories have traditionally been preoccupied with evaluating regime framework as it has been 
used for research on the differences in level of compliance between international agreements. 
Such an approach is inappropriate in this thesis as I focus on cross-national patterns of 
compliance with a single IEA. Nevertheless, inspired by Börzel et al. (2007) and Bernhagen 
(2008), I argue that the IR theories projecting the field of environmental governance can be 
used as a framework for hypotheses on cross-national differences of compliance. Hence, this 
chapter is structured around the realist enforcement school, the institutionalist managerial 
school and the constructivist legitimacy school. A short introduction to each of the schools is 
presented, consecutively followed by the presentation of the theories and hypothesis that I 
find to fit under each branch. However, it needs to be pointed out that the intention of 
structuring the chapter this way is not a wish to test and compare the strength of each school 
up against the others. This is merely a structural grip to reflect the literature that the IEA 
paradigm originates from and place the hypotheses accordingly. Thus, this thesis is interested 
in assessing each hypothesis’ explanatory power when compliance is considered, and the use 
of IR theories should not be considered anything more than a structural device. 
As already mentioned, this thesis is exploratory in nature. As the compliance paradigm 
with regard to cross-national variation is still under-studied, the theoretical foundation for the 
hypotheses to be tested here is less established than the theories that originated with regard to 
overall regime compliance and effectiveness. Consequently, the point of departure for the 
following theoretical discussion is theories and empirical assessments on the broader subject 
of international environmental politics. The aim of this study then, is to test a group of 
hypothesis that have been postulated to affect a state’s environmental record, and see whether 
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these assumptions hold in a quantitative analysis on member state compliance with the 
Montreal Protocol. 
 
3.3 The enforcement school 
The enforcement school arose out of a realist account of international politics. Some realists 
argue that the only reason why states comply with IEAs is that they are so shallow and 
vaguely formulated that it is close to impossible for members to defect (Downs et al. 1996; 
Haas 1998). The enforcement school treats international accords in a more serious manner, 
but considers inter-state binding agreements to be signed by states only when the states’ 
myopic self-interests justify the costs of membership. Non-compliance in the realist eyes, 
therefore, is intentional and based on a profit-maximising rationale. Consequently, the 
scholars contend that for members to comply with international agreements, institutionalised 
monitoring and sanctioning mechanisms that make the costs of defection exceed the benefits, 
must be introduced (Börzel et al. 2007; Downs et al. 1996). However, states do not face the 
same compliance costs, nor are they homogenously sensitive to sanctions. This section will, 
through theories on state power and economic integration, consider the importance of 
autonomy versus interdependence when explaining the observed variance in compliance 
across member states to the Montreal Protocol. 
 
3.3.1 State power 
Following the realist line of argument, one can expect the sensitivity of imposed costs to vary 
with states’ economic and political power (Börzel et al. 2007:5-8). Thus, powerful states are 
expected to be less preoccupied with complying with international accords as their size 
politically, economically or military is what grants them legitimacy and influence, and not 
their cooperation reputation (Perkins and Neumayer 2007:22). Along a similar line of 
argument, one can argue that powerful states are more autonomous, making their ability to 
resist pressure and defy international obligations stronger (Börzel et al. 2007:5-6). Hence, it 
naturally follows that external enforcement constraints are more costly for the economically 
and politically weak states. Based on this assumption, scholars expect that less powerful 
members ratifying IEAs are better compliers than their powerful adversaries. A competing 
assumption is that the more economic and political power a state has got, the more able it is to 
shape the legal framework according to its own preferences (Moravcsik 1997; Börzel et al. 
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2007). Thus, one should expect a better record of compliance to be seen among powerful 
states.  
In their study of member state compliance with EU law, Börzel et al. (2007) find 
support for the theoretical assumption that less powerful states are better complaints than their 
adversaries. Yet, this stand is challenged by Neumayer (2002), who argues, based on a 
quantitative study of reporting requirements under CITES7, that one can expect big and 
important signatory states to be better compliers than smaller, less important members. His 
line of argument is that the process to reach compliance should not be taken as a sign of 
outright concern, but rather as an indicator of state’s interest in demonstrating their 
importance in the world. The lack of consensus in the literature leads us to the following two 
hypotheses: 
 
H1: Compliance with the Montreal Protocol is more likely when the member state is weak. 
H2: Compliance with the Montreal Protocol is more likely among strong member states.  
 
3.3.2 Economic integration  
The more dependent a state is on sustaining a good relationship with the outside world, the 
more it will be in its interest to comply with an agreement one is member of. Consequently, 
globally and regionally integrated states should be more prone to adopt ambitious agreements 
as well as change their behaviour accordingly compared to their less integrated adversaries 
(Mitchell 2003:453; Haas 1998:29-30). Based on empirical studies conducted on trade and 
environment by Runge (1996), Vogel (1997) and Péchoux and Pouyet (2002), Bernhagen 
summarises the relationship between environmental records and openness to trade as 
ambiguous.  
 
“On the one hand, trade integration can increase environmental cooperation by promoting growth and 
technological development, thereby increasing public demands for environmental protection while 
reducing the pollution intensity of production. On the other hand, integration in global trade provides 
governments with incentives to keep the domestic cost burden on producers low, minimizing the costs 
to business from strong environmental regulation, and thereby depressing a country’s commitment to  
international environmental action” (Bernhagen 2008:92). 
 
As the first scholar to test this assumption quantitatively with regard to environmental 
compliance and participation, Bernhagen (2008) finds that trade dependence depresses IEA 
                                                 
7
 The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora. 
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participation significantly, whereas no significant effect on compliance can be concluded. 
However, the small sample is problematic, possibly making the detection of statistically 
significant results unnaturally hard. The theoretical differences lead to the following two 
hypotheses: 
 
H3: Higher levels of integration in the world economy raise the propensity for compliance 
with the Montreal accord.  
H4: Higher levels of integration in the world economy lower the likelihood of member 
compliance with the Montreal Protocol. 
 
3.4 The managerial school 
Opposed to the realist focus on a lack of willingness, the managerialists8 focus on the states’ 
lack of ability to comply with international accords. The managerial school is a branch within 
the institutionalist IR approach. The literature has focused on three main sources of 
involuntary defiance: weak or lacking state capacities, ambiguous and indeterminate treaty 
language and the temporal dimension tied to social and economic changes following treaty 
obligations (Chayes and Chayes 1993:188-197; Chayes and Chayes 1995; Haas et al. 1993; 
Brown Weiss and Jacobson 1998; Börzel et al. 2007; Breitmeier et al. 2006). Most of the 
empirical work on compliance has concluded that state capacity is decisive. This section will 
focus merely on state capacity and social and economic changes, as the treaty language apply 
similarly to all members of the accord, and therefore cannot account for cross-national 
variation. There are many factors that may influence state capacity, directly as well as 
indirectly. First, government capacity and autonomy is considered, followed by political 
regime, and economic development, which both make up a broader framework that restricts a 
state’s freedom of movement in the international sphere. Lastly, the importance of legal origin 
is discussed as it frames the legal system through which international law is domesticated.  
 
3.4.1 Government autonomy and capacity 
Because the literature that considers state capacity uses the concept differently, an important 
divide between government autonomy and government capacity is introduced (Simmons 1998; 
Börzel et al. 2007). Government autonomy emphasises the dynamic between domestic 
institutional structures and partisan veto players. The underlying logic is that as the amount of 
institutional veto players increases, the state is less efficient in making and implementing 
                                                 
8
 The designation “managerial school” was first introduced by Downs et al. (1996). 
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national policies that comply with costly international prescriptions (Börzel et al. 2007:8; 
Haverland 2000; Giuliani 2003). As influential veto players come to the fore, the likelihood of 
a state moving into compliance decreases. Haverland (2000) finds support for the paralysing 
effect veto players can have in his case study of implementation of the Packaging Waste 
Directive imposed on the member states by the EU. He concludes that the timing and quality 
of compliance depends on the opposition met by institutional veto players when running the 
directive through the national political system. Similarly, Giuliani (2003:152) finds that the 
degree of national adaption to the EU decreases as the number of veto players increase, as 
they increase internal decision-making costs and creates less flexibility and effectiveness in 
the policy-making system. 
Government capacity comprises a state’s ability to act, based on financial endowments 
and human resources (Cameron et al. 1996:49). Still, sufficient endowments do not 
automatically mean full compliance. Dispersed resources may make coordination difficult, 
independent of the endowments available. Also, connected to state capacity is the existence of 
corruption. The more corruption is present in a society, the harder it is to secure that 
endowments are effectively managed. I thus hypothesise that a society driven through a high 
degree of corruption is more prone to defect than a society where corruption is insignificant. 
The presentation above allows us to assume a positive relationship between 
government capacity and government autonomy and state compliance, as well as a negative 
effect of corruption on compliance. An influential study by Brown Weiss and Jacobson (1998) 
has compared state compliance for eight countries with five environmental accords through 
ten years9. They conclude, in harmony with the managerial school, that administrative 
capacity is a crucial variable when seeking to explain compliance. Supporting such findings, 
Simmons (1998:83) writes: “[l]acking such administrative or technical capacities, rule-
consistent behaviour may simply not be within a signatory’s choice set.” Taking such 
assumptions as their starting point, Haas, Keohane et al. (1993) argue that the main function 
of international agreements, next to introducing obligations to signatory states, is to facilitate 
a minimum performance for states who lack the resources or endowments necessary for 
compliance. The above discussion allows three hypotheses to be formulated: 
 
                                                 
9
 The eight countries under scrutiny were; Brazil, Cameroon, China, Hungary, India, Japan, the Soviet 
Union/Russian Federation, the United States as well as the European Union. The five treaties chosen were; The 
World heritage Convention, CITES, the International Tropical Timber Agreement, the London Ocean Dumping 
Convention and the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer.   
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H5: Compliance with the Montreal covenant is more likely when the degree of government 
autonomy is strong. 
H6: Compliance with the Montreal Protocol is more likely when the degree of government 
capacity is strong. 
H7: The probability of compliance with the Montreal accord increases adversely with the 
range of corruption in society. 
 
 
3.4.2 Political regime 
The importance of political regime for economic growth and social welfare is a well studied 
phenomenon among political scientists. The regime’s role for compliance with international 
regimes, however, is less theorised. Beth A. Simmons (1998) introduces us to an approach she 
names democratic legalism. The assumption is that democratic regimes are more likely to 
comply with international legal obligations than autocracies. The mindset behind this 
argument is based on the tendency among democracies to be bound into a ‘zone of law’ in 
their meeting with the legal frameworks on the arena of international cooperation (Simmons 
1998:83). Their respect for judicial processes and constitutional limitations on governing 
power makes democratic rulers more prone to accept rule-based constraints on their behaviour 
in the international sphere, especially so if the judiciary is independent. Thus, Simmons 
(1998:84) conclude that: “liberal democracies are more likely than are other regime types to 
revere law, promote compromise, and respect processes of adjudication.”  
Young (1979) and Neumayer (2002) also argue that democracies should exhibit 
stronger IEA commitment than their autocratic adversaries. Their argumentation, however, 
hinges on another kind of reasoning. According to Neumayer; 
 
“(…) in democracies citizens are better informed about environmental problems (freedom of press) and 
can better express their environmental concerns and demands (freedom of speech), which will facilitate 
an organization of environmental interests (freedom of association), which will in turn put pressure on 
policy entrepreneurs operating in a competitive political system to respond positively to these demands 
(freedom of vote), both domestically as well as via international cooperation” (Neumayer 2002:140) 
 
For Neumayer, the core of the positive link between democracy and international 
environmental commitment is that environmentalists can influence policy-makers. Simmons, 
however, sees the constraints on power by law as the decisive driving force creating a positive 
link between democracy and environmental compliance. 
 Some theorists also find it likely that democracies might not be as positive for the 
environment as one might think. As liberal democracies are built around a capitalist system, 
 18 
private property rights and individual liberty are cornerstones in a free society. Maximising 
profit for one self through economic advancement is thus a self-evident right, whereas the 
environment might suffer severely from such a mentality10 (Neumayer 2002; Desai 1998). 
Political economists also raise this concern, arguing that the short-lived character of a 
democratic government forces politicians to have dual goals; both pleasing the population and 
winning the next election. This narrow time prospect underlying the politicians’ policy 
recommendations break with the necessity of long-term, non-myopic planning to combat 
environmental problems (Lafferty and Meadowcroft 1996:268-271; Keech 1996). 
 Turning to empirical studies, most scholars find a positive relationship between 
democracy and different environmental issues. In one of the first empirical contributions to 
this field, Congleton (1992) finds that when controlling for other variables, democracies are 
more likely to sign the Vienna Convention and the Montreal Protocol. Still, the same 
democracies show statistically higher methane and CFC emission rates. Such a 
multidimensional relationship  is also supported by Midlarsky (1998). Brown Weiss and 
Jacobson (1998:532-534) find, in their comparative study, support for the assumption that 
democracies are positive for compliance. They emphasize both independent courts and public 
influence as important features promoting member accession. Still, evidence also show that 
environmental action might be hampered or delayed in democracies as government must 
respond to the public will, which may not be in favour of environmental commitments. Strong 
support for the theorised positive relationship is found in Neumayer’s (2002) cross-national 
study of environmental commitment with four IEAs11. He observes that regardless of 
operationalisation, democracy enhances environmental performance. This makes him 
conclude: “All other things being equal, a more democratic world will also be a world with 
stronger environmental commitment” (Neumayer 2002:158). From this discussion the 
following hypothesis can be deduced:  
 
H8: Higher levels of democracy raise the likelihood of compliance with the Montreal 
Protocol.           
    
                                                 
10
 Of course, capitalism is also found in authoritarian states. The difference is that here, private property and 
individual rights are often restricted to a small elite in practice, whereas it in democracies is supposed to 
comprise all citizens. 
11
 The Environmental agreements studied were; the Kyoto Protocol, the Montreal Protocol, the Rotterdam 
Convention and the Cartagena Protocol. 
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3.4.3 Economic development 
The effect of economic development on environmental degradation was first put out by the 
World Bank Development Report in 1992 and has since then been assigned the name ‘the 
Environmental Kuznets curve’, with a clear reference to the theories of income inequality put 
forward by Kuznets (1955), showing a U-shaped inverted pattern. Briefly, the shape of the 
curve shows us that as poor states become richer, they first increase environmental pressures 
until a turning point is reached. From this point on, the relationship changes from negative to 
positive and continued economic advances reduce environmental damage (Panayotou 
2003:45-46). Grossman and Krueger (1995:370-371) find in their influential work that despite 
natural variation in the turning point for different pollutants, environmental degradation tends 
to start decreasing as a state reaches an income rate of $8000 per capita. They thus provide 
support for a curvilinear relationship between economic development and compliance. 
Despite the consensus in the early 1990s with regard to this relationship, more recent 
empirical assessments are critical of assigning a particular shape to all pollutants and across 
all countries. Re-examining the World Bank and Grossman and Krueger analyses with more 
recent data, Harbaugh et al. (2002) find that the evidence for an inverted-U relationship is 
weak. Their reassessment shows that both the turning point and the very shape of the 
relationship between development and different pollutants are sensitive to only small changes 
in the data. Panayotou (2003) points out that despite the established empirical relationship 
found, it is not higher income per se that creates environmental improvement. Rather, it is the 
responsiveness to the increased demand for protection of the environment.  
Jänicke (1992:53) postulates that high levels of economic development is favourable 
for environmental protection because richer countries sees a substantial drop in the number of 
people working with industrial production as the service industries turn dominant. As for 
environmental awareness, the author argues that education and increased leisure promote 
change in values and offers better preconditions for environmental mobilisation. Another 
empirical study finds that an increased standard of living show little discernible effect on 
implementation and compliance with the IEAs under scrutiny. Economic collapse, on the 
other hand, turned out to have a profound effect, but mainly indirectly as limited resources 
and rapid inflation rates made the customs inspectors more inclined to allow illicit trade in 
endangered species in exchange for a return service, often money12 (Brown Weiss and 
Jacobson 1998:530-531).  
                                                 
12
 The study found that Cameroon and Russia failed to continue being in compliance with the CITES regime in  
the wake of the economic chaos that both member states experienced in the mid-1980s 
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There are complex processes lying behind the change from a traditional through an 
industrial to a modern society. Hence, one should keep in mind that whichever effect is found 
between economic development and IEA compliance, what lies behind is immense changes in 
society permeating all levels of a citizen’s life. This allows us to create the following 
hypotheses: 
 
H9: Increases in economic development first decrease the likelihood of compliance with the 
Montreal Protocol before the effect turns and continued economic advancement sees an 
increased chance of reaching compliance. 
H10: The likelihood of compliance with the Montreal Protocol increases the richer the state. 
 
3.4.4 Legal origin 
In the literature on compliance, the importance of culture and tradition is often evaluated 
through a country’s legal system. The assumption is that the more litigious and complex the 
legal system is, the more likely the member state is to be a non-complier. La Porta et al. (1999) 
distinguish between five types of legal origin; Common law, French civil law, German civil 
law, Scandinavian civil law and Socialist law. In the literature on EU-compliance, the 
Scandinavian civil law model is considered the most effective in their treatment of disputes as 
well as being respectful to international law. This record makes scholars assume that 
compliance with EU law happens quicker here (Perkins and Neumayer 2007:25-26).  
 Taking a broader approach to the importance of national legal systems, Simmons 
(2000) tests compliance with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). She finds that French 
civil law as well as Socialist law is inferior to the other systems at securing property rights, 
significantly decreasing a member state’s probability of moving into compliance with IMF 
law. Furthermore, the same two groups of legal systems are expected to have the lowest level 
of government efficiency, further reducing the chances of compliance. In socialist law this 
finding is based on the argument that the extreme power of the state corrupts the bureaucracy, 
whereas the French civil law system’s inefficiency hinges on a too autonomous bureaucracy 
(Glaeser and Schleifer 2002; La Porta et al. 1999:231-233).  
 Based on the empirical assessments of the importance of legal origin for compliance, I 
expect to find that member states practising Socialist law or French civil law will perform 
worse than Common law, German civil law and Scandinavian civil law when compliance 
with an environmental accord is considered.  
 
H11:  The likelihood of reaching compliance with the Montreal Protocol declines if 
the member state has a French civil law or a Socialist law model. 
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3.5 The legitimacy school 
Opposing the enforcement and management schools’ understanding of non-compliance as a 
matter of power or capacity, scholars based in the constructivist branch of IR focus on the 
importance of legitimacy through social learning and persuasion (Checkel 2001; Simmons 
1998). They agree with the enforcement schools’ assumption that compliance is strategic, 
implying a matter of choice. However, the mechanism through which this happens, vary 
substantially. The legitimacy school considers international agreements to be social constructs, 
and thus they argue that compliance should be analyzed with a focus on communication 
between agents. Consequently, scholars assume that states comply with international law 
because they feel a moral obligation to do so, a so called ‘logic of appropriateness’ (Checkel 
2001:557). Checkel (2001) introduces two causal mechanisms through which social actors 
internalise international norms; social mobilisation and social learning. The work on social 
mobilisation focuses on how domestic and international interest groups may promote pressure 
on state policy makers, utilising international norms13 (Checkel 2001:557-560). Through the 
mechanism of social learning, preferences are altered in a more lasting manner, for example 
through compliance pull from other compliant states, acceptance of the rule-setting 
institutions as well as persuasion and learning through deliberative argumentations where 
demands and threats are absent. (Börzel et al. 2007:10-12; Checkel 2001:560-564). The 
theories and hypotheses presented in the following section all relate to this constructivist idea 
of the importance of norm-driven behaviour for understanding signatory state compliance. 
Public opinion, Environmental Non-Governmental Organisations (ENGOs) and green and 
left-libertarian parties are assumed to influence political attitudes. Moreover, the length of 
membership, both of the Montreal Protocol and the EU, are assumed to affect the 
internalisation of norms. Lastly, compliance pull from neighbouring states is theorised to 
affect states through persuasion and social learning. 
 
3.5.1 Public opinion 
Connected to the social mobilisation theory of the legitimacy school, compliance with an 
international environmental accord is considered to be higher the more concerned the 
population is with the problem at hand (Haas 1998:28). Brown Weiss and Jacobson (1998:29-
30) point out that if the public thinks of an IEA as important and that environmental 
regulation is needed, then the government will be more inclined to pursue policies securing 
                                                 
13
 This type of “social sanctioning” against defectors have a realist touch to it as norms are not internalised; they 
merely constrain state behaviour. 
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compliance in the long run. They point out that public support for environmentalist issues 
suddenly became salient in the US in the early 1970s and in Europe during the second half of 
the 1980s. The close link between the rising concern with environmental issues and the wave 
of IEAs introduced in this time period should not be underestimated. Still, the environmental 
issue constantly fights with other political issues for attention, and the trend is that when the 
economy fares well, the relative importance of environmentalism grows, but as economic 
hardship comes, economic concerns get higher salience. Supporting these theoretical 
considerations, Brown Weiss and Jacobson (1998) find in their qualitative study of five IEAs 
that the importance of public opinion coupled with media coverage turned out as very 
important in persuading national authorities to act according to IEA norms. 
 
H12: The likelihood of member compliance with the Montreal accord increases as the 
population acknowledges the agreement as important. 
 
3.5.2 Montreal Protocol membership length 
Understanding the nature of compliance without taking time into consideration is hard. Most 
scholars working empirically with this concept see compliance with regimes as improving 
over time as norms are accepted and internalised, increasing the legitimacy of an accord. In 
this, there is a strong case to be made for the constructivist theory of the importance of social 
learning processes. Brown Weiss and Jacobson (1998:512, 537-542) find that: “the trend over 
the decades was toward greater compliance.” The mechanism through which this happens is 
an overall increased attention to implementation and compliance, as well as a strengthening of 
the supervisory mechanisms and compliance pull by other members taking a leading role. 
Breitmeier et al. (2006:71) find the same converging pattern of compliance over time in their 
study of 23 IEAs. Still, they only include what they have defined as important members in 
each agreement, and thus they do not represent the wide range of members in the agreements. 
Haas’ (1998:29) study of compliance with EU directives assigns a role to maturity as well. He 
argues that the political will to comply increases over time as EU institutional factors gain 
more influence on domestic factors. Thus, implementing a time dimension into the analysis to 
comprehend its importance, as well as measuring the chain of causality, seems valuable.  
 
H13: The likelihood of compliance with the Montreal Protocol increases the longer the time 
since the state ratified the agreement. 
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3.5.3 EU membership length 
One of the biggest achievements of the European Union project has been to create more 
interdependence between member countries. Based on this regional integration, Mitchell 
(2003:453) theorises that EU-members are more prone to adopt ambitious agreements and 
change behaviour according to IEAs more easily than less integrated states. This also follows 
from the fact that the EU is a contracting member to many environmental accords and has 
even taken on a global leadership role in some of these. As the EU signs binding treaties, it 
affects all member states as they are expected to live up to the standards set in Brussels (Grant 
et al. 2000:89-119). 
 Also, when considering compliance with EU-directives, a reputational effect has been 
introduced as a possible explanation for why there exists variation with regard to compliance. 
Giuliani (2003:146-147) argues that new EU-entrants are better compliers than older ones. 
This hinges on the assumption that new members wish to show themselves as dependable and 
responsible collaborators and create legitimacy among the other members. Thus, they are 
expected to make bigger efforts to implement and comply with IEA law. Support for this 
hypothesis is found in Perkins and Neumayers’ (2007) study of implementation of EU 
environmental directives where a quantitative analysis confirm that recent entrants see less 
legal infringements. They thus contend that well-established members feel comfortable in 
their seats as they have shown themselves as reliable partners over a long period of time. 
Hence, they might defend national economic interests over EU environmental law.  
 Contradicting the abovementioned chain of causality, some constructivists inspired by 
the social movements’ literature argue that the relationship between membership length and 
compliance is reverse. Checkel (2001) argues that the causal mechanism behind this 
assumption is that through social interaction, other member states and international actors 
help infringing states into adherence with the norms of the organisation and thus towards 
compliance. However, Checkel (2001:567-568) points out that domestic institutions influence 
whether the change in agent interest towards compliance happens through learning, 
persuasion or social sanctioning. Inherent in the social learning theory is the assumption that 
such learning happens over time. Thus, one should expect that with time, norms and rules are 
more likely to be internalised by the member states, and through this a move towards 
compliance should be observed. This theoretical review allows for three hypotheses:  
 
H14: The propensity for compliance with the Montreal Protocol increases if the member state 
is an EU-member. 
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H15: Young members to the EU are more likely to be in compliance with the Montreal 
Protocol than older members. 
H16: The longer a state has been an EU-member, the more likely it is to comply with the 
Montreal covenant. 
 
3.5.4 Environmental Non-Governmental Organisations  
The role of ENGOs in global environmental politics has been heavily studied, mainly through 
qualitative studies (e.g. Brown Weiss and Jacobson 1998; DeSombre 2000; Jänicke and 
Weidner 1997; Haverland 2000). Scholars theorise that national and international ENGOs 
create a compliance pull on authorities and policy makers (Breitmeier et al. 2006; Axelrod et 
al. 2005; Brown Weiss and Jacobson 1998; Young 1979; Checkel 2001; Haas et al. 1993; 
Andresen and Gulbrandsen 2003; Cameron et al. 1996). Both Breitmeier (2006), Young et al. 
(2006:104) and Brown Weiss and Jacobson (1998) find in their empirical studies of 
environmental accords that the presence of ENGOs is positive for compliance. The latter 
scholars found that because democracies provide ENGOs with freedom to operate, 
transnational coalitions lobbying for improving government compliance efforts are 
established. This tendency has been strengthened from the 1970s to the 1990s. Haas et al. 
(1993), in their influential study of seven IEAs, confirms and adds further qualifications to the 
already mentioned empirically based assumptions. They conclude:  
 
“[i]f there is one key variable accounting for policy change, it is the degree of domestic 
environmentalist pressure in major industrialized democracies, not the decision-making rules of the 
relevant international institutions” (Haas et al. 1993:14).  
 
Environmental groups, then, are expected to have a positive effect on signatory state’s 
compliance with the Montreal Protocol. This leaves us with a new hypothesis: 
 
H17: Compliance with the Montreal agreement is more likely among member states where 
active ENGOs operate with success 
 
3.5.5 Political orientation 
In a constructivist context, the success of green and left-libertarian political parties can be 
held as an indication on how citizens evaluate the importance of environmental issues. The 
bigger these parties are, the more environmentally concerned the population. Bernhagen 
(2008) argues that green party popularity is a proxy variable reflecting the view a member 
state population has on the importance of avoiding environmental deterioration through 
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complying with IEAs. He finds evidence for the importance of green party popularity when 
considering IEA implementation, but the effect is not significant for member compliance. 
Furthermore, Jänicke (1992; Jänicke and Weidner 1997) finds weak results for the green seats 
theory. In his first review of conditions for environmental policy success, Jänicke (1992:49) 
renders little influence to green parties. In his more recent publishing, Jänicke and Weidner 
(1997:306-307) are more moderate, concluding that according to 13 case studies on 
environmental policy making, green parties are no necessary condition for implementation 
even though they may have a positive effect. They argue that part of its lacking influence is 
due to unfavourable electoral systems that obstructs their high voting potential from 
materialising. 
Neumayer (2003) considers the combined strength of green and left-libertarian parties 
and finds, in his panel analysis of air pollution in OECD countries, that “green or left-
libertarian parliamentary strength is unambiguously and robustly associated with lower 
pollution levels for all five air pollutants (…)” (Neumayer 2003:218). He explains the robust 
results by arguing that even though green parties are small in most countries, their influence 
stems from their success in forcing governments to take environmental concerns seriously. 
When concerned with left-wing party strength alone, Neumayer (2003) observes that the 
association with lower pollution levels are less consistent and robust, although it too point in a 
positive direction. Jänicke (1992:49) supports these findings with regard to the left-wing 
parties, arguing that: “in international comparison, left-wing governments as a whole do more 
for the environment than those on the right wing.” Because there are varying assumptions and 
findings with regard to the effect of green and left-libertarian parties, two separate hypotheses 
are introduced in an attempt to single out their isolated effects.  
 
H18: Green party popularity raises the likelihood of compliance with the Montreal accord. 
H19: Left-libertarian executives raise the likelihood of compliance with the Montreal 
Protocol. 
 
3.5.6 Regional compliance 
In the democratisation literature, Doorenspleet (2004) focuses on the importance of 
democracy in the region for the propensity of a state becoming democratic. In the 
international regimes literature, such an argument has not been particularly prominent. 
However, Simmons (2000) argues that one should consider the effect of a regional 
compliance pull. In her event history analysis of commitment and compliance with IMF, she 
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finds statistical evidence for the hypothesis that a state is more likely to move into compliance 
if the contiguous countries already are compliers. Hence, she concludes that: “[o]ne of the 
most interesting findings is that the behaviour of other countries, especially in one’s own 
region, has far more influence on commitment and compliance than has generally been 
recognized” (Simmons 2000:832). Simmons’ findings serve as an argument for a 
constructivist inspired argument in close relation to the social learning theories introduced 
earlier. Thus, a hypothesis is developed for empirical research: 
 
H20: The likelihood of reaching compliance with the Montreal Protocol increases if the 
region the member state belongs to is one of generally good levels of compliance. 
 
3.6 Summary of arguments and hypotheses 
Table 1 summarises the theorised effects of each variable on the likelihood of member state 
compliance with the Montreal Protocol. 
 
Table 1: Expected effects on member state compliance with the Montreal Protocol 
 Expected effect 
Enforcement factors  
     Country Strength +/- 
     Integration in world economy +/- 
Managerial factors  
     Government autonomy + 
     Government capacity + 
     Corruption - 
     Democracy + 
     Level of economic development +/- 
     French Civil law - 
     Socialist law - 
Legitimacy factors  
     Public attitude towards Protocol + 
     MP-membership length + 
     EU-membership length +/- 
     Active environmental NGOs + 
     Green party popularity + 
     Left-libertarian executive + 
     Regional compliance + 
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Founded on an assumption of states as rational actors, some authors argue that powerful states 
are more likely to be bad compliers based on the international autonomy they exhibit. Others 
contend that powerful states are good compliers because they see this as an opportunity of 
showing their importance in the world. Turning to economic integration, opposing views also 
exist. Whereas some postulate that highly integrated states are better compliers because they 
depend on a good reputation internationally, others contend that the same countries have great 
incentives to keep production costs at a minimum to attract companies and investors, and this 
does not allow for environmental commitments.  
Focusing on states’ ability to comply, scholars agree that the more autonomous a 
government is from society, the more effectively it can rule, thus the faster compliance. 
Government capacity, seen through endowments and human resources, is also theorised to be 
positive for a state’s compliance record. Corruption, on the other hand, is assumed to reduce a 
signatory state’s compliance merit.  A democratic state is taken to be a better complier than 
its authoritarian adversary. Likewise, resources are important to be able to comply, and even 
though scholars disagree on the shape of the relationship, there is consensus with regard to 
economic development’s positive influence on the chance of living up to the Montreal 
Protocol’s demands. A state’s legal system is also assumed to impact on compliance chances. 
Here, Socialist law and French civil law is hypothesised to fare worse than other judicial 
systems based mainly on low efficiency. 
The last group of theories are based on the understanding that social learning and 
legitimacy pushes compliance. Public support for IEAs is thus assumed to be positive for 
compliance. Furthermore, states that have been members to the Montreal Protocol for a while 
are assumed to be better compliers than newcomers because they have internalised the 
underlying norms. EU-membership length is also hypothesised to be influential on 
compliance both in a negative and positive way. Some scholars assume that new entrants will 
be preoccupied with appearing as responsible and reliable partners, and thus comply, whereas 
others argue that mature members are more likely to be in compliance because they have had 
more time to internalise laws and move into adherence. The importance of a compliance pull 
from ENGOs for compliance has also been underlined by scholars. Also, political orientation 
is postulated to play a role in the compliance process. Both green seats in parliament as well 
as left-libertarians in government are assumed to push national politics in a more 
environmental-friendly direction. Lastly, a theory on the importance of regional compliance 
for own adherence materialise in a hypothesis that the higher compliance rates in a region, the 
more likely a non-compliant state is to follow. 
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4.0 Methodology: Event history analysis 
This section will connect the theoretical discussion in chapter three with the methodological 
framework for the analysis. The term methodology is here understood as; “the means scholars 
employ to increase confidence that the inferences they make about the social and political 
world are valid” (Hall 2003:373). First, the choice of a quantitative model will be argued for, 
followed by an introduction of the case selection that proved necessary. Furthermore, the 
logic of an event history model will be introduced, before an introduction to the specific 
model of choice is presented and thoroughly discussed. 
 
4.1 Choosing a quantitative model 
 To be able to draw proper inferences from the data, identifying a determinate research design 
is crucial (King et al. 1994:9, 118-124). In my research question I ask which factors affect 
member state compliance with international environmental accords. This point of departure 
implies two things; first, member state behaviour must be analysed, and secondly, a process 
across time is necessary to see how party compliance changes. The cross-unit and cross-time 
dimensions embodied in my research question, implies the ability of causal inference to be 
made. Mitchell (2004:140-143) points out that longitudinal studies able to point at causal 
relationships are highly needed, but lacking because of theoretical and empirical obstacles. 
According to King, Keohane and Verba (1994:75-97), causal processes with high certainty 
can best be traced through quantitative approaches. Thus, I have decided to utilise a 
quantitative model labelled event history analysis.  
Next to enabling causal inferences, the quantitative method’s main strength is its 
ability to draw parsimonious conclusions from big amounts of information (George and 
Bennett 2005:30-31; King et al. 1994). As I include all signatory states (196 states) to the 
Montreal Protocol and follow them over the course of time, a large-N study is best at 
deducing clear and meaningful inferences based on the large sample in this thesis.   
When choosing a quantitative design, I sacrifice the advantages connected with the 
qualitative approach. As pointed out frequently, a problem with researchers applying a 
quantitative method, as opposed to a qualitative design, is that they do not possess in-depth 
knowledge of their many cases (Hall 2003; McKeown 1999; Ragin 2004; Gerring 2004). 
Lacking knowledge about the units of the phenomenon under scrutiny might lead to bias. At 
 29 
its worst, it might lead to model misspecifications with regard to internal validity14. Sartori 
(1970:1040-1046) underlines the importance of conceptualising the theories so broadly that 
empirical testing can be made on the whole sample, but narrow enough to be able to say 
something substantial about the world, as is. He thus warns against moving to such a high 
level of abstraction that conclusions are made that do not reflect the nature of the research 
object. However, I try to mitigate these shortcomings through establishing a firm research 
design as well as taking question of validity and reliability serious. 
As a reminder, I end this section by repeating what I seek to do with my thesis, and 
contrasting this with what I do not intend to do. I wish to be able to say something about how 
states behave with regard to binding processes in the international sphere, more in particular, 
with IEAs. To absorb the notion of behaviour in my analyses, I focus on understanding what 
makes some member states comply early while some become laggards and others do not 
comply at all. This being said, I am not interested in explaining how much is achieved from a 
given environmental regime in total progress, nor do I regard the implementation process of 
an IEA as important for my study. These considerations are different processes than the 
evolution of compliance, and consequently should also be treated separately.  
Furthermore, my focus is on parties to, or members of, IEAs15. This means that I am 
not conducting research on non-members to the agreements under scrutiny. I therefore follow 
Chayes and Chayes (1993; 1995) assuming that agreements matter inherently in pushing for 
change, and that the compliance processes seen within an environmental agreement differs 
from the pattern of behaviour seen among non-members. This assumption has been criticised 
under the label the endogeneity problem, and is according to Mitchell (2003) and Downs 
(1996:382-287) a problem to the entire area of research. The argument is that there exists a 
bias in the entire branch of research because only countries that have already become member 
to an agreement are put under scrutiny. If one assumes that: “[a]greements are signed only by 
those states that are ready to limit environmental harm – and only when they are ready to do 
so” (Mitchell 2003:453), there is no surprise that the research come to such positive 
conclusions about how IEA matter per se. This is a valid critique of the paradigm that should 
be taken into concern when considering studies within this school of research. However, my 
motivation for this thesis is a wish to understand what makes signatory states comply with the 
                                                 
14
 Adcock and Collier (2001:529) name this type of validity “measurement validity”, and define it as: “(…) 
whether operationalisation and the scoring of cases adequately reflect the concept the researcher seeks to 
measure.” 
15
 In the IR literature, members to international accords are identified as Parties to an agreement. Yet, in this 
thesis I consistently avoid using the word party when talking about the member states. This is done to avoid 
confusion as party is used in this thesis with the meaning political party.  
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regimes they are members of. Accordingly, my focus is not on the importance of agreements 
alone, but on what make their members comply. Thus, I acknowledge the presented critique, 
but I do not feel that this thesis is up against the wall as the interest here lies in understanding 
state behaviour.  
 
4.2 Case selection – choosing the Montreal Protocol  
When I have chosen to study one protocol from one environmental accord, it reflects a 
compromise between wanting to compare as many agreements as possible and developing a 
framework for research that is feasible within the time and scope limits of a master thesis. 
According to Barrett (2003:135), there were 225 IEAs in force by the start of the new 
millennium16, and a protocol is only a component of an IEA. As mentioned earlier, the 
Montreal Protocol is part of the Stratospheric Ozone Regime which was initiated by the 
Vienna Convention in 1985. Then the Montreal Protocol came as the first binding framework 
on the Parties. Following the Protocol, four legally binding amendments have been adapted, 
respectively in London (1990), Copenhagen (1992), Montreal (1997) and Beijing (1999) 
(Andresen et al. 2008:61).  
Studying only one protocol from an environmental regime may be problematic as so 
much information regarding the IEA is lost. However, to enable concrete regime goals that 
can be measured in a quantitative manner, it was necessary to move down ‘the ladder of 
abstraction’ (Sartori 1970) and choose one protocol to reflect the phenomenon of compliance. 
Since studying a single case entails a lack of representativeness, and there is a selection bias 
present in my choice of study object, the external validity in this study is weakened (Geddes 
1990). I thus loose the ability to generalise my findings to the rest of the population of IEAs. I 
argue that despite this qualification, which is considered to be one of the great advantages of 
quantitative research, my study is important. It is one of the first attempts to analyse state 
behaviour within the realm of international environmental accords statistically17. Furthermore, 
the focus from the IR-scholars has mainly been on effectiveness of environmental regimes 
(Underdal and Young 2004; Miles et al. 2002; Ringquist and Kostadinova 2005; Victor et al. 
1998; Young 1999; Breitmeier et al. 2006). Here the research units have been agreements, and 
consequently the amount of quantitative research done on effectiveness is of little use for the 
scholars wishing to explain member state compliance.  
                                                 
16
 Most of the IEAs in this review were regional, though. 
17
 A notable exception is Bernhagen (2008). 
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 When only studying one case, the choice of the Montreal Protocol should be properly 
advocated for. George and Bennett (2005:83) state: “the primary criterion for case selection 
should be relevance to the research objective of the study (…).” I argue that the Montreal 
Protocol is relevant and important because it inhabits a role as a crucial case within the IEA 
literature. As the success story of effective international environmental governance, 
agreements ratified in recent history have built upon a similar regime framework for 
maximising success (Andresen et al. 2008:67-68). Despite holding such a brand, the observed 
variance with regard to state behaviour is intriguing. This serves as an indication that even 
with the most effective IEA legal framework in place, states do not move in a monotonous 
process towards compliance. It is clear then, that factors external to the agreement play a role 
in this process, and that the institutional aspects do not paint the whole picture. Basing my 
analysis on the success story, I argue that the findings will give empirically rich insights into 
the extralegal factors driving compliance. Though the findings can not be directly transferred 
to other IEAs, the knowledge attained from studying compliance with the Montreal Protocol 
might tell us something about which national factors might be present in a compliance process 
and thus introduce valuable policy recommendations. 
 Also, I find it valuable to use one of the most heavily theorised IEAs as starting point 
for my statistical analysis, as it is interesting to see how the study I conduct corresponds with 
the theory that has focused on overall treaty compliance or effectiveness.  
 Lastly, there is a data aspect inherent in the choice of case. Few of the IEAs have 
proper reporting procedures allowing for an effective measuring of compliance. Even those 
regimes that do have reporting procedures are paralysed by incomplete and missing data as a 
result of reporting neglect in member countries. For the Montreal Protocol, data records are 
good as annual reports are demanded from all member states. Also, the protocol is supervised 
by the UNEP, providing necessary resources to provide online databases where emissions 
data can be accessed. These data are crucial for the operationalisation of compliance. 
 
4.3 Event history analysis 
The event history analysis originated in biology, by biostatisticians analyzing the occurrence 
of deaths, and is probably better known under the label survival analysis18. It is a quantitative 
                                                 
18
 Event history analysis has also been labelled failure time analysis, hazard analysis, transition analysis, 
reliability analysis and duration analysis (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004:2). However, this thesis will 
consistently use the designation event history analysis. 
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method, involving statistical examination of longitudinal data gathered on a set of 
observations (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004:1-5). The starting assumption of event 
history analysis is that the duration spent in a state is related to the likelihood of experiencing 
some event at a certain point in time. In political science, the use of event history modelling 
has traditionally been scarce. Blossfeld et al. (1989:25) argue that the absence is due to an 
inability among social science researchers to use methods of dynamic analysis. Hall 
(2003:375) agrees, maintaining that “the ontologies19 of comparative politics have 
substantially outrun its methodologies.” Yet, the last two decades have seen a growing body 
of longitudinal data, rendering event history research available. To illustrate its recent 
visibility, Golub (2008) finds 84 cases of event history analysis published in leading political 
science journals20 over the time period 1989-2005. Still, the numbers are not overwhelming, 
signifying that even today, the method is far from common within political science research.  
The very nature of social phenomena makes this model attractive, as many social 
science theories have an explicit or implicit interest in notions of timing and change. 
Criminologists are concerned with crimes, convictions and recidivism. Sociologists study job 
changes, layoffs and retirements, and demographers focus on marriages, divorce and deaths. 
Similarly, political scientists give much attention to riots, revolutions and changes of 
government. In each of these examples, an event occurs at a specific point in time, leading to 
a substantial change in the units experiencing it (Allison 1984:9-10).  The longitudinal aspect 
often embedded in research questions makes the consideration of event history analysis 
natural for social scientists.  
Turning to my particular research question, event history analysis is considered 
preferable for studying compliance with the Montreal Protocol because it can model both 
whether a member state complies with the agreement, as well as the amount of time that 
elapses before an affiliate has fulfilled the demands necessary to be labelled complier to the 
accord. As my thesis is mainly interested in the relationship between the length of the process 
towards compliance and independent variables21, it is these variables’ effect on the likelihood 
of reaching compliance which is in focus. Thus, the amount of time member states use to 
                                                 
19
 Ontology refers to “the world as it actually is” (Hall 2003:374). 
20
 The following journals were under scrutiny: American Political Science Review, American Journal of Political 
Science, International Organization, World Politics, Journal of Politics, International Studies Quarterly, 
Journal of Conflict Resolution, Comparative Political Studies, Journal of Peace Research, Political Research 
Quarterly and British Journal of Political Science.  
21
 The designations ‘independent variable’, ‘explanatory variable’ and ‘covariate’ will be used interchangeably 
throughout this thesis. 
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move from non-compliance to compliance is in itself not relevant for the research question 
posed in this thesis.  
I find it justifiable to assume the process towards compliance with the Montreal 
Protocol to be a unidirectional process. The nature of the phenomenon I am studying makes it 
unlikely that parties will come into compliance with the Protocols they have signed, only to 
disregard them and break with the agreement at a later point in time. The Montreal Protocol 
creates legal limitations to production as well as consumption of the products comprised in 
the accord. This means that the industry is forced to manufacture new products for the market. 
Once the technology is “out there” to replace the pollutants in the Protocol, the demand for 
contaminants also decreases. In the end, there is little left of the polluting products in the 
market, as intermediaries have replaced them. Based on the assumption of unidirectionality of 
compliance, a single-spell model is utilised in this thesis. This means that an event can only 
happen a single time for each unit before it exits the sample. Thus, when a member state has 
reduced the emissions level enough to be considered in compliance with the Montreal 
Protocol, it is no longer part of the analysis because its development has been tracked and it is 
not considered to move out of compliance again. 
  
4.3.1 Defending the choice of model 
In the process of answering the research question asked, I considered three quantitative 
techniques. Next to event history analysis, the logistic regression and the panel analysis were 
studied. Thus, a discussion of why the event history model was chosen is necessary.  
 First, associate compliance with the Montreal Protocol implies a process, indicating 
the dependence on time to get accurate estimates of the effects the explanatory variables have. 
As event history analysis is a longitudinal model, it can account for the temporal dimension. 
Event history models measure time to an event, and does this through including a time 
dimension in the variables next to defining them as either categorical or continuous. Because 
of its longitudinal character, event history analysis allows for inferences about the causality 
between the covariates and the dependent variables to be drawn. Panel analysis also includes a 
time dimension in their predictors, but this analysis focuses on how covariates influence 
dependent variable in a temporal dimension, and fails to reflect the time to event dimension 
that is so intriguing with regard to event history models. Logistic regression does not allow 
for such a time dynamic in their analysis and is thus also considered less suitable than the 
event history analysis for answering the research question 
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 Secondly, event history analysis can handle the problem of right-censoring. Censoring 
occurs in a study over time when a unit does not experience the event during the observation 
period22. This means that on the last year of observation we do not know how much longer 
this unit will survive. The logistic regression fails to distinguish the censored units from the 
units with an event occurring at the last point of observation. Consequently, both groups of 
units will be treated as having experienced the event, when in fact one of them has not. The 
only option for these models would thus be to omit all censored cases, creating a biased 
sample only including units that actually experience the event (Allison 1984:9-11; Box-
Steffensmeier and Jones 1997:1415-1417). Such selection bias into the data has implications 
that are considered particularly grave for comparative research (Geddes 1990; King et al. 
1994). As the event history model is able to include the cases of right-censoring, it is 
considered superior to logistic regression for my study. 
 Thirdly, a great advantage of some event history models is that they allow for few 
specifications to be made. Panel data, on the other hand, relies on many specifications before 
running the analyses. As few specifications are given from the theoretical discourse on 
associate compliance with IEAs, I would risk reading inaccurate conclusions about the rates 
and timing of events in a panel analysis framework (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 1997:1418). 
Thus, an event history model is preferred over a panel design also because of its dynamic 
approach to study a complex process.  
The great flexibility in the event history approach with regard to the time aspect, the 
problem of censoring and the advantage of few specifications enables insights of the entire 
process towards party compliance that logistic regression and panel analysis would not be 
able to provide. I thus argue that an event history design is the best way possible to study my 
research question. 
 
4.3.2 Introducing fundamental concepts: survival and risk23 
As noted above, timing and change are integrated parts of an event history analysis. Box-
Steffensmeier and Jones (2004:2) argue that the notion of survival is implicitly present in 
most of the theoretical issues that social scientists grapple with. Why does civil war endure 
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 Censoring will be more thoroughly discussed in section 5.1.2. 
23
 The notions of survival and risk reflect the model’s origination in biostatistics, and consequently may seem 
artificial and intuitively misleading when utilizing them on different social science phenomena. However, this 
theoretical introduction will use them as they are part of a crucial vocabulary underlying event history analysis. 
In the later chapters, however, I will use more universal designations like chance and likelihood when talking 
about risk, and persist and remain instead of survive. 
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(survive) or end (fail to survive)? And why do politicians get re-elected (survive), even under 
unfavourable conditions? The examples imply that event history analysis is based on 
hypotheses formed with an implicit interest in survival. Framing research questions this way 
can give social sciences intriguing answers to important processes. Furthermore, survival can 
not be properly understood without considering the concept of risk. As Box-Steffensmeier and 
Jones (2004:3) denote, “[t]he notion of risk in political science (…) implies a conditional 
relationship with survival.” As a phenomenon persists – or survives – what is the risk that it 
will subsequently end? Or, if a member state has failed to move into compliance (survives) 
with the Montreal Protocol until a given point in time, what is the risk that a signatory state 
will move into compliance (fail to survive)? 
 
4.3.3 The underlying logic of event history modelling 
The three elementary concepts; the survivor function, probability density function and hazard 
rate, as well as their covariation, are introduced to show the nature of the event history 
approach. All three functions describe the same probability distribution for duration T to a 
failure event24. Actual survival time of a unit is here reported as t.  
The survivor function reports the probability that no event is seen prior to time t. S(t) 
can also be thought of as identifying the proportions of units surviving beyond t. 
Consequently, all parties still not in compliance with the Montreal Protocol at the time of a 
given observation would be considered survivors in my thesis. At the origin time, t=0 and 
S(0)=1, indicating that all units are survivors. As time goes by, units fail to survive, giving the 
survivor function a decreasing shape (or flat, if all units survive) (Box-Steffensmeier and 
Jones 1997:1418-1421; 2004:12-14). The survival function may be presented as  
( ) ( )tTPtS ≥=  
 
The concept of probability distribution involves the probability that an event T will occur at 
time t25. Lim signifies the limit of a function which is conditional on t∆ , denoting change in t, 
which moves towards zero as time passes. As we assume that time is absolutely continuous, 
the probability density function of a unit looks like the following: 
( ) ( )
t
tTttP
tf t ∆
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= →∆ 0lim  
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 Failure event is equal to failure to survive. Once an event occurs, the unit is no longer a survivor and exits the 
analysis.   
25
 Time t is here understood as a random time within the time frame of the analysis. 
 36 
 
The Hazard rate is the third component, capturing the relationship between the already 
mentioned survival function and the probability density function:  
( ) ( )( )ts
tf
th =  
 
This signifies the ability of the hazard function to reflect both survival and death (non-
compliance and compliance) in one measure. More in detail, “the hazard function is the rate at 
which units fail by t, given that the duration has survived until t” (Box-Steffensmeier and 
Jones 2004). Thus, the hazard rate is naturally conditional. The rate can vary between zero (no 
risk) and infinity (indicating the propensity for failure at that instant) (Cleves et al. 2008:8). 
Mathematically, the hazard rate may be expressed as: 
 
( ) ( )
t
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The hazard rate may take many different shapes as it changes over time. For instance, the 
human mortality pattern has a “bathtub hazard,” where the hazard is falling for a while after 
birth, followed by a long, flat line, before constantly rising again as one moves towards 100 
years (Cleves et al. 2008:8). 
Scholars using event history models often utilize the hazard rate, h(t), instead of s(t) 
and f(t) for interpretation. I follow this practice. The reason is twofold; first, it allows me to 
include both the risk and survival notion in the same measure, allowing more information into 
the interpretation. For instance, using the hazard rate allows me to ask the question: “what is 
the chance that a member state to the Montreal Protocol will move into compliance, taking 
other factors into account?” Secondly, h(t) is useful because it is able to derive the survival 
and duration density functions from identifying the hazard rate (and knowing how the 
functions relate to each other mathematically). 
As I aim to explore how explanatory variables affect the risk of associate compliance 
with the Montreal Protocol, a transformation of the hazard rate into hazard ratio is needed to 
make it reflect covariates’ influence on the measure. Consequently, in what follows I explain 
what this transformation comprises and how the hazard ratio is used to interpret coefficient 
effects. 
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4.3.4 Interpreting the hazard rate 
Coefficient estimates give information about changes in the hazard rate associated with 
changes in the explanatory variable. In short: “positive coefficients imply shorter survival 
times; negative coefficients imply longer survival times” (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 
2004:59). To assess the impact a covariate has on the hazard rate; the hazard ratio must be 
calculated. This is found by exponentiating the coefficients, showing the relative change in 
the hazard rate for a one unit change in the covariate (Cleves et al. 2008:131-132). For 
instance, a coefficient of 0.5 gives us a hazard ratio of 1.65 (because exp(0.5) = 1.65), 
whereas a negative coefficient of -0.5 has a hazard ratio of 0.61 (because exp(-0.5) = 0.61). 
As visualised through the abovementioned examples, interpretation of the hazard ratio is 
always relative to 1. All ratios exceeding 1 implies an increase in the hazard, and thus a 
positive effect, while reported ratios below 1 show a negative effect on the hazard of 
experiencing an event. Furthermore, to find the percentage point change in the hazard for a 
one point increase in the specified variable, the hazard ratio is subtracted by 1 and then 
multiplied by 10026. Applying this logic to the same examples as above, I find that the first 
coefficient (0.5) leads to an increased hazard of 65 percent (because exp(0.5) = 1.65, and 
(1.65-1)*100 = 65%), whereas the negative coefficient (-0.5) decreases the hazard rate by 39 
percent (because exp(-0.5) = 0.61, and (0.61-1)*100 = 39%).  
An example based on the forthcoming analyses of compliance with the Montreal 
Protocol shows how to interpret the coefficients. As already mentioned, a state’s political 
regime is theorised to influence the rate at which compliance with Protocol commitments 
happens. The regression shows that a one-point increase in the Polity2 covariate increases the 
hazard by 2,2 percent, advancing the time a member state spends before it complies with the 
Montreal Protocol’s emission standards27. This means that the less autocratic a country, the 
shorter the time before compliance.  
Because of its importance for the understanding of the event history models, the 
difference between the hazard rate and the hazard ratio bears repeating. The hazard rate tells 
us the likelihood that a unit experiences an event at time t, presupposed that it has survived 
until this point. The hazard ratio includes the covariates in their calculation, showing how 
much the hazard changes from a one point increase in the specific variable. Hazard ratios are 
automatically reported by STATA.  
                                                 
26
 Percentage points are used in this analysis because we are interested in detecting the absolute difference 
between two numbers expressed in percent. Thus, a percentage point can be above 100 without that sounding 
artificial, as 0 is not nothing and 100 is not everything.   
27
 Because exp(.022) = 1.022 and (1.022-1)*100 = 2,2%. 
 38 
4.4 Applying the Event History Model to the analysis of member 
state compliance with the Montreal Protocol 
In this section, I discuss the event history models available for the study of member state 
compliance with the Montreal Protocol. After evaluating my research question up against 
different event history models, I present the Cox proportional hazard model as the selected 
tool for the analysis of compliance with IEAs. Furthermore, I present model-specific issues 
related to the Cox model, and consider the opportunities for combating potential problems 
inherent to the model of choice. 
 
4.4.1 Choosing event history model 
Behind the label event history analysis lays a variety of models available for the researcher. 
Event history models can be divided into two main categories: discrete-time and continuous-
time models. There are two main differences between the groups of models. First, the 
dependent variable in a discrete model estimates whether a unit experiences an event or not. 
The continuous model, on the other hand, measures the amount of time spent before an event 
occurs. Secondly, a discrete-time formulation presumes that an event can only occur at certain, 
often predetermined times. To illustrate, election only happens on Election Day. However, 
one can easily think of processes that do not change according to predictions. Revolutions and 
wars can break out anywhere in time. When subjects under scrutiny behave this way, a 
continuous-time approach is needed (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 1997:1423-1427). As 
member compliance can happen at any point in time, a continuous time model is needed for 
this study28. This means that the dependent variable reflects the amount of time spent in a 
social state (non-compliance) and is measured as a metric of time.  
Three types of continuous event history models can be applied; a nonparametric, a 
semiparametric and a parametric. An important divide is whether the baseline hazard is 
known to the researcher or not. The baseline hazard is the hazard rate for a unit when all 
predictor values are equal to 0 (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004:48-49). If it is not, a non- 
or semi-parametric model should be used. To anticipate such regularity one would need 
strong theories verified through models with an explanatory strength bigger than what is 
normally found in social science research. Imposing the wrong baseline can lead to severe 
bias as the shape affects the estimated coefficients (Golub 2008:531-534). As I have no strong 
                                                 
28
 A problem with the phenomenon under scrutiny is that even though compliance with an environmental accord 
in theory can be traced down to the very day, dependence on the member states’ national reports only allows me 
to measure compliance on an annual basis. However, this is not a problem as long as the sample is of a certain 
size, and the incidence of ties is not too serious (see discussion of tied data under 4.6). 
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theoretical ground for fitting a particular shape to the data, the parametric model should not be 
used in my thesis29.  
 The main difference between the non- and semi-parametric models lies in their 
respective handling of covariates. Whereas a semiparametric analysis assumes that covariates 
shape the likelihood of an event occurring, nonparametric models compare survival 
experience at a qualitative level across the values of the covariates (Cleves et al. 2008:3-6, 91). 
For social scientists, the interest often is more with the correlation between an outcome and 
theoretically based covariates than with the exact shape of the relationship (Box-
Steffensmeier and Jones 1997:1432; Blossfeld and Rohwer 1995:212). With this in mind, 
Box-Steffensmeier and Jones (2004:47) argue that: 
 
“(…) in our view, most research questions in social science should be chiefly concerned with getting the 
appropriate theoretical relationship ‘right,’ and less concerned with the specific form of the duration 
dependency, which can be sensitive to the form of the posited model.”  
 
The abovementioned discussion speaks for utilising a semiparametric model for my analyses 
of compliance with the Montreal Protocol. Its strength lies in its ability to measure the effect 
of covariates, but not having to deal with the issue of time-dependency included when a 
baseline hazard is specified. The model is labelled semiparametric exactly because of the 
parameterisation of covariates, and the non-parameterisation on the impact of time (Cleves et 
al. 2008:3-5).   
 
4.4.2 The Cox proportional hazards model30 
The far most commonly used semiparametric model is the Cox proportional hazards model 
(Cox 1972)31. A version of this model will also be used for the analysis in chapter six. Its 
popularity hinges on its elegance and computational simplicity. The hazard rate for ith subject 
is; 
( ) ( ) ( )xththi 'exp0 β= , 
 
                                                 
29
 However, dismissing the parametric model leads to a loss in efficiency, as identifying a functional form would 
have provided for a better model. 
30
 The model is also called the relative risk model (Kalbfleisch and Prentice 2002). However, this thesis uses the 
designation Cox proportional hazard model, or just Cox model. 
31
 The most commonly used event history models, except from the Cox model, are the Weibull and Gompertz 
models as well as the exponential, gamma and log-logistic models. For further reading on these models, please 
confer Box-Steffensmeier and Jones (2004). 
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where ( )th0  is the baseline hazard function and x'β  represents the regression coefficients and 
the covariates. As already mentioned, the model makes no assumption with regard to the 
shape of the hazard over time. Because the baseline hazard rate is left unspecified, Cox 
regression models do not have an intercept term. This might be unconventional, but does not 
restrain the strength of the model (Cleves et al. 2008:131). Also, as the baseline hazard rate is 
unfamiliar, maximum partial likelihood estimation is used to measure the parameters in the 
Cox model. As the baseline hazard is not directly parameterised, the rate is merely assumed to 
have an arbitrary shape, opening the possibility for the likelihood function to be as low as zero 
for the non-censored units between the events. Here, the ordered failure times, instead of the 
length of the interval between events, contribute information to the construction of a 
likelihood function32. Because of this, the likelihood function is not a true likelihood as the 
actual survival times of censored and uncensored cases are not directly incorporated into the 
likelihood. Based on a risk-set, denoting the set of units whose state just before t has not yet 
ended and consequently is not censored, the product of the conditional probability of an event 
happening at time t makes up the likelihood function of a unit failing (compliance occurring) 
(Blossfeld et al. 1989:73-74; Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004:51-56).   
 
4.4.3 Modelling group effects: The Stratified Cox model 
This analysis is based on an extension of the Cox model, namely the stratified proportional 
hazards model.  There are three different reasons identified in the literature for choosing a 
stratified Cox regression. First, a covariate might be fixed by the design of the research, 
second, a variable might have been identified as a stratification variable in previous studies, 
and third, a covariate that does not fulfil the proportionality requirement can be stratified to 
avoid related problems in the analysis (Hosmer et al. 2008:208-209; Yamaguchi 1991:108-
109). Moreover, it is important that it is not considered crucial to the analysis to be able to 
measure the effect of the stratifying covariate on the dependent variable. For this analysis, it is 
mainly the research design which lies behind the decision to utilize a stratified model33. As 
mentioned in chapter two, the parties to the Montreal Protocol could ask for a ten year delay 
to reach compliance. Most developing countries asked for this, being identified as Article 5-
                                                 
32
 In the parameterised models, knowing the shape of the distribution of time allows for a maximum likelihood 
estimation where the interval between survival times is used to construct the likelihood function (Box-
Steffensmeier and Jones 2004:21-46).  
33
 Even though the decision of using a stratified model is based on a design-specific reasoning, the variable does 
show signs of non-proportionality when it is included as a covariate in a normal Cox regression. This makes the 
argument for making it a stratifying variable only stronger. 
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members. With such existing heterogeneity in the data, it is likely that the hazard rate for 
compliance will differ by group. This, of course, is an aspect of the nature of the case under 
study, and hence it is not theorised. Consequently, it would be wrong to treat such a covariate 
the same way as the other independent variables. Still, we know that it would come out as 
highly significant, because it is closely related to the shape of the hazard.  
To find out whether the hazard really changes against the two protocol groups, an 
estimated hazard function based on the range of observed failure times were created (See 
Figure 2 in Appendix). The graphs show that the hazards differ significantly for the two 
values of the Article 5 variable. This is a strong argument for allowing the hazard rate to vary 
by group34. To include this important aspect in the analysis, the regression is stratified by a 
dummy variable identifying whether the member state was given a delay or not. I thus 
consider the model to be improved when a stratified Cox regression is utilised as the results 
reflects the nature of the protocol more effectively. Also, I avoid bias in the measurements 
with regard to the effectiveness of the covariates, as an effect is reported taking into account 
the variation across the two groups of accord members (Hosmer and Lemeshow 1999:244). A 
residual based test confirms the improved model fit to data for a stratified model compared to 
a normal Cox regression35. 
Statistically, a stratified analysis allows the baseline hazard to vary between the groups 
making up the stratifying variable. However, the coefficient effects are considered the same 
across strata (Cleves et al. 2008:152).  Consequently, the normal Cox regression equation is 
relaxed in favour of; 
)'exp()()( 01 xththi β=  if i is in group 1 
)'exp()()( 02 xththi β= if i is in group 2 
 
Choosing the best model to reflect the issue at hand comes with a price. When estimating 
separate hazards for the two member groups, the partial likelihood function is formulated for 
each stratum. Hence, I loose the ability to compare relative duration times across groups, 
leading to a loss of efficiency in the parameter estimation (Yamaguchi 1991:109). Comparing 
                                                 
34
 Next to the stratified model, a random effects Cox regression, also called shared frailty Cox model, was also 
considered. The random effects model assumes that the different hazard rates are multiplicative functions of each 
other and that the effect of the Art.5-variable is random and unobservable (Cleves et al. 2008:156-164; Box-
Steffensmeier and Jones 2004:142-148). However, since we have a variable available that we know leads to 
unobserved heterogeneity, it makes more sense to utilise the stratified approach. Also, when comparing model fit 
after having run both types of analysis on the same data, the stratified Cox model performs better than the 
random effects model. Consequently, the best model has been chosen, both with regard to research design and 
model fit statistics. 
35
 See Figure 3 in Appendix. 
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the stratified regression with a standard Cox regression, it is visible that when accounting for 
grouped effects, several explanatory variables that were significant in the standard Cox 
regression loose their robustness. Thus, it seems that the loss in efficiency leads to a loss of 
predictive power in the stratified regression. Nonetheless, I argue that a theoretically and 
empirically sound model is more important that maximizing model fit and significant results. 
To sum up, I end up choosing a stratified Cox model because I find it to be the model 
best reflecting the nature of the subject under scrutiny. As the Article 5-variable is not of 
theoretical interest, I do not loose any theoretically important information stratifying it. When 
stratifying an analysis by a dummy variable, the effects only come out as significant if the 
pattern of variation is found across both member groups to the accord. 
 
4.5 Method-specific issues: proportionality and time-varying 
covariates 
 
4.5.1 Testing the proportionality assumption 
Even though the Cox model does not specify a distribution of the hazard rate, the covariates 
are expected to have the same effect over time. Thus, the ratio between 0h  and ih  should be 
constant across time (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004:48-49; Cleves et al. 2008:129-145). 
If the proportional hazard assumption is not followed, the researcher risks “enormous bias 
and render the estimates meaningless” (Golub 2008:537). The challenge with non-
proportionality is even greater for my study as I include many time-varying covariates, and 
these violate the proportional hazard assumption by definition (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 
1997:1433; Golub 2008:538). Because of the problems connected with non-proportionality, 
Box-Steffensmeier and Zorn (2001) argue that testing the models for proportionality should 
be standard procedure.  
The most frequently used test to detect non-proportional trends in the data is a residual 
based test called the Schoenfeld test, which was developed by Grambsch and Therneau 
(1994)36. The intuition behind the test is that if the covariates under scrutiny have non-
proportional traits, the residuals will vary significantly from zero with time. Following Box-
Steffensmeier and Zorn (2001:976):  
 
                                                 
36
 The Schoenfeld test can only be performed on a semiparametric Cox model in the STATA software package, 
giving the Cox regression yet another advantage over it’s parametric equivalents (Golub 2008). 
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“[I]f hazards are proportional (…), there should be no relationship between an observation’s residual for 
that covariate and the length of its survival time. Conversely, if proportional hazards do not hold, the 
fitted model will underestimate the hazard during those periods where the hazards are diverging and 
overestimate it when they are converging.” 
 
Tests based on Schoenfeld residuals can be applied both for the model as a whole and 
individually to each variable. There exists no consensus with regard to which of the tests is 
the most powerful in detecting non-proportionality. Golub (2008:536-539) warns that the 
global test is not very strong, wrongly reporting proportionality even though covariate tests 
reveal significant violations37. Box-Steffensmeier et.al (2003:36, 45), on the other hand, claim 
that both tests are valuable and should be performed. To be sure, both global and covariate 
tests are run on all my models38. 
The residual-based tests makes clear that the global test in all five models are 
insignificant, supporting the null hypothesis of proportionality of the covariates collectively. 
However, a closer look at the individually based tests reveals that Green Party popularity 
reports rather high chi square values which are statistically significant in two of five models, 
meaning the null hypothesis of no violation of the proportional hazard must be abandoned. In 
the remaining model, the same variable just misses the ten percent significance line, but as a 
significance level are arbitrary, I also treat the variable as non-proportional in this model. 
 The well-recognised solution to the problem of non-proportionality is to interact the 
variable with some function of analysis time (starting the year a country ratifies the Montreal 
Protocol) and include this interaction term alongside the original variable in the relevant 
models (Box-Steffensmeier et al. 2003). This is done, and a Wald chi square test is run to 
verify whether the inclusion of the interacted and the original variables improved model fit 
significantly39. The interaction term was found to be a significant improvement in all three 
models, and consequently will be included in the multivariate analysis.  
 
4.5.2 Capturing the functional form of time-varying covariates 
Next to securing proportionality, determining the functional form of the covariates is 
important to ensure a correctly specified model. This is especially important in this study 
                                                 
37
 His claim is based on a review of 84 articles using event history analysis from 1989 until 2005. From this 
sample, he replicated forty-five studies, finding grave flaws with regard to the proportional hazard assumption; 
especially bad was the global test.  
38
 See Table 12 for the results. 
39
 The results are reported in Table 6, p. 82-83. 
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because many of the covariates are time-varying, allowing for rather complex relationships 
between the covariate and the dependent variable. This thesis relies on Martingale residuals 
and fractional polynomials when assessing the covariates’ functional form. 
The Martingale residuals test is estimated from the Cox regression model, and is 
defined as “the difference between the observed event indicator, given by the censoring 
indicator and the expected number of events, which is given by the integrated hazard” (Box-
Steffensmeier and Jones 2004:122). To evaluate whether each covariate’s functional form is 
linear, the residuals are plotted against the independent variables. If the graph deviates 
systematically from 0 and does not hold a flat line, this indicates nonlinearity, and another 
functional form should be included (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004:126). Among my 
covariates, corruption and regional compliance are identified as non-linear for higher values. 
For corruption, graphic comparison showed that utilising an exponential function created a 
close to linear effect on the predictor. With regional compliance, a logged transformation 
creates a close-to flat line40.  
I also utilise fractional polynomials to see whether this test assumes other functional 
forms on other variables than the Martingale residuals test did41. Hosmer (2002:429) argues 
that fractional polynomials are superior for detecting inadequacies in the linear predictor42. 
The great advantage using fractional polynomials is that not only do they detect bad 
specification of the variables; they also identify the function that best reflects the nature of the 
predictor. Fractional polynomials provide a wide range of functional forms that the time-
varying variables are tested against, adjusted for the other covariates (Cleves et al. 2008:177). 
The best functional form is the one with the lowest deviance43 of all the possible models. If 
this is not statistically significant, the model with the second lowest deviance is considered 
and if this too fails to reach statistical significance the linear model assuming the original 
functional form stands44. Thus, fractional polynomials check whether they find alternative 
functions of continuous covariates that improve model fit significantly compared to the linear 
model. If the function reaches statistical significance, including it will increase model fit 
compared to keeping the linear alternative (Cleves et al. 2008:178-179). 
                                                 
40
 Also, green party popularity shows non-linear trends. However, the nonlinearity of this covariate has been 
taken into account through an interaction term. See section 6.3.1 
41
 Fractional Polynomials was first developed by Royston and Altman (1994). 
42
 The linear predictor in a Cox model is the logarithm of the relative hazard (Cleves et al. 2008) 
43
 Deviance is defined as minus twice the maximised log-likelihood (Sauerbrei and Royston 1999:74). 
44
 For technical details on the underlying logic of fractional polynomials, I refer you to Royston and Altman 
(1994), Sauerbrei and Royston (1999) or Cleves et al. (2008:176-179). 
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 Running this test on all time-varying variables reveal that three of them have a more 
complex non-linear relationships with the linear predictor, and that taking such functional 
forms into account significantly improves model fit compared to the initial linear shape. MP-
membership - length and Country strength are both found to have inversely squared functions 
creating the best models. For MP-membership, it is significant with a p-value of 0.10 whereas 
the Country strength covariate has a stronger p-value of 0.029, dismissing the null hypothesis 
of no better model fit with alternative functional forms. Consequently, these functions will be 
included in the analysis alongside their original equivalents. A squared transformation implies 
that the coefficient is interacted with itself, letting the effect depend on its respective level 
(Kam and Franzese Jr. 2007:42). An inverse function computes 1/x. The effect of this 
computation is that small numbers are made large, and large numbers are made small. Both 
transformations compress the right side of the distribution more than the left side (Osborne 
2002). Regional compliance is also found to be better reflected through a non-linear function, 
namely a logged function. This non-linear trend in the covariate is in accordance with the 
Martingale residuals results. Logged functions are used to allow the marginal effect of X to 
increase at lower levels of X and decline at higher levels of X (Kam and Franzese Jr. 2007). 
The logged function was found to improve model fit significantly with a p-value of 0.001.  
 One should not be uncritical towards such data transformations. Osborne (2002) warns 
that such transformations should not be utilised unless there exist clear reasons for it. Thus, 
the functions identified should make sense theoretically, and one should also make sure that 
influential observations and outliers do not influence the analysis excessively (Royston and 
Sauerbrei 2007). As the theories presented for country strength and MP-membership – length 
do not assume a certain shape of the hazard, it is hard to dismiss or confirm the findings on 
these premises. Influential observations were detected through their dfbeta-values, and those 
with unusually large values relative to the other observations were excluded for each relevant 
variable. Then fractional polynomials were rerun. All tests confirm the findings of the first 
fractional polynomials test and for country strength and regional compliance the statistical 
significance of their functions are even stronger. This allows us to conclude that the functional 
forms do not come from extreme observations, meaning they represent the data well. 
 
 
 46 
4.6 Analysis specific considerations 
Tied data is a problem for event history models. The event is tied if several units experience 
an event at the same point in time (Kalbfleisch and Prentice 2002:104-107). Because the 
hazard function is considered to be continuous, identically censoring of units (event occurring 
at the same time t) is regarded as impossible. Tied data is problematic as it renders the partial 
likelihood inestimable. As I have annual time units over the course of 20 years, tied data are 
present in my analysis45. However, due to recent advances in software, the likelihood function 
can be modified to account for tied data46. There are four possible ways to deal with this 
problem. I have chosen to use the Efron model for this analysis, which is the most accurate 
model when the number of tied failures increases with time (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 
2004:53-59). This decision is based on descriptive statistics showing that there are quite a few 
member states complying the last two years of the observation period.  
Robust standard errors are reported in this analysis. This is based on the 
acknowledgement that the observations in my dataset are not likely to be independent of each 
other47. Robust standard errors, then, account for clustering of observations and thus tend to 
report larger standard errors than its normal adversary. In my instance this is a more accurate 
test of the effects of covariates. Despite this modification of the standard errors, the 
coefficients are left unchanged (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004:114-116; Cleves et al. 
2008:317). 
As mentioned earlier, a maximum partial likelihood procedure is utilised to obtain 
estimates of the covariate parameters48. This procedure produces measures which the 
goodness-of-fit of the estimated models derive from. The likelihood ratio value is the most 
commonly used model fit measure, and takes the value of – 2 times the difference in the log-
likelihood between the model with no covariates and the full model (Box-Steffensmeier and 
Jones 2004:44). As this analysis utilises robust standard errors, STATA reports a 
pseudolikelihood value instead of the common likelihood value. This measure fails to reflect 
the distribution of the sample accounting for the lack of independent observations, and thus it 
cannot be used to compare models (Sribney 2005). The multivariate Wald test chi squared is 
                                                 
45
 As a rule of thumb, ties is not a problem if no more than 5% of the observations fail at the same point in time 
(Prentice and Farewell in: Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 1997:1434).  
46
 This is another advantage of the Cox proportional hazard model. Standard parametric models have no way to 
handle tied data in their datasets (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004:53; Golub 2008:539-540). 
47
 Longitudinal data usually does not fulfil this independence requirement as the value on a variable one year is 
not likely to be completely independent from the value on the same variable the year before (Box-Steffensmeier 
and Jones 2004:114). 
48
 “The function is derived by taking the product of the conditional probability of a failure at time t, given the 
number of cases that are at risk of failing at time t” (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004:51). 
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another measure on model fit, which will be used to compare the different models in this 
thesis. It assumes an asymptotically normal distribution between the coefficient estimate and 
the mean vector and the covariance matrix (Hosmer and Lemeshow 1999:104), while 
adjusting for the number of variables added. The higher the score, the better the model is at 
explaining actual observations.  
Several interaction terms are included in the upcoming analysis, thus hardening 
interpretation as well as significance testing for these predictors. Interaction terms are based 
on the assumption that the effect of one variable differs across values of another variable. 
Putting it differently, the effect of X on Y is contingent on the value of Z (Kam and Franzese 
Jr. 2007:22-23). The first type of interaction included in the analysis is green party popularity 
that is included in the analysis alongside the interacted variable green party popularity 
*analysis time49. When interpreting an interaction term in this thesis, its effect is reported for 
a one unit increase in green party popularity at different values of analysis time50. Also the 
significance test needs to be differently carried out for interacted variables. Just like with the 
interpretation, the significance test depends on the joint performance of green party popularity 
and green party popularity*analysis time. Thus, a univariate Wald chi squared test will be run 
on the original variable and the interaction variable to assess whether the interaction term is 
statistically significant.  
The second type of interaction included in this analysis is the squared term. As 
mentioned, country strength and MP-membership – length are given squared functions based 
on their data composition. This is a special type of interaction terms where X is interacted 
with itself so that its effect is contingent on its own level (Kam and Franzese Jr. 2007:42). The 
exact same logic of interpretation and significance testing as the one mentioned above applies 
to this type of function.         
            
  
 
 
 
                                                 
49
 When interacting the non-proportional variable with a function of analysis time one allows the covariate’s 
effect on the hazard of compliance to vary monotonically with length of membership. 
50
 The effect at time t = exp[ )(21 tββ + ], where 1β is the coefficient for Greenseats and 2β is the coefficient 
for Greenseats*analysis time (Hosmer et al. 2008:116-120). 
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5.0 Data and variables 
When conducting research, the choice of sample as well as the operationalisation of the 
explanatory variables is crucial for the framework of the analysis. This chapter introduces the 
sample that the analysis rests on and the implications of this choice. Furthermore, the 
operationalisations of the hypotheses into testable variables are introduced and discussed. 
5.1 Data 
The following section will introduce the dataset that the analysis bases itself on, succeeded by 
a thorough treatment of the model-specific issues of censoring and truncation in event history 
data. Moreover, a discussion related to the sample selection is introduced. 
 
5.1.1 The dataset 
As reflected in Table 2, I base my analysis on one dataset including all members to the 
Montreal Protocol. As already mentioned, many developing countries pushed for a delay for 
their phase-outs of CFC and halon gases. Even though it is the time until phase-out that is of 
interest here, the fact that they were given this delay has led to many of these countries 
entering the sample at a later period in time. Intuitively, it might seem that the obvious way to 
deal with these differences is to divide the members into two different samples. When this is 
not done, it is because the event history model can deal with units entering late, allowing 
these two groups to be included in the same sample51. Moreover, even though one could think 
of different processes explaining compliance in the Article-5 and the non-Article 5 groups, 
there is no theoretical discussion expecting such variance. I thus argue that there is no 
theoretical problem including all members in the same dataset, maximising the number of 
observations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
51
 See the disussion of left-truncation in the following section. 
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Table 2: Overview of the dataset 
Analysis of party compliance 
with… 
Time period Number of 
compliance 
incidents 
Average number 
of member years 
until compliance 
Number of 
countries  
 
…the Montreal Protocol 1989 - 2008 118 9,5 15452 
 
Before going into details on data-specific issues, a clarification is needed. By member state, I 
refer only to states that have ratified the treaty53. This means that states that have signed the 
Montreal Protocol but not ratified the agreements are excluded from the analysis. In IEA 
bargaining processes signature implies nothing more than an intent to seek ratification 
(Barrett 2003:147). It is first when the protocol is ratified and has entered into force54 that a 
state is legally bound to act in accordance with the treaty text.  For the Montreal Protocol this 
happened on January 1st, 1989. 
 
5.1.2 Model-specific issues: censoring and truncation 
An issue specific to the event history analysis is censoring. This is considered to occur: 
“whenever an observation’s full event history is unobserved” (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 
2004:16). Right-censoring is when a unit does not experience an event within the observation 
period. This type of analysis is the perfect tool for taking care of such instances, as the model 
is able to distinguish between the units having experienced an event and the ones that have 
not (Cleves et al. 2008:30-31). The contrasting case of left censoring is experienced when; 
“the event occurred at some time when the subject was not under observation” (Cleves et al. 
2008:43). In this thesis, left-censoring refers to units where compliance has occurred before 
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 As of 25 November 2009, there were 196 Parties to the Protocol (The Ozone secretariat 2009). However, 
Andorra, Iraq, San Marino and Timor Leste are excluded from the sample as they became members on the last 
point of observation or later. Thus, we will not gain sufficient information to draw meaningful inferences from 
these units. Furthermore, 32 countries were omitted from the sample because they have less than 500, 000 
inhabitants and therefore are not included in the Polity Project’s democracy scores (CIA World Factbook 2010a). 
See Table 10 in Appendix. Also, Ireland and Portugal are omitted because the Ozone Secretariat has never 
registered any emissions information on them. Consequently, I am not able to measure their compliance record. 
EU is a member to the Protocol as well, but is naturally excluded. Lastly, Belgium, Denmark and Solomon 
Island are excluded from the sample because they are left censored cases (see 5.1.2). 
53
 Ratification normally requires the approval of a state’s parliament and is considered a formal commitment 
from the state under question to implement IEA law  (Barrett 2003:147). 
54
 A protocol normally enters into force 90 days after the ratification of a certain amount of signatory states. 
Since the protocol considered here was opened for ratification quite early in 1988, some states ratified the 
Protocol already this year. When the starting year for my analysis is 1989, this is because I consider the day of 
entry into force as the first year of analyses. I do this because the Protocol text is not legally binding on the 
members prior to the entry into force, and therefore their ratification may be considered nothing more than a vote 
of consent before it actually becomes binding.  
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the period of observation starts55 (Yamaguchi 1991:4-8). This is an unresolved problem for 
event history models, leaving me with two options. Either, I can treat the left-censored cases 
as having experienced the event at the first year of observation in the study period, or the left-
censored units must be omitted from the analysis. The former option risks biased coefficients 
if there exists discrepancy between the covariates’ values in the attributed years and the years 
of actual change. The latter option means a loss of information by excluding units from the 
sample. However, sample bias is avoided (Allison 1984:56-57; Mooney and Lee 2000:231). 
Because discarding the left-censored units is superior at avoiding bias, it has become the 
standard solution to this problem. I follow this advice, excluding left-censored units from the 
analysis56. Thus, the sample represents the members to the agreement that were not in 
compliance with the Montreal legal framework before ratifying the accord.   
Truncation is another issue characteristic to the event history analysis. Box-
Steffensmeier and Jones (2004:16) consider left-truncation to emerge in event history datasets 
“when history prior to the first observation point is unobserved.” More in detail, the primary 
concern is that some units might enter the risk set before the initial observation point t0. 
Consequently, important information about their event history is lost. Left-truncation is absent 
in my data as units are only considered to enter the risk set the year they ratify the agreements 
under scrutiny. Before this, they are simply not considered to be in danger of experiencing 
compliance because they have not legally committed themselves to comply. Right-truncation 
is evident in units that have entered the risk set but are not observed throughout the 
observation period. The model treats such cases the same way as right censored cases, 
assuming that failures are certain to occur sometime outside the observation period as time 
extends to infinity (Cleves et al. 2008:36). Austria, Finland, Greece and Spain are right-
truncated in the Montreal Protocol. The great advantage with event history analysis is that it is 
able to treat truncation in the data57.  
 
5.1.3 Sample selection 
The ideal type in quantitative studies is a sample including the entire population, meaning all 
states at all times. As this is usually impossible, based both on lack of data as well as lack of 
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 Box-Steffensmeier and Jones (1997:1422) define left censoring slightly different, considering left censored 
units as incidents where the point of beginning is not known, whereas the point of failure is. This corresponds 
with what I define as left truncation. 
56
 The omitted left-censored units are Belgium, Denmark and the Solomon Islands. 
57
 In contrast, the standard OLS regression model would treat left-truncated observations as having equivalent 
entry times to all non-left or non-right-truncated observations. 
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resources, random samples where all empirical units have the same probability of being 
included have become the feasible ideal. Even though most statistics assume random samples, 
this is not always easy to fulfil (Grønmo 2004:92-98). Since the universe of members to 
international environmental accords is so big and complex, a random sample is hard to obtain. 
To reduce complexity and the costs of data collection, the data are based on a clustered 
sample58, where one cluster is first defined from the entire universe of cases (all IEAs), and 
then units within this cluster are identified as research units (all parties to the Protocol)59. 
(Pennings et al. 2006:61-62). A consequence of a clustered selection is that this study cannot 
generalise60 its findings to the broader population of IEAs61 (Grønmo 2004:97-98). First, all 
non-random samples entail a loss in security and precision as the random variance between 
the universe and the sample increases. Secondly, since I only consider one cluster, the 
generalisation potential is small as the representativeness of the sample decreases. However, 
this study is exploratory and consequently serves an important function providing 
comprehensive research in a format previously understudied within this paradigm. 
While the case selection in chapter four decides the maximum amount of data possible, 
access to data also influences the final sample which the analysis rests upon. As already 
mentioned, not all members to the agreement are included in the analysis, some of them 
because of lacking data, other because of data-specific concerns. Nonetheless, the evictions 
are not considered to lead to bias in the analysis as states on all continents are affected. 
 
5.2 The dependent variable: Time until compliance with the MP 
This thesis aims at understanding the determinants of an associate’s compliance with the 
Montreal Protocol. More precisely, within the framework of an event history analysis, the 
dependent variable measures how much time (in years) elapses from a member state enters 
the sample (ratifies an agreement), and thus becomes at risk of compliance, until the 
agreement is complied with by the same state, if it complies at all. Quite a few of the 
countries included in this analysis enter the analysis at the start of the observation period, here 
understood as the first year of ratification. For the Montreal Protocol the first year of 
                                                 
58
 It has also been labelled multi-level sample (Pennings et al. 2006:62). 
59
 Even though I analyse all units within the Montreal Protocol, my study is not a population study. The universe 
of units identified in my research question is ‘all parties to IEAs’. A population study based on my thesis would 
therefore include all parties to all IEAs, and not only the parties to one protocol.  
60
 The generalisation potential is also commonly referred to as the ‘external validity’ of the data (Pennings et al. 
2006:67). 
61
 Consequently, significance tests will only be interpreted as indicating the likelihood that the results are not due 
to random measurement errors of coincidence. 
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observation is 1989. However, many of the Article 5 states to the Montreal Protocol enter the 
sample later in the observation period. As already mentioned, these incidents of left-
truncation create no problem for event history modelling. 
To understand what is implied in the event, defining and further operationalising 
compliance with the Montreal Protocol is necessary. In the absence of previous quantitative 
research on compliance62 (to my knowledge), the operationalising and coding of this variable 
has been done by the author. I consider an associate to be in compliance with the agreement if 
it successfully makes the changes necessary to fulfil the goals it has obliged itself to within 
the protocol framework. Considering the Montreal Protocol, the non-Article 5 members have 
committed themselves to phase out (100% reduction) CFC and halon gases by January 1st 
1996 and January 1st 1994 respectively. The Article 5 states negotiated a delay, and were 
supposed to phase out CFC and Halon gases by January 1st, 2010. The baseline year on which 
reductions were to be calculated was set to 1986. 
The Montreal accord secretariat considers a member state to be in compliance when it 
reduces the amount of pollutants in question within the deadline set in the agreement. In this 
thesis, however, compliance is coded based on the reduction criteria only. This means that a 
party will be coded to be in compliance with the given Protocol regardless of whether it 
complies within the deadline or not, as long as the event happens in the observation period. 
Such an operationalisation of compliance reflects this thesis’ interest in identifying real 
behavioural change. Problematic as it may be, it is not possible to include the deadline 
information in the measure of the dependent variable63. Yet, I argue that this can be defended, 
as IEAs initiate complex processes of behavioural change where the success should not be 
measured solely by whether they comply on time, but also how the change in behaviour 
materialise in visible environmental quality data.  
Based on the operationalisation above, the compliance variable is coded as a dummy 
variable, with the value 0 for non-compliance and 1 for compliance. I utilise data from the 
UNEP Ozone Secretariat web page (United Nations Environmental Programme 2010). The 
coding is based on the variable ‘ODS Consumption in ODP Tonnes64’ for CFC and halon 
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 Honorable exceptions are Simmons (2000) and Bernhagen (2008). 
63
 A better compliance measure would probably be an evaluation of how international law materialises to 
national policies, and to evaluate whether these are sufficient to create the necessary change in behaviour, thus 
detecting members that comply without actually making an effort. However, such a measure would entail an 
enormous job collecting information for each member state. Thus, a proxy of actual emission reductions is used, 
assuming that national policies are behind the reduction records. 
64
 ODP is short for Ozone Depleting Potential, and refers to the amount of ozone depletion caused by a substance. 
This weighting of raw emissions numbers is done to reflect the impact on ozone of a chemical substance 
compared to the impact of the pollutant CFC-11 (the basis), which is considered to be equal to 1. CFCs have 
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gases, and covers the period from 1989-2008. The Ozone Secretariat (2004) operationalises 
‘consumption’ as “production plus imports minus exports of controlled substances minus 
destroyed quantities minus feedstock uses of controlled substances.” In this measure both 
consumption and production are accounted for in the same variable. To take into account the 
different starting points for the member states, the relative reduction in ODS production and 
consumption is considered. This means that the dependent variable is measured based on the 
percentage reduction relative to the production and consumption of ODS in the baseline year. 
This way, a behavioural dimension is included in the measure as it is not insensitive to the 
various starting points65.  
Even though 100 percent reduction is the requirement in the Montreal Protocol, the 
parties have been coded to experience compliance the year they have reduced 95 percent or 
more of the registered consumption in the baseline year. I do this because the Protocol allows 
for excemptions for “laboratory and analytical uses” and “essential and critical use”. A brief 
calculation of exemptions given to several countries in 2005 and 2006 showed that they never 
exceeded 5 percent of the baseline consumption. Consequently, I consider this to be a proper 
way of taking this qualification into account in the measure. 
When basing the coding on national reports written by the parties themselves, the 
potential problem of lack of reliance and thus low internal validity66 should be discussed. 
Reasons for potentially inadequate estimates may be found in different methods utilised 
among parties for collecting emissions data, errors of emission, over-reporting, under-
reporting, failure to report as well as mis-categorisation of substances67. To evaluate the data, 
the United Nations Statistics Division (2010) has run a test on the discrepancy between global 
and national figures of emission levels on  the Montreal Protocol from 1997 to 200568. They 
find the average error level to be 6% annually for that time period. This is an acceptable error 
                                                                                                                                                        
ODPs ranging from 0,6 to 1, whereas halons have ODP values up to 10 (United Nations Statistics Division 2010). 
The numbers I operate with to code the dependent variable therefore are the natural emissions data reported from 
the parties, weighted with the ozone depleting potential of the substances reported. 
65
 Inherent in every IEA is the fact that it always takes less for some countries to comply than others simply 
because they are not as severely struck by the problem at hand. This mean that the best compliers can be the 
member states where the problem is of minor importance, whereas the laggards may be the countries actually 
making a proper effort to combat the environmental issue of the IEA. This means that for some states minor 
changes in environmental behaviour is necessary, whereas it for others requires a great deal of actual changes. 
66
 Internal validity is concerned with how well the measures represent the theoretical concepts are supposed to 
reflect (Midtbø 2007:25). 
67
 Deliberate refusal or outright manipulation of data are rarely the reason behind reporting failures, an ILO 
working group has concluded (Brown Weiss and Jacobson 1998:46). 
68
 The study is based on the assumption that globally, net exports should equal net imports, given that all national 
data reported are accurate.  
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level, indicating a high degree of validity. To sum up, relying on self-reporting by the parties 
is potentially a problem, but here the internal validity of the measure is found to be good.  
As mentioned earlier, the previous research on environmental regimes has been mainly 
qualitative. Several authors argue that the main reason for this methodological imbalance 
reflects the challenges in measuring a non-observable process like compliance (Underdal and 
Young 2004). Brown Weiss and Jacobson (1998:4-5) treat this more in detail, contending that 
even though member state compliance is measurable in principle, precise measurements are 
elusive. 
”(…) [O]ne can tell if the production of a prohibited substance such as chlorofluorocarbons has been 
discontinued. But measuring emissions resulting from changing refrigerators in automobile air 
conditioners is much more problematic. And how should an occasional emission be weighted in relation 
to the overall cessation of production?” 
 
Well aware of the challenges it poses to study quantitatively something that cannot be 
properly observed, I have taken my precautions. The operationalisation of compliance shows 
that I combine an environmental indicator with a behavioural indicator. I consider net 
reduction of ODS, but it is measured relative to member states’ starting point in the baseline 
year. Doing this, I follow Mitchell (2004) and Haas et al. (1993) who argue that 
environmental improvement and behavioural change are appropriate metrics to use when 
seeking to explain variation in compliance. Moreover, Mitchell (2004:125-126) argues that a 
focus on change in behaviour over time (in my case seen through reduction in ODS) is the 
preferred way to understand compliance. As international regimes initiate complex processes 
of change, the results in the environmental indicator might be visible long before as well as 
long after deadline. Thus, by analysing net reductions over time, occasional emissions are 
likely to be disclosed during the coding of the variable. Consequently, only long-term efforts 
to reach compliance have been identified as compliance according to the coding procedures.   
 
5.3 Operationalisation of the independent variables 
This section will present the operationalisation of the factors that were hypothesised to 
influence compliance in the theory chapter. In general, the reliability of the data is considered 
to be good, as I utilise a quantitative method and most measures are derived from well reputed 
databases, with codebooks allowing for accuracy and consistency, ensuring replication 
possibilities. The question of internal validity will be dealt with consecutively if it is 
considered important to discuss for the variable at hand. 
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5.3.1 Enforcement factors 
A state’s population status as reported by the World Databank (2010) is used to measure 
country strength. To ease interpretation, the actual population numbers are reported per 
million inhabitants. Even though it is questionable whether a state’s population is a sufficient 
measure on strength, it is commonly used in the literature. Thus, I also utilise this, despite its 
reduced validity. As a fractional polynomials test showed that this variable had a more 
complex relationship with the log hazard, it is presented through an inversely squared 
function. This is done to ease interpretation so that hazard ratio and standard errors make 
intuitive sense. Influenced by Perkins and Neumayer (2007:28), the natural logarithm has 
been used as it is not expected that the size of a population increases linearly with its non-
compliant behaviour.    
Integration in the world economy, or trade dependency, is measured by the size of a 
country’s international trade. Data are gathered from the World Databank (2010), and the 
variable Merchandise trade as percentage of GDP. The trade concept is referred to as the sum 
of imports and exports of goods and services. To ease interpretation and not make the distance 
between values so small that its effect seems diminutive, the measure has been divided by 10.  
 
5.3.2 Managerial factors 
Government autonomy is measured through the variable number of veto players, derived from 
the World Bank Database of Political Institutions (Keefer 2009). The indicator relies on a 
check and balance system when coding the units. Based on an index of electoral 
competitiveness, those that score less than 4 are considered not to have electoral 
competitiveness. These are automatically coded to have 1 veto player, as only the chief 
executive wields a check when the legislature is not freely elected. However, those that score 
5 or more are considered to be sufficiently competitive. Then, the amount of veto players is 
incremented by 1 if; a) there is a chief executive, b) the chief executive is competitively 
elected and c) if the opposition controls the legislative. Furthermore, the different regime 
types also affect the amount of veto players possible for a state. In presidential systems, the 
amount of veto players increases by one; a) for each chamber of the legislature69 and b) for 
each party that is allied with the President’s party, but has another ideological orientation. For 
parliamentary systems, three features affect the amount of veto players. The amount increases 
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 Unless the executive party has a majority in the lower house AND a close list system is in effect (as this 
implies stronger presidential control). 
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by one; a) for every party in a government coalition70 and b) for every party in government 
that is closer to the opposition party than to the major government party when economic 
issues are discussed. Lastly, the prime minister’s party is not considered a veto player if there 
is a closed rule in place71 (Keefer 2009:14-19). Where data are missing for a unit, but there 
exist data before this year, the last registered value will be used to fill the missing years. This 
variable is evaluated to hold high validity. 
 In the discussion of government capacity in the theory chapter, emphasis is put on 
financial endowments and human resources as crucial for a state’s ability to act. To capture 
this understanding in the analyses, the Human Development Index (HDI), published by the 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (2009), is utilised as the measure of 
government capacity. Embodied in this measure is the confession that it is the manner in 
which the country spends its wealth, and not the wealth in itself, that creates development72 
(ul Haq 2003). This measure has three components; health, knowledge and standard of living. 
Health is measured as life expectancy, based on population health and longevity. Knowledge 
is operationalised as a weighted education indicator where the literacy rates accounts for 2/3 
of the variable’s value and the total gross enrolment of primary, secondary and tertiary 
schools account for the last third. Lastly, standard of living is based on the natural logarithm 
of GDP per capita Purchasing Power Parity (PPP), to reflect the reduced importance of 
income with enlarged GDP. Even though this indicator is originally a measure of the general 
development of a society, I argue that the literature on government capacity moves close to 
this understanding. Consequently, I contend this measure to hold good validity. As annual 
data was not available until 200573, the last registered values are used to fill in missing values 
if there exist data previous to the missing period. HDI is considered a rather constant 
phenomenon, thus this procedure should not be problematic. Also, the original measure varies 
from 0 to 1; however the measure has been recoded into values between 0 and 100. 
The variable corruption relies on the World Bank measure Control of Corruption 
found in the Worldwide Governance Indicators project (WGI) (The World Bank Group 
2009a).  The measure ranges from -2.5 to 2.5, with higher values corresponding with more 
control of corruption (Kaufmann et al. 2009). The index is made up by specialist assessments 
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 Given that the party is needed to maintain a majority in the parliament.  
71
 This is because in such settings, the prime minister is presumed to have full control over the party.  
72
 Following this line of argument, human development is assumed to depend on 1) the formation of human 
capabilities (improved health, knowledge and skills) and 2) the use people make of their acquired capabilities 
(employment, political affairs and productive activities) (ul Haq 2003:18-19). 
73
 Previous to 2005, data were gathered every 5 years from 1980 onwards (United Nations Development 
Programme 2009). 
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and opinion surveys from different institutions that all focus on corruption as the abuse of 
public office for private gain74. This variable has two shortcomings. First, data is only 
reported from 1996 onwards, in biennial intervals until 2002, followed by annual data. This 
means that there is no data for the early observation period75. To avoid many missing values 
in the dataset on this variable, a separate model will be run only including the years from 
1996 onwards when assessing the impact of corruption on compliance. Secondly, the validity 
of the measure is reduced as there exists a divide between what one wants to analyse 
(corruption) and what is actually measured (perception of corruption). Corruption is a 
sensitive issue, and one can easily think of numerous reasons why a respondent would not 
report its actual presence in society. Consequently, the use of a perception index reflects the 
difficulty of measuring the phenomenon directly. However, as very few incidents of 
corruption are reported, objective measures would also be nothing more than imperfect 
proxies. I therefore argue that this measure can reflect the situation in a realistic manner. 
A note should be made on why Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions 
Index (CPI), which is the most frequently used measure of corruption, have not been applied 
to this study. First, the World Bank measure included 154 countries in their first round in 
1996, whereas CPI only covered 41 countries in their first year, 1995. As the scope of this 
thesis is broad, missing values would have become a problem using CPI. Secondly, the basis 
for longitudinal comparison of the CPI measure is challenged by low validity. Transparency 
International report that their focus is not on changes over time, and has consequently edited 
their sample as well as their methodology over the course of time (Lambsdorff 2006:3). In 
contrast, the WGI-project focus on the advantages of comparisons across time, and changes to 
their samples have been done in a way so that the measures are still comparable (Kaufmann et 
al. 2009:19-22). Thirdly, the WGI-measure includes annual aggregate measures of corruption, 
whereas the CPI index for a year is made up by their scores in prior years. When using 
averages over time, the values are not independent of each other, causing unavoidable 
problems with autocorrelation. Lastly, the correlation between the two measures is close to 
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 These six sources make up the measure: World Bank’s Country Policy and Institutional Assessments, Political 
Risk Service’s International Country Risk Guide, Global Insight Business’ Conditions and Risk Indicators, 
Global Insight’s Gobal Risk Survey, Economist Intelligence Unit’s Country Risk Service and Democracy Index 
and World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Survey (Kaufmann et al. 2009:39) 
75
 An alternative corruption measure provided by the Political Risk Services Group (2010) exists and includes 
corruption measures for the entire time period. Nonetheless, these data are not available as the company owning 
it only share data in exchange for money, and the university made it clear that they would not pay for this access.    
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one, implying almost complete correlation76. This means that I do not loose valuable 
information about corruption when choosing the WGI over the CPI measure. 
Level of democracy is measured using the Polity2 score (Marshall and Jaggers 2009a). 
The Polity IV Project provides coding of democratic and autocratic “patterns of authority” in 
all independent countries with a population exceeding 500 000. The project is extensive, 
including regime data from 1800-2008, and has become leading in collecting data on regime 
characteristics (Marshall and Jaggers 2009b)77. In the original Polity score, democracies and 
autocracies are measured separately, based on expert evaluations of their competitiveness of 
executive recruitment, openness of executive recruitment, constraints on the Chief Executive 
and competitiveness of political participation. However, the acknowledgement that regimes 
can hold democratic as well as autocratic characteristics led to a synchronisation of the two 
scores.  Later, the Polity2 variable was added to render time-series analyses possible. The 
variable is a modification of the combined annual Polity score, ranging from -10 (strongly 
democratic) to +10 (strongly autocratic) (Marshall and Jaggers 2009b).  
Because data on democracy have become so available and central in much social 
science research, some critical remarks with regard to validity prove necessary. An important 
critique against the democracy indexes in general is that they aim at making an unobservable 
latent variable observable through different indicators, but do not seem to treat the chance of 
measurement error inherent in the selection process. In their comparison of nine democracy 
indices, Munch and Verkuilen (2002) find that only two provide a detailed justification for 
their indicators. Moreover, Hadenius and Teorell  (2004) find large discrepancies at different 
levels of the democracy scale when comparing five leading democracy indices. Moving to the 
specific issue of the Polity index, the conceptualisation has been criticised for focusing solely 
on contestation and not including an inclusiveness aspect as theorised by Dahl (1971). 
Another problem is the redundancy present in the index attributes78. This problem is never 
explained, and consequently many incidences of double counts are seen without any reason 
put to it. Moreover, its aggregation rules have been criticised. In short, the different indicators 
are considered to be equally important measures of democratic quality through a weighting 
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 Running a bivariate correlation analysis shows that the correlation between the two corruption indexes is ,971, 
the correlation being significant at a 1% level. 
77
 The Freedom House indicator for democracy and civil rights is not utilised in this thesis due to the limited 
accuracy of the rating over time. As Neumayer (2002) point out, changes in the score over time might reflect 
global changes rather than national institutional transformations. 
78
 The redundancy problem is evident in the Polity IV and Hadenius indices. First, they use the attributes 
competitiveness and regulation of participation, which reflect the competitiveness of a regime. Also, the indices 
competitiveness and openness of excecutive recruitment both measure competitiveness in connection with 
offices (Munck and Verkuilen 2002:14).  
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scheme that is not justified. The attributes are added together, assuming that this reflects the 
nature of democracy. Thus, a moving from 1 to 2 on indicator j is assumed to have the same 
impact as an increase from 1 to 2 on indicator k (Munck and Verkuilen 2002). Furthermore, 
Treier and Jackman (2008:205-206) point out that the assumption of independence between 
the indicators is broken. The pattern found in the interaction between the indicators clearly 
show that few of the combinations of values possible are actually observed, thus lowering 
randomness between attributes. Comparing different democracy measures, the authors also 
find that the cluster of cases at top and bottom of the Polity scale has comparatively high level 
of measurement errors. When these countries are obviously very different79, despite being 
given the same score, the precision of the Polity estimate must be treated carefully. Despite 
this critique, the Polity index is one of the democracy indices that best treat the problems 
connected with conceptualisation, measurement and aggregation. Also, Munch and Verkuilen 
(2002:29-30) end up finding high correlations between the democracy measures, indicating 
that despite different procedures, they seem to be measuring the same.  
 Level of economic development is measured by GDP per capita PPP in constant 2005 
US dollars. Data are gathered from the World Bank (2009b). I have registered the data per 
1000 US dollars to make the numbers easier to manage. Also, the natural logarithm of the 
GDP measure is taken as it is assumed that the impact of each additional dollar decreases as 
income increases. As mentioned in chapter three, the theory of the Environmental Kuznets 
Curve argues for a squared relationship between economic development and the success of 
environmental policy. Because of expectations of collinearity, pre-tests (not reported) on the 
linear variable and the squared term for different samples are run. I find that the squared term 
fails to reach joint significance across all models, whereas the linear model performs 
considerably better. Hence, the squared version is not included and H9 is not further tested.  
 Based on La Porta et al. (1999) a nominal operationalisation of different legal systems 
has been reported in the Quality of Government dataset (Teorell et al. 2009). The original 
variable has been recoded into two dummy variables to reflect the theory that Socialist law 
and French civil law are unfavourable when compliance with IEAs is considered (Simmons 
2000). To create more flexibility in the estimations and see whether they yield interesting 
results, additional dummies considering Common law, German civil law and Scandinavian 
civil law are also included. When dummy variables are exclusive and complete like here, one 
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 In their analysis, Treier and Jackman (2008:210) find that countries as diverse as Mongolia, Costa Rica and 
Papua New Guinea are considered to have democracy levels that are indistinguishable from the United States, 
based on data from 2000. 
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dummy must serve as a reference category to avoid perfect collinearity (Cleves et al. 
2008:172-174). Here, I make the Scandinavian civil law dummy the reference category, 
omitting it from the remaining estimations.  
 
5.3.3 Legitimacy factors 
World Value and European Value Surveys (WVS/EVS) were used to gather data on public 
attitudes towards the government with regard to environmental issues. Data from four waves 
made up the background for the data, asking respondents to give their opinion about the 
statement “Government should reduce environmental pollution” (European Values Study 
Group and World Values Survey Association 2006:125). However, there are too much 
missing data, and a minimum of the countries under study have data covering the entire 
observation period. Consequently, it is not methodologically justifiable to run this variable in 
the analysis. Excluding variables is problematic when there exists theoretical expectations 
considering their importance. Nonetheless, too many missing values create problems for the 
entire sample, even though sophisticated methods have been developed to handle missing 
data80, I find excluding the variable to be the soundest solution. Thus, I conclude that public 
support will not be further dealt with in this thesis. 
MP membership - length is a numeric variable coded with information from the 
secretariats of the Montreal Protocol (The Ozone secretariat 2009). The year an agreement 
enters into force on a party is coded as the first member year. Following a fractional 
polynomials test, the covariate exhibited an inversely squared function with the log hazard. 
Thus, this variable is presented through an interaction term in the analysis.  
The three hypotheses introduced in the theory chapter necessitate two variables to be 
reflected. First, an EU-membership dummy is included to reflect H13. Then, a numeric 
variable identifying EU membership - length, counted from the year the member countries 
enter the EU, is included to reflect H14 and H15. The coding of the variables is based on 
information taken from Perkins and Neumayer (2007). Because of collinearity between the 
two measures, as well as with the theoretical expectations being strongest for the numerical 
covariate, the EU-membership dummy is excluded from the upcoming analysis81. 
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 See Honaker and King (2010) assessment on “multiple imputation.” 
81
 It is always unfortunate to leave out theoretically justified variables from an analysis. Nevertheless, running 
the dummy variable for EU-membership through the models (not-reported), the predictor fails to reach 
significance in all of them. Thus, we can be certain that the null-hypothesis of no relationship between EU-
membership per se and chance of reaching compliance stands, and that it was not of importance to the analysis.  
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The importance of active ENGOs pushing for compliance is hard to measure. Ideally, 
financial resources and membership base should make up this measure, but such data are not 
easy to get hold of. Binder and Neumayer (2005:531) utilize the number of ENGOs per capita 
as a proxy for an optimal measure where budgets and membership base is considered. As 
opposed to Binder and Neumayer’s limited sample, my global sample further complicates 
such a measure as proper information of ENGOs in all countries in the world is hard to 
acquire. Alternatively, measuring the number of environmental NGOs at the national level 
could be a good measure. However, Roberts et al. (2004:28) point out that this measure is 
problematic for two reasons. First, the word “environmental” has become a rather fuzzy 
concept that is hard to measure strictly. Secondly, NGOs in the developing world are often 
cross-issue oriented and do not merely treat the environment alone. Consequently, a proxy 
indicator, based on the Yearbook of International Organisations and reported by the UNDP 
Human Development Report (2002:42-45), measures the number of active NGOs and is used 
to reflect ENGO strength in civil society. This has been measured for year 2000 for all 
countries; consequently this variable is treated as constant in the analysis. Although not 
optimal, this is the best available measure on global ENGO activity. The assumption 
underlying this selection is that the more NGOs there are in a society, the more ENGOs one 
would expect to find in a nation. This measure is problematic. First, one might expect the 
number of NGOs to vary with the size and geographical placement in the world, creating bias 
in the estimates. Secondly, a high number of NGOs in society does not equal presence of 
ENGOs. However, we know that where few NGOs are found, chances are high that 
environmental organisations are also prevented from operating. As this indicator is a proxy, 
the validity of this measure is weakened, and consequently the results should be interpreted 
with care. To ease interpretation, the variable is reported per 100 NGO in a society. 
The variable green party popularity is measured through a global measure that 
estimates the distribution of seats in parliament gained through elections by Green parties82. 
Information about green parties worldwide are drawn from the Global Greens Network 
(Global Greens 2010), whereas election results are found in the PARLINE database managed 
by the Inter-Parliamentary Union (2010). Green parties are first and foremost existent in the 
developed world, as a result of post-materialist values theorised to coincide with increased 
wealth (Inglehart 1997). However, it turns out that Green parties are prominent in quite a few 
                                                 
82
 To evaluate which parties should be included under the label ‘Green parties’ I primarily base my evaluation on 
the parties that are members of the Global Greens network (Global Greens 2010). But not all green parties are 
affiliates here, and to avoid bias all parties that include the words ‘environment’, ‘ecology’ or ‘green’ in their 
party name are considered a green party.  
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developing countries as well, making their inclusion in this variable important. Where 
information about green parties is unavailable (mostly authoritarian regimes), additional 
sources are used. In most of these states, political parties turn out to be banned. Consequently, 
these were given the value 0, the same value as for states that have multiparty government, 
but where the greens are not represented. This is a problem theoretically, as green parties have 
the opportunity to enter the parliament where parties are allowed, whereas the situation is 
completely different in states where parties are banned. Nonetheless, I argue that this is an 
acceptable way to register the phenomenon for my thesis.  
With regard to validity, the measure reflects the actual support for green parties rather 
inconsistently. The electoral system in a state may either favour or hinder representation of 
the green movement in the political sphere. Another problem is that this variable does not 
measure the amount of green seats relative to the actual amount of seats in parliament. The 
size of the legislative can vary dramatically between states, and if the amount of seats is 
supposed to be a proxy of the green party’s political influence, the absolute number of seats 
does not tell us very much if parliament size is not included in the measure83. Despite the 
problems inherent in this measure, it is found valuable as such a variable is usually never 
applied on a global sample. Also, with clear theoretical expectations to this phenomenon, 
excluding it from the analysis would lead to a loss in the analysis. 
The measure of the left-libertarian executive are obtained from the Database of 
Political Institutions, published by the World Bank (Keefer 2009). The variable chief 
executive party orientation is coded into left, centrist and right, based mainly on the content of 
the party name84. As the hypothesis indicates, my theoretical expectation is regarding left-
libertarian leadership. To reflect this anticipation in my operationalisation, the variable is 
recoded into a dummy where left-wing and centrist executives are coupled together, with right 
wing executives making up the reference category. The coding of leftist and centrist 
governments into left-libertarian is based on the definitions provided in the codebook. Here, a 
left-wing party is defined as: “communist, socialist, social democratic, or left wing,” whereas 
the centrist parties are defined as “centrist, or when party position can best be described as 
centrist (e.g. party advocates strengthening private enterprise in a social-liberal context)” 
(Keefer 2009:6). It should be noted that this interpretation of left, centre and right is based on 
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 To illustrate, the smallest country included in the sample, Bahrain, has a Chamber of Representatives holding 
40 seats, whereas the most populous state, China, inhabits 2987 seats in the National Peoples Congress (CIA 
World Factbook 2010b). Thus, occupying ten seats in the Bahraini parliament would be dramatically different 
from occupying ten seats in the Chinese legislative. 
84
 In the cases where party names did not indicate any orientation, several alternative approaches were used to 
identify party orientation. For a closer look at their other measurement mechanisms, see Keefer (2009:6-7). 
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a European understanding. Outside the developed world, Keefer (2009) has consulted 
additional sources to make sure that the party names actually reflected their ideological 
orientation. Where this distinction did not fit the categorisation, it has been coded 0. As such, 
I argue that the validity of this measure is satisfactory.  
 Lastly, the regional effect of IEA compliance is here understood as the percentage of 
countries in a region85 that has complied at time t. As the factional polynomials test revealed a 
logged relationship with the log hazard, the variable is logged in the upcoming analysis.  
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 The regions are taken from the United Nations (2000). 
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6. Analysing the determinants of compliance with the 
Montreal Protocol 
The aim of this thesis is to analyse what makes states comply with soft international 
environmental law within the frames of the Montreal Protocol. To do this, the biggest sample 
of member states possible has been collected, analysing behaviour from the onset of each 
member state's ratification. As this is one of the first statistical studies on party behaviour in 
IEAs, the main achievement of this thesis is to test different hypotheses based on previous 
research conducted on environmental performance, and apply it to the study of state 
behaviour within the study on compliance. 
A Cox semi-parametric regression model will be used to look into the theorised 
expectations of the influence of national structural factors on the likelihood of compliance. 
The main assumption underlying this research tool is that the propensity to experience 
compliance either increases or decreases as covariates are included in the analysis. As this is a 
longitudinal study, I am able both to say something about the hazard at one point in time and 
to draw conclusions based on how members behave over time, thus strengthening our ability 
to make causal inferences.  
This chapter starts off with introducing descriptive statistics of the variables. Next, 
bivariate Cox models are examined, revealing the relationship between the dependent variable 
and its covariates. Subsequently, multivariate Cox models will be introduced, allowing for 
statistical control. Based on the findings in the analyses, a synthesis model is established, 
followed by a thorough discussion related to the theoretical expectations.  
 
6.1 Descriptive statistics – range and distribution 
Before the results of the analysis are presented, a look at the distribution of data is important 
to create a proper understanding of the data used. As event history analysis does not assume 
normal distributed functions, skewed variables are not considered a substantial problem for 
the analysis (Cleves et al. 2008:2). Table 3 gives an overview of the minimum and maximum 
value, mean, standard deviation and observed N for the dependent and the independent 
variables, the latter being organised based on their theoretical affiliation.  
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics 
 Variable type Min. Max. Mean Std.Dev Obs N. 
Dependent variable       
     Compliance Dummy 0 1 ,24 ,42 2513 
Independent variables       
Realist factors       
     Country strength (pop.) Numeric 0,49 1314,36 43,31 139,99 2454 
     Ec. integration Numeric 0,7 74,30 6,53 4,23 2380 
Institutionalist factors       
     Government autonomy Numeric 1 18 2,88 1,74 2404 
     Government capacity Numeric 25,4 97,1 70,72 17,83 2152 
     Corruption Numeric -2,09 2,39 -,15 ,94 1845 
     Democracy Numeric -10 10 3,08 6,61 2419 
     Ec. development Numeric -1,83 4,20 1,56 1,29 2386 
     Common law Dummy 0 1 ,30 ,46 2457 
     French civil law Dummy 0 1 ,44 ,50 2457 
     Socialist law Dummy 0 1 ,21 ,41 2457 
     German civil law Dummy 0 1 ,03 ,18 2457 
     Scandinavian civil law Dummy 0 1 ,02 ,14 2457 
Constructivist factors       
     IEA-membership(length) Numeric 1 20 9,01 5,24 2457 
     EU-membership(length) Numeric 0 57 2,02 8,90 2457 
     NGO activity Numeric ,01 35,51 9,43 8,55 2390 
     Green Party Popularity Numeric 0 55 1,05 4,99 2439 
     Left-libertarian executive Dummy 0 1 ,61 ,49 1405 
     Regional compliance Numeric -5,50 2,10 -2,96 3,04 2015 
The interacted variables are not included here as nothing substantial about the nature of the variable 
can be interpreted from these. 
 
6.1.1 The dependent variable 
When evaluating a binary variable, the interpretation of the mean and standard error values 
differs from that of a continuous variable. However, the mean gives information about the 
proportion of subjects attaining the value 1 in the variable (Midtbø 2007:44). Thus, for the 
dependent variable in this study, compliance, it is clear that 24 percent of the country-years86 
in this analysis attained 1 and consequently is in compliance. 
                                                 
86
 The designation country-years is used synonymously with observations in this analysis. It refers to the fact 
that there are several observations across time for each country, and thus that each observation is valid only for 
the country for a specified year.  
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6.1.2 Enforcement determinants 
Country strength shows that the countries included in the analysis range between a population 
of 500 000 and 1,3 billion. Taking the mean into account, it is clear that most countries 
included in the study belong to the lower percentiles of this measure, identifying a skewed 
distribution in the predictor. Economic integration varies between 0,7 and 74,3, with a mean 
and standard deviation of 6,53 and 4,23 respectively. This tells us that most country-years find 
themselves inhabiting values between 2 and 11, and that few inhabit extreme values.  
  
6.1.3 Managerial determinants 
Government autonomy, government capacity and corruption, as well as democracy, are all 
numerical predictors. Even though the government autonomy variable ranges from 1 to 18, the 
mean of 2,93 tells us that the maximum value is an extreme, and that few veto players is a 
much more common situation than many veto players. Government capacity is measured 
through the Human Development Index which has been stretched out to range from 0 to 100. 
As the HDI is a composite index, it is hard to interpret exactly what a change in values means. 
Its mean reveals that most countries are placed on the upper half of the index, and this 
signifies that they are better at human development. However, it is hard to evaluate the 
distance between each value in this measure. Corruption ranges from -2,09 to 2,42 and has a 
mean of -,15 and standard deviation of ,94. The mean moves close to the median, signifying 
that most values are centred around the median values indicating an even distribution. 
However, the extreme values show that there exist states that deviate from this pattern. 
Whereas the democracy variable ranges from -10 to 10, the mean of 3,21 and the standard 
deviation value of 6,60 tells us that the states under scrutiny are quite evenly placed on the 
values, but that there is a majority of countries placed on the democratic side in the period 
under analysis.  
 As mentioned in the operationalisation, economic development has been logged, 
meaning its values have been stretched at lower values and compressed at higher values. This 
hardens descriptive interpretation as the distance between values is unknown. However, one 
can say something about the distance between values per se. This is important as the hazard 
rates in the upcoming analysis are based on a one unit change in the corresponding variable. 
Minimum value is -1,83 and reported maximum value is 4,20. This places the values more 
evenly out, which is visible through the mean value of 1,56 and a standard deviation of 1,29.  
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Legal origin has been divided into four binary variables, a fifth one serving as a 
reference category. First, the mean of Common law signifies that 30 percent of the member 
states have this legal system. Second, the mean of French civil law indicates that 44 percent of 
the member states have a French legal system.  Fourth, member states practising a socialist 
law system make up 21 percent, whereas only three percent have adopted a German civil law 
system. The reference category, the Scandinavian civil system, makes up the two remaining 
percents of states in this study 
 
6.1.4 Legitimacy determinants 
The IEA-membership - length variable has values from 1 to 20, with 9,03 being the mean 
value and 5,25 the covariate's standard deviation. From this we understand that most member 
states are members to the Montreal Protocol from five to 15 years of the period under analysis. 
This also corresponds with the historical assessment of the Protocol. EU-membership – length 
has a skewed distribution. It ranges from 0 to 57, with a mean of 2,02 and a standard deviation 
of 8,90. Thus, the majority of countries in the analysis are given values at the lower end of the 
scale. Such a distribution is not surprising, taking into account that there are 154 countries in 
the analysis and 27 members of the EU. Moreover, the proxy variable for ENGOs ranges 
from ,01 to 35,51 with a mean value and standard deviation of 9,43 and 8,55 respectively. 
Thus, we see that also for this variable the distribution is not entirely even across the range of 
values, lower values being overrepresented in the sample. 
The Green party covariate lets us know that even though the variable's maximum 
value is 55, this is an extreme case, as the mean and standard deviation when all county-years 
are considered are 1,23 and 5,28 respectively. This skewed distribution reveals what the 
theoretical discussion already suggested; that green party popularity is mainly a regional 
phenomenon in the western world, and that all in all, green parties tend to be quite marginal 
when seat representation is considered. Left-libertarian executive is a binary predictor. Based 
on the mean value, we find that in 60 percent of the subject-years in this analysis, a left-
libertarian government is in charge. This, however, goes against my historical knowledge of 
the world between 1989 and 2008. Considering coutry-years, we find the reason for this 
unlikely finding. This is the predictor with the lowest N, and when looking at the data it 
becomes clear that the reported missing values are mainly seen in the developing world. This 
bias is unfortunate, and weakens the robustness of the findings for this predictor.  
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Lastly, regional compliance is also logged, rendering interpretation hard. Ranging 
from -5,50 to 2,10, but with a mean of -2.96 and standard deviation of 3,04, the predictor has 
been manipulated into distributing the country-year values evenly around the mean by 
stretching out lower values and compressing high values.  
 
6.2 Bivariate Cox regressions 
Bivariate regressions produce the first indications of the strength of the theories presented in 
chapter three. Here the independent variables are measured against the dependent variable 
separately, meaning the effect of other covariates on the single variable is not taken into 
consideration. However, bivariate regressions are important because they say something about 
how the covariates behave separately. Also, it reveals if the explanatory variables have any 
effect when regressed against the dependent variable alone, and if they do, if it is in the 
expected direction.  
 
Table 4: Bivariate Cox regression of compliance with the Montreal Protocol 
Independent variables Hazard 
Ratio 
Robust 
Standard 
error 
Z Number of 
subjects 
Events Time at  
risk 
 
Country strength 1.001 .001 2.54 154 115 2031 
Country strength inv.sq. 1.020 .011 1.91 154 115 2031 
Ec. integration 1.021 .032 .66 150 114 1959 
Government autonomy 1.039 .031 1.28 152 114 1982 
Government capacity 1.001 .006 0.06 146 109 1742 
Corruption 1.100 .131 0.80 146 108 1425 
Democracy 1.038* .017 2.39 153 115 1996 
Ec. development logged 1.001 .076 0.01 150 114 1965 
Common law 1.266 .268 1.11 154 115 2034 
French civil law .797 .163 -1.11 154 115 2034 
Socialist law .918 .210 -0.38 154 115 2034 
German civil law 1.423 1.019 0.49 154 115 2034 
Scandinavian civil law 9.473*** 6.747 3.16 154 115 2034 
MP membership – length  1.004 .026 0.16 154 115 2034 
MP membership – length inv.sq .976* .012 -2.04 154 115 2034 
EU membership - length .987 .013 -1.02 154 115 2034 
ENGO activity 1.006 .016 0.36 147 113 1969 
Green party popularity .976 .075 -0.32 153 114 2018 
Green party pop*analysis time 1.005 .007 0.71 153 114 2018 
Left-libertarian executive 1.021 .248 0.08 108 67 1121 
Regional compliance logged 2.349*** .463 4.34 154 115 2034 
Wald test Green pop*t, chi2 
Prob>chi2, 
1.29 
0.524 
     
Wald test MPlength(sq.), chi2 
Prob>chi2 
4.78 
0.091 
     
Wald test C.strength(sq.), chi2 
Prob>chi2 
6.72 
0.035 
     
Standard errors are robust. Efron method is used to handle ties. 
Significance: *** p<.001 ** p<.01 * p<.05 • p<.10. The tests are all two-tailed. 
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Rather few covariates come out of the model with a significant effect on the hazard of 
compliance. Starting out with the variables focusing on autonomy when explaining 
compliance, integration in the world economy is not found to be significant, confirming the 
null hypothesis of no effect. However, the inversely squared country strength reaches joint 
significance through the reported Wald test (see lower part of the table)87.  
Among the variables focusing on the importance of an effective institutional 
framework, most factors have a positive effect on the likelihood of reaching compliance, 
corresponding with the theoretical expectations. The better government capacity, the better 
control on corruption, the more democratic and the higher economic development, the higher 
the hazard for experiencing compliance, corresponding with theoretical expectations. 
Nonetheless, only democracy reports a significant effect. The variable government autonomy 
shows that an increase in the number of veto players is followed by an increase in the hazard 
of compliance. Even though the result is not significant, this contradicts the theory assuming 
that the more veto players, the less autonomy and, consequently, less efficiency in the policy 
making process. Lastly, the dummy variables, making up the expectation of a countries legal 
system on IEA compliance, show mixed effects. French civil law and Socialist law both show 
the expected negative relationship, but fails to reach significance. Common law and German 
civil law show a positive effect, but fail to turn out significant, whereas the effect of 
Scandinavian civil law is extreme, reporting a significant nine times higher propensity for 
experiencing compliance if this legal system is at the base of a society. Two factors weaken 
the reliability of this finding. First, the high standard error reports that the variable is not to be 
trusted. Secondly, when inspecting the data, we find that only three countries in the analysis 
have this legal system88, and two of them comply early, explaining the extreme hazard 
reported. Thus, this finding should not be rendered much explanatory power. 
 Moving on to the factors emphasising social learning and legitimacy, mixed results are 
reported. The inversely squared MP membership function is through a Wald test found to 
significantly affect the chance of compliance. Moreover, active ENGOs, left-libertarian 
executive and regional compliance are found to have a positive effect on the likelihood of 
experiencing compliance. Only the last predictor is significant, though. Lastly, the interacted 
green party popularity fails to reach significance, and thus the effect of no relationship 
between the variable and compliance with the Montreal Protocol is upheld. 
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 The actual effect of the interacted and logged variables is only reported for the upcoming multivariate 
regression as it is here the main focus of the analysis lie. 
88
 The countries are Norway, Sweden and Finland. Denmark and Iceland would also have been included here, 
but as mentioned earlier they are not included in the sample. 
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This initial analysis shows possible relationships in the data. However, the robustness 
of these findings is limited as they do not control for the effect of other variables, and 
consequently may be reporting spurious relationships in the data. Neither do they take into 
consideration the problem of collinearity between independent variables that is so common in 
social sciences analyses. In the following section, multivariate Cox regression models will be 
introduced, providing more valid results of the relationship between the likelihood of reaching 
compliance and its determinants. 
 
6.3 Multivariate Cox regressions 
As already mentioned, a great advantage with multivariate regression is that it enables 
estimation of the real effect of the independent variables on the achievement of compliance 
with the Montreal Protocol, statistically controlled for the effect of the other covariates. Yet, 
including several covariates in the same regression creates new challenges to secure valid 
measurement of their separate effects. Thus, a premise for multivariate regression is that the 
effect of the explanatory variable (X) on the dependent variable (Y) is independent from the 
effect of the other covariates included in the analysis. If there exists correlation between two 
explanatory variables, collinearity is present in the data. This means that the effect of the two 
variables is hard to isolate as they tend to appear simultaneously for most subjects. As a result, 
accurate estimation of the relative contribution of each variable to the analysis becomes 
difficult (Skog 2004:286-288). 
 To get an overview of the presence of collinearity among the independent variables, a 
correlation analysis was conducted. Table 13 in Appendix reports the results89. The pairwise 
correlations show that the covariates economic development and government capacity have 
severe collinearity problems with a Pearsons R value of 0.92. This does not come as a surprise 
as HDI is used to measure government capacity, and this composite measure includes 
economic development as part of the index. Based on the theoretical interest in these two 
measures, they will both be included in the analysis, but will not appear jointly in the same 
model.  Furthermore, some variables correlate at a problematically high level. This is the case 
for corruption, which shows values above 0.7 when paired with ENGO-activity and economic 
development. Economic development and ENGO-activity also correlate on this level. This 
                                                 
89
 For Pearsons R scores below 0.5, collinearity is considered modest, with limited influence on the results. 
Values of 0.6 and 0.7 lead to big standard errors, and as the values comes close to 0.8 the data becomes 
unreliable (Skog 2004:288).   
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indicates that the three covariates tend to measure similar phenomenons as they appear 
together most of the time. Because the corruption predictor is weakly justified and is stricken 
by missing data, it is excluded from the analysis90. Lastly, the pairwise correlations reveal that 
the stratification variable, Article 5-membership, shows Pearsons R-values around 0.6 with 
five covariates (Government capacity, NGO-activity, Regional Compliance, Economic 
development and Corruption).  When stratifying the models after this variable, then, we risk 
that parts of the covariates' effect is absorbed by this variable. Still, the theoretical 
justifications for choosing a stratified model is more important than maximising model fit, I 
argue.  
   
6.3.1 Compliance with the Montreal Protocol – the results 
Table 6 reports the results of the effect country-specific factors have on the chance of 
reaching compliance with the Montreal Protocol. The composition of the models has been 
chosen based on the dual wish to maximise N as well as including as many relevant variables 
as possible. Thus, the first model has the largest N and least covariates included. As more 
covariates are enclosed in the analysis, the amount of observations drops due to missing data. 
Recall that the results reported are hazard ratios, not coefficients. This means that they 
must be interpreted as relative to 1. Reported values below 1.0 signify a negative effect on the 
hazard rate per unit positive change in the covariate. On the opposite side, values above 1.0 
indicate a positive effect between a one unit increase in the explanatory variable and the 
hazard ratio for reaching compliance.  To exemplify, a democracy variable reporting a hazard 
ratio of .95 would mean that one unit change in the democracy covariate leads to a five 
percentage point reduction in the hazard rate (meaning it is less likely that compliance is 
reached relative to the previous value). On the other hand, a hazard ratio of 1.05 tells us that 
for a one unit increase in the democracy variable, the chance of experiencing compliance 
heightens with five percentage points compared to the previous covariate value. Also, one 
should keep in mind that the Cox regression performed is stratified, meaning that all hazards 
reported are controlled for inter-member differences with regard to the postponement on 
emission reduction given to Article-5 countries.  
                                                 
90
 When the analysis is run including the corruption variable, it is far from statistically significant, also when the 
correlating covariates are excluded from the model. This is a strong indication that the corruption covariate does 
not affect the increase in the hazard ratio for experiencing compliance. Furthermore, a Wald test is also run, 
reporting a chi2 value of 0.33, thus showing that leaving the Corruption variable out does not lead to a 
significant reduction in model fit. Consequently, we can be quite certain that leaving this variable out of the 
analysis does not lead to decreasing explanatory models. 
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The Cox model assesses coefficient significance using Wald statistics. Thus, the 
reported p-values are based on reported Z scores91. Tests of model fit are introduced at the 
bottom of table 6. As mentioned earlier, the log-pseudolikelihood test and Wald chi squared 
test report whether the models significantly contribute to explaining the nature of compliance 
measured against an empty model. The higher value, the better the covariates are at 
explaining the phenomenon under scrutiny. When comparing across models, only the Wald 
chi squared test is used due to reduced robustness of the -log pseudolikelihood measure. 
Related is another model fit test, linktest, which reports whether the model (_hat) is correctly 
specified as opposed to an alternative model (_hatsq) with random covariates92. Lastly, 
univariate Wald tests for the interacted variables are included for all three models; showing 
that in all models the inclusion of the original variable alongside the interacted covariate 
significantly improves the model. All models cover the period 1989-2008. Considering the 
limited number of country-years, especially in model 3, a .10-level will serve as the cut-off 
point for significant results. Two-tailed tests are run on all variables. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
91
 These are interpreted the same way as the  t values used for testing coefficient’s significance in linear 
regression models (Hair et al. 2006:273). 
92
 The linktest is a test verifying that the specifications of covariates are good by searching for hypothetical 
variables to add to the model. The variable hat_ should be significant, whereas the variable hat_sq should be 
insignificant. This is because _hat represents the predicted value from the model. _hatsq, on the other hand, 
should not have much predictive power except by chance if the model is properly specified. 
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Table 5: Multivariate analysis of the Montreal Protocol  
Independent variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Country strength 1.001** 
(.000) 
1.000 
(.000) 
.999 
(.001) 
Country strength inversely squared 1.034** 
(.013) 
1.044** 
(.017) 
1.046* 
(.057) 
Integration in world economy  1.006 
(.043) 
.980 
(.040) 
Government autonomy  .961 
(.048) 
1.061 
(.050) 
Government capacity   .989 
(.017) 
Democracy  1.022 
(.022) 
.976 
(.032) 
Economic development  .818∗ 
(.079) 
 
Common law .997 
(.832) 
1.061 
(.934) 
1.450 
(1.437) 
French civil law 1.199 
(1.037) 
1.256 
(1.150) 
1.090 
(1.175) 
Socialist law .859 
(.764) 
1.126 
(1.105) 
1.593 
(1.847) 
German civil law .981 
(.783) 
1.002 
(.810) 
1.058 
(1.209) 
MP-membership (length) 1.016 
(.031) 
1.024 
(.037) 
1.046 
(.057) 
MP-membership inversely squared .967** 
(.012) 
.958** 
(.016) 
.951* 
(.022) 
EU-membership (length) .966* 
(016) 
.963• 
(.020) 
.968 
(.022) 
ENGO-activity  1.029 
(.038) 
1.014 
(.060) 
Green party popularity .905 
(.076) 
.902 
 (.082) 
.910• 
(.051) 
Green party pop*analysis time 1.016* 
(.006) 
1.016* 
(.007) 
1.018*** 
(.004) 
Left-libertarian executive   1.201 
(.400) 
Regional compliance 2.633*** 
(.554) 
2.507*** 
(.506) 
2.424*** 
(.521) 
Number of country-years 2015 1855 977 
Number of compliance events 114 111 66 
Log-pseudolikelihood -397.18 -374.42 -169.18 
Wald chi2 44.42 49.19 76.01 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Linktest, _hat 
Linktest, _hatsq 
0.000 
0.539 
0.000 
0.456 
0.000 
0.424 
Wald test Green pop.*t, chi2 
Prob>chi2, Wald test Green pop.*t 
9.99 
.007 
8.92 
.012 
29.99 
.000 
Wald test, MP-length (sq.), chi2 
Prob>chi2, Wald test MPlength(sq.) 
8.60 
.013 
9.00 
.011 
6.84 
.033 
Wald test, Country strength (sq.) 
Prob>chi2, Wald test C.strength(sq.) 
9.56 
.008 
10.84 
.004 
4.81 
.092 
Reported hazard ratios. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Efron method is used to handle ties.  
Significance: *** p<.001 ** p<.01 * p<.05 • p<.10. 
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6.3.2 Model one 
Model one has the biggest sample, with 2015 country-years93  and 114 instances of 
compliance occurring. Recall that the Cox regressions are all stratified, and that the reported 
results takes into account the heterogeneity found between the two different groups of 
members to the Montreal Protocol. Thus, significant results see the same patterns in both 
member camps. 
Country strength was identified as having a non-linear trend through fractional 
polynomials and was thus included alongside an inversely squared version in the regression. 
As with all squared functions, country strength and country strength inversely squared can 
not be interpreted independently. Even though both predictors turn out statistically significant 
in model one, the univariate Wald chi squared test shows that jointly, the covariates are 
significant at the 01.-level. To interpret the predictor’s effect on the hazard ratio, an equation 
was run on the coefficients. The results reported in Table 16 in Appendix show a monotonic 
negative effect of a one million increase in population at different values of the predictor. 
There is a steep and clear trend towards 50 million, and after that the effect of one million 
more inhabitants is diminishing. After 100 million inhabitants the hazard ratios decrease has 
levelled up around 0, meaning that a one million rise in population reduces the likelihood of 
moving into compliance with the Montreal Protocol by 100 percentage points94. 
None of the dummy variables included to measure the effect of legal system turn out 
statistically significant. As such, they confirm the null hypothesis of no connection between 
legal system characteristics and the chance of reaching compliance with the Montreal 
Protocol. Considering the theorised relation, Socialist law shows the expected negative sign 
when moving from Scandinavian law (the reference category), whereas French civil law 
shows a positive effect on the hazard of experiencing compliance, contradicting its theoretical 
basis. Common law and German civil law were also found to be insignificant. Recall that they 
were included to create flexibility in the subject of interest, and thus are not of theoretical 
                                                 
93
 Originally, the sample was considerably bigger, containing 2457 country-years. However, when telling 
STATA that my data are to be used in an event history analysis (using the stset-function), STATA excludes 423 
observations because they include information about the subjects after they have reached compliance, thus 
exiting the analysis. The final sample then, is on 2034 observations.  
94
 One should however be aware that there are only ten countries in the sample with a population of more than 
100 million, meaning that the finding may be an artefact of the limited number of observations at the high 
population level as well as of the squared equation used in the estimation. Still, running the equation on a sample 
excluding the extreme outliers China, India and the US, shows the exact same curve, indicating that the trend 
seems to reflect the data. 
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importance. Big standard errors combined with non-significant findings render all legal 
system results unreliable95.   
Like the country strength predictor, MP membership - length is evaluated through an 
inversely squared function. Running a Wald Chi squared test shows that the two predictors are 
jointly significant with a p-value of 0,014, thus their effects must be regarded as valid for the 
larger population of member states. Looking at its effect for a one year change on different 
values of the predictor, we find that the effect is positive across all values. Yet, the effect is 
more modest for a one year increase on smaller values before it starts increasing rapidly from 
ten year onwards. The first year a signatory state’s chance of reaching compliance increases 
with 16,7 percentage points for one additional affiliate year. Yet, as states have been members 
for ten years, the hazard doubles for one year added and as one moves towards twenty the 
reported hazards become extreme96.  
EU-membership – length is significant at a five percent level. The results indicate that 
a one extra year as an EU-member leads to a 4,4 percentage point reduction in the likelihood 
of reaching compliance. This supports the theories assuming better compliance records for 
new EU-members.  
 The Green party popularity failed to pass the Schoenfeld proportionality test. 
Consequently, an interacted version, multiplying Green party popularity with analysis time is 
included alongside the original variable. Like the squared functions, this interaction can not be 
evaluated without both variables being jointly included in the analysis. A univariate Wald chi 
squared test confirms that the two variables combined are significant and thus improve model 
fit. The direction of the connection signifies that the original Green party variable sees a 
negative development, whereas the interacted variable shows a positive effect on the hazard 
ratio. To be able to interpret the effect of this non-linear relationship, the covariates’ 
coefficients are run through an equation reported in Table 14 in Appendix. The table reveals 
that the effect of the variable on the likelihood of experiencing compliance changes over time. 
Initially, the hazard ratio is negative, before the function changes direction after 6,4 years. 
After this, the effect slowly turns more positive, and for the last observation point the hazard 
has jumped to 1.219, indicating that one extra green seat in parliament in year 19 leads to 21,9 
                                                 
95
 The high standard errors can probably be explained by the few observations present on some of the dummies. 
Both Scandinavian law and German civil law has got way too few observations to see robust results here. 
Furthermore, bivariate variables tend to have higher standard errors that metric variables as there is smaller 
variation across the sample (Skog 2004:286).  
96
 A probable reason for the extreme effect on the hazard ratio on higher values is that most countries in this 
analysis do actually comply with the Montreal Protocol during the analysis time, and this rate is especially high 
for the ones who have been members the longest. This should affect the hazard substantially. 
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percentage point bigger chance of fulfilling the compliance obligations to the Montreal 
Protocol.  
 Regional compliance is found to have a significant effect on the likelihood of reaching 
compliance at the .001-level. The reported positive effect is in accordance with the theoretical 
expectations. A one unit increase in the variable reports an extreme 163 percentage point raise 
in the hazard ratio of experiencing compliance. As this variable is logged, measuring absolute 
change does not give much intuitive meaning (Skog 2004:248). Thus, the reported 
coefficients are modified into measuring the effect of one percentage point change in the 
predictor97. When doing this, we find that for a one percentage point positive change in 
regional compliance the hazard ratio is raised by 2,7 percentage points. This may sound like a 
minimal effect, but keep in mind that the variable is continuous and contains 100 values, 
meaning that the difference between units is qualitatively smaller than the distance between 
units in a bivariate covariate.  
 In terms of overall fit, Model one performs well. The –log pseudolikelihood value 
reports -397,18, which must be considered good on the premises that the higher the negative 
number, the better the model. Furthermore, the Wald chi squared test measuring the strength 
of the model is statistically significant at a .001-level, concluding that the model is better than 
the null model of mere chance. The test itself of 44,42 is not particularly high. As the test 
measures covariates’ strength at explaining accord compliance, this is an indication that the 
model performs moderately when explaining the parameters. Lastly, linktest performs well, 
showing that Model one (_hat) includes well specified and significant covariates, whereas the 
competing model (_hatsq) representing mere chance is far from being statistically significant.   
 
6.3.3 Model two 
Model two includes five new covariates into the analysis, consequently reducing the number 
of observations and compliance incidents to 1855 and 111, respectively. Integration in world 
economy fails to meet statistical significance, and furthermore seems to have close to no effect 
on the likelihood to reach compliance with a hazard ratio of 1.006. Despite its minimal effect, 
the result is in the hypothesised direction. The negative effect of government autonomy is in 
accordance with theoretical expectations, but fails to significantly affect a member state’s 
compliance record. Moving on to democracy, a positive relationship is found, corresponding 
                                                 
97
 To find the effect of a one percent rise in a logged covariate, the coefficient is divided by 100. Furthermore, 
the hazard ratio is detected by exponentiating the modified coefficient. 
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with theory, but again a p-value of .292 shows that the results are not statistically robust. The 
heavily theorised ENGO-activity is no better than the three previous predictors, reporting a 
positive relationship that is not verified because of lack of statistical significance. In contrast 
to the four abovementioned covariates, economic development shows a significant, negative 
relationship with the dependent variable. Recall, however, that the variable is logged. When 
converting the coefficients, I find that for a one percentage point increase in the variable, the 
hazard of reaching compliance increases by 0,8 percentage points98. This means that the richer 
the country, the more likely it is to fulfil the requirements set out in the Montreal Protocol. 
Confronting the results with theory, we see that this finding corresponds with the well 
established assumption that richer countries are better compliers. 
 The introduction of five new variables only leads to small changes in reported effects 
in the other variables. First, a Wald test of the joint contribution of the original and the 
interacted Green party popularity variables is now only significant at the .05-level. Still, the 
effect of the variable on compliance is almost identical to the one found in Model one. 
Secondly, the reported effects of the Common law, Socialist law and German civil code 
dummies have all changed direction. Now both Socialist law and French civil law show a 
positive effect on the chance of reaching compliance, contradicting the initial assumption. As 
already mentioned, problems with the measurement itself as well as the lack of significance 
may account for the big changes in reported effects. 
 Considering model fit, Model two performs similarly to Model one. Despite the 
increase in predictors included in the regression, the multivariable Wald chi squared test 
shows a small increase from Model one to 49.19. This indicates that the two models to a 
limited extent, although significantly, can explain the parameters under scrutiny. The -log 
pseudolikelihood is reduced, but not considerably. The linktest reports that the variables 
included are of importance and that their specification is good. 
 
6.3.4 Model three 
Model three is built on the smallest sample, including 977 observations and 66 instances of 
compliance occurring. The reason for the substantial decline is that two variables with a 
considerable amount of missing data are included in the model. These are the Government 
capacity and Left-libertarian executive predictors99. Both of the new covariates are expected 
                                                 
98
 Because 0,818/100 = 0,00818, and exp(0,00818) = 0,8%. 
99
 As the Government capacity and economic development measures show problematic instances of collinearity, 
the former is removed from this model so the actual effect of the latter covariate can be measured. 
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to vary positively with the likelihood of reaching compliance. Government capacity has a 
negative effect on the chance of compliance, running counter to theoretical postulations. 
Nonetheless, a p-value of .505 upholds the null hypothesis of no effect between Government 
capacity and the likelihood of protocol compliance. The positive effect of left-libertarian 
executive is in accordance with theory, but also this predictor fails to reach a minimum of 
significance, confirming the null hypothesis of no relationship.  
The effects of most variables remain similar to the previous model. Nonetheless, some 
exceptions are present and should be mentioned. First, the effect of EU-membership fails to 
reach statistical significance. Secondly, the significance level of country strength decreases, 
barely reaching a .10-level joint effect, whereas Green party popularity turns out significant at 
the .001-level. Thirdly, the same green party predictor changes direction earlier than what 
was reported in the two previous models. Fourthly, several predictors report a change in effect 
direction. Government autonomy moves from being negative in Model two to positive here, 
and integration in world economy as well as democracy reports of negative effects as opposed 
to the positive effects seen in Model two. The change in direction is likely to be caused by the 
substantial decline in country-years seen in Model three. Still, all these covariates are 
statistically insignificant. 
When evaluating model fit, Model three reports a Wald chi squared value of 76,01, 
significantly better than the previous two models. This is an indication that it reflects the 
world more properly. Missing data is a problem here, following the two included variables. 
As reported in the descriptive analysis, left-libertarian executive systematically misses values 
from the developing world. Knowing this, a possible reason why Model three outperforms the 
two former might be that mainly developed countries are included, and the variables included 
in my model fits the developed world better than the developing world. The linktest is still 
significant for the model under question and insignificant for the model of mere chance, 
indicating that the correct covariates are included and that they are soundly specified. 
 
6.4 Constructing a synthesis model 
Wishing to present the best explanatory model of compliance with the Montreal Protocol, the 
synthesis model will include all variables that have turned out statistically significant in the 
three former models, regardless of their theoretical affiliation. The covariates meeting this 
criterion are summarized in the table below. 
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Table 6: Overview of variables with significant effects in Models 1, 2 and 3 
 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 Variable Sign. Direction Sign Direction Sign. Direction 
H1/H2 Country strength Yes Negative Yes Negative Yes Negative 
H10 Economic Development - - Yes Negative - - 
H13 MP-membership Yes  Positive Yes Positive Yes Positive 
H15/H16 EU-membership Yes Negative Yes Negative No Negative 
H18 Green party popularity Yes Neg/Pos Yes Neg/Pos Yes Neg/Pos 
H20 Regional compliance Yes  Positive Yes Positive Yes Positive 
The cells where Neg/Pos is written indicate that this is an interacted variable where the effect changes from 
negative to positive over time. 
 
Table 7 includes six different covariates, as well as two inversely squared functions of Green 
Party popularity and MP membership – length which are still found to increase model fit 
significantly when included next to the original first degree variables. When checking for the 
proportionality function in a Schoenfeld test, we find that Green party popularity does no 
longer break with the proportionality assumption, meaning the interaction with analysis time 
is not necessary for the synthesis model100. The significant variables were already included 
together in Model two, but then many inefficient predictors were also included, possibly 
influencing the effect on the other predictors as well as lowering model fit.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
100
 See the Schoenfeld results in Table 11 in Appendix  
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Table 7: Synthesis models 
Independent variables First Synthesis model Final synthesis model 
Country strength 1.000* 
(.000) 
1.000 
(.000) 
Country strength inversely squared 1.041** 
(.014) 
1.043*** 
(.013) 
Economic development .839• 
(.076) 
.818* 
(.073) 
MP-membership 1.041 
(.032) 
1.042 
(.032) 
MP-membership inversely squared .967** 
(.011) 
.968** 
(.011) 
EU-membership .981 
(.018) 
- 
Green party popularity 1.029 
(.029) 
- 
Regional compliance 2.437*** 
(.480) 
2.452*** 
(.481) 
Number of country-years 1947 1947 
Number of compliance events 113 113 
-Log Pseudolikelihood -391.230 -392.373 
Wald chi2 38.06 36.62 
Prob>chi2 0.000 0.000 
Linktest, _hat 
Linktest, _hatsq 
0.000 
0.292 
0.000 
0.247 
Wald test, MP-member(squared, chi2) 
Prob>chi2, Wald test MP-member(sq.) 
11.78 
0.003 
11.88 
0.003 
Wald test, Country strength(squared), chi2 
Prob>chi2, Wald test C. strength(squared) 
9.67 
0.008 
11.02 
0.004 
Reported hazard ratios. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Efron method is used to handle ties.  
Significance: *** p<.001 ** p<.01 * p<.05 • p<.10. 
 
Looking at the first synthesis model, the statistical merit is high. Most of the covariates show 
statistically significant effects that correspond to the theoretical postulations. The less 
powerful a state is, the more prosperous it is, the longer it has been member to the Protocol 
and the more compliant region it belongs to, the higher propensity for complying with the 
Montreal Protocol. Yet, two of the variables, Green party popularity and EU-membership, are 
rendered statistically insignificant with p-values of .298 and .288 respectively101. This result 
might not be that surprising for green party popularity, as it has been included alongside an 
interaction term in the previous models because of non-proportionality. It seems that when the 
variable is not interacted with time, it fails to reach significance, and thus the null hypothesis 
of no connection between green party success and the likelihood of reaching compliance 
stands. EU-membership - length also reports results that make their inclusion in a final 
                                                 
101
 The MP-protocol covariate also fails to reach significant results. Yet, when coupled with the transformed 
variable it reports significant results and is thus kept in the model. 
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synthesis model difficult. However, we already saw that this predictor failed to reach 
significance in Model three, indicating that the connection was not that strong. Based on their 
insignificant results of the two variables, the hypotheses H5 and H7 are not supported by the 
model: the success of green parties as well as the length of EU-membership in a state does not 
significantly affect the chances of reaching the goals put out by the Ozone Secretariat. 
In terms of model fit, we see that the first synthesis model performs moderately. The 
multivariate Wald chi squared test is quite low, but significant. This means that the model 
helps explaining the issue of compliance substantially, but that the strength of the model in 
explaining the parameters is reduced. The -log pseudolikelihood reports high values, 
indicating good model fit, but as this can not be compared across models it does not tell us 
much. The linktest tells me that I am still including the correct predictors, and that their 
specifications are sound.  
Based on the above-mentioned considerations, I conclude that the model can still be 
improved. Thus, wishing to maximise efficacy, parsimony and model specification, a final 
model is presented excluding the two insignificant variables from the first synthesis model. 
To detect whether the removal of the two variables can be justified, a univariate Wald test chi 
squared is conducted to see whether they improve model fit significantly.  
 
Table 8: Wald test of the Green popularity and EU-length covariates’ joint effect 
Wald test  
Chi2(2) 1.19 
Prob>chi2 .553 
 
The far from insignificant p-value tells us that the null hypothesis asserting that the variables 
do not influence the model significantly should be upheld. Thus, removing Green party 
popularity and EU-membership will not influence the model’s explanatory power 
significantly.  
The final synthesis model is reported in the right column of Table 7. In terms of 
variable effect, the model largely corresponds to the first synthesis model. The covariates 
have statistically significant effects in the same directions, and their reported Z-scores have a 
close to identical magnitude. Economic development is now significant at the .05-level with a 
p-value of .024 in the final model. The statistical effect has also improved for the Country 
strength interaction term. Considering model fit, the two synthesis models are close to 
identical. 
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6.5 Discussion 
The examination of the models has confirmed that the results reported in Table 5 and Table 7 
perform relatively well and that their results are robust. This section will discuss the results of 
the analysis more in detail and connect them with the hypotheses. When assessing the size of 
predictor effects, the model with the largest number of observations and cases of compliance 
available for the predictor are chosen to maximise reporting soundness.  
Country strength shows a large, negative effect over time. Based on Table 15, an 
increase from one million to two million inhabitants decreases the chance of experiencing 
compliance with the Montreal Protocol with 11,8 percentage points. For a state with 30 
million inhabitants, a one million increase would decrease the hazard with 92,1 percentage 
points relative to the baseline hazard. To exemplify these findings, one can picture Algeria 
who had 30 million inhabitants in 1999, but reached 31 million in 2001. From 1999 to 2001 
then, the likelihood of Algeria complying with MP emission standards decreased by 92,1 
percentage points. Zambia, on the other hand, reduced its chances of reaching compliance 
with ‘only’ 58,3 percentage points between 1999 and 2004 as their number of inhabitants 
increased from 10,2 to 11,2 million. Hence, I conclude that the more powerful the country, 
measured in the shape of its population, the less likely it is to adhere to the Montreal accord. 
As mentioned earlier, we see a stabilising effect around 0 from 90 million onwards, and from 
there the effect of one extra million inhabitant does not have an additional decreasing effect 
on the hazard. 
Confronting the results with theory, my analysis of compliance with the Montreal 
Protocol finds that the less country strength, the more likely a member state is to move into 
compliance, regardless of their Article 5-status. Thus I can conclude that out of the two 
hypotheses presented regarding country strength; only H1 is supported. This finding gives 
strength to Perkins and Neumayer’s (2007) assumption that powerful states legitimate 
themselves through their importance economically and politically and thus do not depend on 
cooperation within international agreements to be considered an actor in the international 
community102. This observation serves as support to the realist school arguing that states 
always evaluate their self-interest before moving into binding IEAs. Since powerful states can 
afford to act more autonomous internationally, they are less likely to join in on international 
efforts to save the environment if it is more costly than beneficial to them. 
                                                 
102
 Even though generalisations to other Protocols are not methodologically sound, I find a good analogy in the 
observed role of the US with regard to the Kyoto Protocol in the late 1990s, where the country was included in 
the negotiations of the regime framework, but in the end did not ratify the agreement. 
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 Moving on to economic integration, this analysis allows no significant assumption 
about the relationship between level of integration and the propensity of experiencing 
compliance, thus rejecting both H3 and H4 theorising such a relationship. This supports 
Bernhagen’s (2008) findings, even though his findings is of a much smaller scope than mine, 
including 35 advanced industrialised countries. Not only is the variable rendered insignificant, 
it also changes direction from Model two to Model three. This is most likely due to the 
considerable drop in number of observed country-years for Model three. Despite this change 
in direction, the variance in effect is minimal and both hazard ratios concentrate around 1, 
signifying no effect. The lack of effect is also further confirmed by the bivariate regression 
reporting that even when the effect is singled out, it fails to reach significance. I thus conclude 
that the level of trade dependency can not explain the observed variance in compliance with 
the Montreal Protocol. 
 The number of veto players in a political system is found to decrease the chances of 
experiencing compliance, thus corresponding with H5. However, the effect is not significant, 
and the effect changes direction as the regression is run on Model 3. The initial bivariate 
regression also showed a non-significant relationship between government autonomy and 
compliance. These findings thus contradict Haverland (2000) and Giuliani’s (2003) findings 
of government autonomy’s positive effect on environmental performance. Based on the 
models presented here, I confirm the null hypothesis assuming that the degree of government 
autonomy does not affect the likelihood of reaching compliance with the Montreal Protocol. 
Thus, H5 is dismissed. 
 As government capacity is only included in model 3, its effect should be interpreted 
with some care as there is a risk of sample bias. The regressions show a negative effect on 
compliance as HDI increases, dismissing the postulated positive effect expressed through H6. 
It also contradicts the positive effect found in the bivariate analysis. This finding challenge the 
assumption by Haas et al. (1993) and Simmons (1998) that it is crucial for IEAs to facilitate 
administrative and technical capacities to increase compliance records among member states. 
Based on the findings in this analysis, H6 is rejected.  
Corruption was excluded from the analysis because of problematically high 
correlations with several other predictors. Hence, H7 is not answered in this thesis. This is a 
weakness, but the bias risked from including the covariate made its inclusion 
methodologically unsound.  
Despite democracy coming out of the bivariate model as significant at the .05-level, 
this effect is lost as the predictor is included in the regression alongside other variables. Both 
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Models 2 and 3 fail to produce significant support for H8, hence the null hypothesis of no 
effect of the political regime on the likelihood of reaching compliance with the Montreal 
accord stands. This finding contradicts previous studies presented in the theory chapter, and 
thus one might suspect that the model specifications may have obstructed the data. 
Nonetheless, the descriptive statistics displayed variation and no signs of a biased sample. 
When running the regression on the sample of Model two without the variables that 
democracy correlates the most with, it still turns out as non-significant. As most of the 
previous empirical studies conducted have a focus on developed countries, their significant 
positive effect for democracy on compliance is not that surprising. As such, it might be 
assumed that the positive effect seen for the developed world is overshadowed in this analysis 
by the mixed record of the non-Article 5 members to the Protocol. Thus, I conclude that the 
political regime of a member state can not explain compliance with the Montreal Protocol.  
The effect on the covariate economic development is negative and significant across 
models. Yet, as the natural logarithm is taken of this variable, a different interpretation is 
required. Doing this, I find that a one percentage point increase in the variable increases a 
state’s chances of fulfilling its obligations by 0,8 percentage points (based on the final 
synthesis model). This may seem like a minimal effect, but one should keep in mind that this 
is a continuous variable, meaning that there are much smaller intervals seen here than for a 
dummy variable where a one unit increase is a move from the one extreme to the other. As 
such, I reject the null hypothesis and strengthen H10; the better the economic situation in a 
country, the more likely it is to reach the protocol emission standards and move into 
compliance. Applying some math, we find that the boom in the Malaysian economy from 
1989 to 1996 increased the country’s chances of complying with the Montreal Protocol with 6 
percentage points. 
Based on this assessment of economic development, I conclude that the findings of 
this thesis with regard to the importance of environmental development correspond with some 
of the literature on the field (Brown Weiss and Jacobson 1998; Jänicke 1992). The importance 
of available resources seems obvious when extensive changes are to be done in a society. This 
further is an argument for an increased focus on compliance funds to help the poorer states 
reduce emissions according to treaty goals. Such managerial help serves as an argument for 
the institutionalist school arguing that non-compliance is not a matter of recalcitrance but of 
inability. It should also be pointed out that this analysis does not find support for H9 arguing 
for the existence of an environmental Kuznets Curve. As mentioned previously, this squared 
effect is not found when other covariates are accounted for, thus supporting Neumayer (2003). 
 85 
Legal traditions are theorised to influence the propensity to comply with the Montreal 
accord, but the legal origin dummies included in the analysis all fail to predict the outcome.  
Societies grounded on French civil law and Socialist law were both theorised to be negative 
for compliance, but in the analysis the former is reported positive against all models whereas 
the latter shows the expected effect in Model one before turning positive in the two latter. It 
should however be pointed out that the descriptive statistics made it very clear that the 
reference category make up two percent of the country-years included in the sample. This 
means that the effect of the other dummies hinges on how three Scandinavian states (Norway, 
Sweden and Finland) perform at every time. This can also explain the great fragility observed 
in the data with regards to which other covariates were included. Nonetheless, the results are 
far from significant, rejecting H11. Hence, there is no effect to be found, neither between the 
two theorised legal systems nor the other legal dummies included in the analysis.  
 H12, hypothesising a positive effect between public environmental concern and 
compliance, could not be tested in the analysis due to lack of comprehensive data from the 
WVS and EVS. This is a weakness, but the decision is in line with the methodological request 
of avoiding too much missing data and consequently risking sample bias. Thus, I am not able 
to conclude on whether the postulations made by Haas (1998) and Brown Weiss and Jacobson 
(1998) correspond with an empirical analysis of the Montreal regime. 
The effect of length of membership to the Montreal Protocol turns out statistically 
significant and consistent with the theoretical expectations across all models, and thus 
represents one of the strongest findings in this study. I find that the effect of one additional 
affiliate year on the propensity for experiencing compliance is non-linear and takes a 
monotonous, curvilinear form in all models. Table 16 shows how the hazard ratio of 
experiencing compliance for one additional member year increases gradually the longer a 
state has been member to the Montreal Protocol. For the final synthesis model we see that as a 
new member, the first year will increase the hazard with 5,7 percentage points compared to 
the hazard for non-members. After five years as a member, an additional associate year 
increases the likelihood of complying with the accord with 36,7 percentage points relative to 
the baseline. To illustrate the effect found here we take a quick look at Switzerland. In 1993 
they had been members to the Protocol for five years. In 1994 then, their chance of reaching 
compliance had increased with 36,7 percentage points in respect of the hazard in 1993. From 
ten years onwards the effect of an extra affiliate year starts growing rapidly, and a state that 
has been a member for 15 years improve their chances of moving into compliance with 160,2 
percentage points for an additional Protocol year. These high numbers make sense when 
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taking into consideration that the average state needs 9,5 years to move into compliance with 
the Montreal accord. This means that for each additional year after this, there are fewer and 
fewer cases left in the sample, increasing the hazard substantially. 
As the few studies that have discussed the effect of membership have been qualitative 
in their approach, the particular shape of its relationship with compliance has not previously 
been theorised. Thus, when this analysis finds a positive and significant curvilinear trend over 
time, it is the first statistical analysis to do so. The results confirm H13; the longer a state has 
been a member to the Protocol, the bigger the chance that it will move into compliance 
(controlling for the effect of the Article 5-delay). Connecting the findings to theory, there is a 
case to be made for the theorised effect of social learning and maturity in a compliance 
process. As affiliates interact with each other on this arena, they internalise the norms 
underlying the treaty and use diplomatic connections to compel other states into taking the 
compliance question seriously. In the case of the Montreal Protocol, there is no doubt that the 
supervisory mechanisms have played an important role in driving member states toward 
compliance. The sanctioning possibilities available to the Members of the Parties103 as well as 
the availability of support for capacity building are likely to effectively steer for compliance. 
This, however, opens up for more rational mechanisms underlying the positive effect of the 
time variable. Maybe it is not internalised norms but rather a cost-benefit analysis by member 
states driving compliance with the accord? Even though I can not single which mechanisms 
explain compliance variance, the findings allows me to conclude in concordance with Brown 
Weiss and Jacobson (1998:512) that the trend over time is towards greater compliance, at 
least for the Montreal Protocol. 
The examination of EU-membership length ended in three hypotheses in the theory 
chapter. Recall, however, that H14 was not tested in the analysis because of variable 
collinearity. The four models including the covariate all show a negative hazard, signifying 
that the longer a state has been member to the EU, the less likely he is to move into 
compliance. This supports H15, as well as Giuliani (2003) and Perkins and Neumayer (2007), 
arguing that new EU-members are more interested in showing international responsibility 
than their mature adversaries. Yet, the skewed distribution uncovered in the descriptive 
statistics might be part of the explanation for this finding. As there are only 27 out of 154 
states under study that are EU-members, each EU-member failing to comply at time t counts 
disproportionately much, potentially skewing the results. Nonetheless, the relationship is 
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 The Member of the Parties have the right to suspend membership rights as well as stopping technical or 
financial transfers (Breitmeier et al. 2009). 
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significant in two of the original models, allowing us to reject both H16 as well as the null 
hypothesis of no connection. The fact that the predictor fails to reach a significant result in the 
first synthesis model seems to be connected to the exclusion of other covariates rather than the 
N as the model is almost as big as Model one where EU-length was found to be significant. 
Thus, it might be that the effect of EU-membership on the hazard of compliance is contingent 
upon other explanatory variables. Nonetheless, the conclusion is that there exists fairly robust 
evidence that young EU-members (and non-members) are better compliers than their 
predecessors.  
That ENGO activity plays an important role as a compliance pusher is one of the most 
established theories presented in this thesis (Breitmeier et al. 2006; Brown Weiss and 
Jacobson 1998; Cameron et al. 1996; Checkel 2001; Haas et al. 1993). Thus, its lack of ability 
to reach significance in this thesis comes as a surprise. Despite showing the hypothesised 
positive relationship between the amount of active NGOs in a society and its compliance 
record, H17 is rejected in favour of H0 concluding that no effect exists. One possible 
explanation for this finding might be that the proxy variable measuring active NGOs fails to 
reflect the actual effect ENGO activity has on the likelihood of reaching compliance. As 
mentioned in the data chapter, this might not be a good measure. It does not automatically 
follow that an open society with many NGOs has an environmentally friendly population. 
Thus, I state that there is no connection between presence of ENGOs and protocol compliance 
in this thesis. Still, it is possible that with a better measure available, I could have gotten 
contrasting results. 
As thoroughly covered, Green party popularity revealed non-proportionality in three 
models when run through the Schoenfeld test104. This indicates that the predictor effect varies 
with time. Thus, a covariate interacted with analysis time has been included alongside the 
original variables in the three models of Table 6. The two variables are jointly found to 
significantly influence the chance of experiencing compliance in all models. Table 14 shows 
the difference in hazard ratios for different values of the Green seats variable. Initially, one 
green seat leads to a nine percentage point reduction in the hazard of experiencing compliance 
compared to those member states not having any green seats. Nonetheless, this negative effect 
diminishes quickly, and after 7 years the effect of on extra green seat in parliament has turned 
positive. After 19 years (maximum amount of observation year a member state has is 20) one 
extra green seat increases the hazard of experiencing compliance by 22 percentage points.  
                                                 
104
 See Table 12 in Appendix. 
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Thus, it appears that the unexpected negative effect of green party popularity seen 
initially, soon diminishes, and turns positive. This finding provides mixed support for H18 
theorising a positive effect. As none of the theories assumes such a complex relationship 
between green party seats and compliance, they are unable to explain the change in direction. 
The results might support a theory of internalisation of norms, arguing that the longer one has 
been a member to the Protocol, the more the population legitimises it, and their increased 
environmental concern is materialised through support for Green parties, strengthening their 
position against the established parties (Bernhagen 2008). Yet, a look into how the variable 
varies with time reveals that Green seats numbers above 0 are evenly spread out throughout 
the research period, frustrating such an understanding. Even though the theories presented are 
unable to explain the observed connection, method-specific issues might be part of the reason. 
A descriptive analysis shows that only 218 country-years report green seats numbers above 0, 
suggesting that each unit’s compliance record heavily influences the coefficient. Recall also 
that the operationalisation has been questioned, as it does not take into account the relative 
influence of the green parties expressed through the size of the legislative.  
When included in the synthesis model, the Schoenfeld test no longer shows signs of 
non-proportionality for Green party popularity, thus leaving the original variable unchanged 
in the sample. Here, the predictor fails to reach significance, even though the hazard ratio 
reports the expected relationship. Thus, the covariate is not included in the final synthesis 
model. To sum up, the significant effect of one extra green seat in parliament is found to 
change from negative to positive in course of analysis time. The established theories can not 
explain this complex shape in hazard, and there is a chance that a skewed distribution may 
influence the hazard in a non-representative way. Thus, the results should be treated with care 
and further investigation should be conducted to determine the nature of this relationship.  
A left-libertarian executive leads to a 20 percent point increase in the likelihood of 
complying with the Montreal Protocol, according to Model three. Even though the findings 
cohere with the theorised relationship, the variable is not significant, thus dismissing H19. 
Because of its relatively few observations, it is only included in one model. Furthermore, the 
descriptive statistics indicates that there is a clear bias towards developed countries. Looking 
closer at the data, it is made clear that the missing data are almost exclusively from Africa or 
the Middle East, regions where the party systems do not fit into Western party organisation 
and cleavage understandings. Thus, this measure would not have been interpreted with care 
even if it had come out as significant because of selection bias. 
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Lastly, regional compliance has throughout all models turned out to be significant at 
a .001-level, making it the best performer in this analysis. The logged variable tells us that a 
one percentage point positive change in the predictor leads to a 2,5 percentage point increase 
in the hazard, all other variables held constant and controlling for the Article 5-effect105. 
Confronting these numbers with empirical evidence, we expect Bolivia’s hazard for 
experiencing compliance increases with 22,75 percent from 2005 to 2006 as its region moves 
from 0 to 9,1 percent compliance. The results confirm H20; the more compliant region, the 
more likely a member in this region is to move into compliance with the Montreal Protocol.  
This positive effect is coherent with Simmons’ (2000) findings in her study of 
commitment and compliance with the IMF. This finding is particularly intriguing as it has not, 
to my knowledge, been theorised in the literature on IEAs previously. This opens up great 
opportunities for focusing on compliance pull from smaller groups of countries through the 
sharing of experience within regions. Building on friendships and trust between neighbours, 
discussion and persuasion as well as technological advice from surrounding countries might 
be a good strategy for pushing member states towards compliance. Even though the 
framework of this thesis does not allow for generalisations, one is tempted to argue that such 
informal processes might be especially important within agreements lacking proper 
monitoring mechanisms. Moving one step down and focusing on compliance regionally, 
instead of centrally from the Ozone Secretariat, can possibly be an effective way of working 
towards maximising adherence to international environmental law.  
 
6.6 Summary of the findings 
The synthesis models were constructed to provide a clear overview of which indicators that 
best explain the variation seen in compliance with the Montreal Protocol. Thus, only the six 
variables with reported significant effects in the same directions against several models were 
included in the synthesis models. The models showed us that aspects of all the IR theories, 
both the enforcement, managerial and legitimacy schools, are represented through the 
variables that are found to influence the likelihood of adhering to the set of obligations that 
the Montreal Protocol comprise. The final synthesis model ended up supporting four of the 
hypotheses set out in the theory chapter.  
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 Because 2,452/100 = 0,0245, and exp(0,0245) = 1,0248. The numbers are based on the final synthesis model. 
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Table 9: The findings of the analysis 
   Actual effects 
  
Variables 
 
Expected 
effect 
 
Model 1 
 
Model 2 
 
Model 3 
Synthesis 
model(s) 
 
 
Implication of 
findings 
H1/ 
H2 
Country strength Pos/Neg Negative Negative Negative Negative Only H1 is 
supported 
H3/ 
H4 
Economic 
integration 
Pos/Neg - Not sign Not sign - H3/H4 is 
rejected 
H5 Government 
autonomy 
Positive - Not sign Not sign - H5 is rejected 
H6 Government 
capacity 
Positive - - Not sign - H6 is rejected 
H8 Democracy 
 
Positive - Not sign Not sign - H8 is rejected 
H10 Economic 
development 
Positive - Positive - Positive H10 is 
supported 
H11 French ccode/ 
Socialist law 
Negative Not sign Not sign Not sign - H11 is rejected 
H13 MP-member 
length 
Positive Positive Positive Positive Positive H13 is 
supported 
H15/H
16 
EU-member 
length 
Pos/Neg Negative Negative Not sign Not sign H15/H16 is 
rejected 
H17 ENGO activity 
 
Positive - Not sign Not sign - H17 is rejected 
H18 Green Party 
Popularity 
Positive Neg/Pos Neg/Pos Neg/Pos Not sign H18 is partly 
supported 
H19 Left-libertarian 
executive 
Positive - - Not sign - H19 is rejected 
H20 Regional 
compliance 
Positive Positive Positive Positive Positive H20 is 
supported 
– indicates that the covariate was not included in the model. H7 Corruption, H9 Economic development squared, 
H12 Public opinion and H14 EU-membership were all excluded before the analysis was run.  
 
The table shows that the hypotheses 1, 10, 13 and 20 are conclusively supported through this 
analysis. From this I conclude that a member state that has been a member to the Montreal 
Protocol for long, is surrounded by compliant neighbouring states and sees a high level of 
economic development has significantly better chances of experiencing compliance with the 
Montreal Protocol than a state not occupying these features. However, the state should not be 
too powerful (measured through country strength); this significantly decreases the chances of 
seeing compliance. 
 Turning to green party popularity and EU-membership, the analysis find mixed results. 
Green party popularity is found to be statistically significant in all three original models 
where it is included with an interaction term to even out its non-proportional effect on the 
hazard. When this interaction effect is excluded in the synthesis models, it no longer reaches 
significance. Still, there is a case to be made for the importance of green party popularity for 
compliant state behaviour. EU-membership, on the other hand, was rendered significant and 
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negative in Models 1 and 2 supporting H15 postulating that older EU-members have less 
chance of abiding to the emission standards. Yet it fails to reach a significant level in model 3 
and the first synthesis model. Here as well, it can be that the effect is of importance, and that 
model specific issues have led to the reported non-significance. 
 Finally, there are seven variables and eleven hypotheses that are rendered no support 
in this analysis, and thus can be discarded with some confidence when considering the 
Montreal Protocol. Despite their insignificance, the direction of the relationship is inherently 
interesting and deserves a review. The variables Left-libertarian executive and active ENGOs 
are found to be positively related to the propensity of reaching compliance with the MP, 
corresponding with the theory. Only Government capacity is found to be negatively related to 
compliance, contradicting the postulations. The remaining variables democracy, government 
autonomy and economic integration in world economy change directions against different 
models. This may be a sign of badly fit data as their influence change depending on which 
covariates are included, or it may imply that the connection between these indicators and 
compliance is weak. Lastly, three of the four dummies checking for the effect of legal origin 
on compliance end up changing directions like the abovementioned variables. Only French 
civil law shows a positive effect on the compliance variable against all three models. 
Nonetheless, this finding contradicts the hypothesised relationship, and consequently is not 
rendered much trust.  
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7. Conclusion 
The objective of this thesis has been to explore whether country characteristics can explain 
the observed variation in compliance with the Montreal Protocol. The motivation was offset 
by two features traced in the existing literature on compliance with environmental accords. 
First, the overwhelming explanatory power acclaimed to treaty-induced features without 
proper investigations of the influence of national mechanisms struck me as conspicuous. 
Secondly, the focus on overall compliance in the existing literature has led to a lack of 
understanding of which mechanisms facilitate compliance at the member-state level. By 
utilizing event history analysis I sought to figure out whether national structures and processes 
can reveal general patterns of influence on a member states’ compliance record. This 
concluding chapter will first report the most important findings and use these to answer the 
research question put out for the thesis. Then, the theoretical implications of the findings will 
be discussed, before the thesis closes off with some suggestions for future research. 
 
7.1 Explaining compliance with the Montreal Protocol 
The findings from the analysis show that there is explanatory power to be attributed to factors 
external to the IEA framework. The analysis showed significant results across all models for 
four variables; Country strength – population, Economic development, MP-membership – 
length and Regional compliance. In addition, mixed support was found for two covariates; 
EU-membership – length and Green party popularity. In terms of overall model fit, the 
models in this analysis matter significantly, but their success in explaining the actual variation 
in compliance is moderate. The significant findings of length of treaty membership, regional 
compliance as well as for length of EU-membership indicate that there is a case to be made 
for the importance of learning effects. The longer a state is a member to the Protocol and to 
the EU, the more likely it is to legitimise the Montreal Protocol and internalise its norms. As 
contiguous countries achieve compliance, the non-compliant member is also ‘caught in the 
undertow’. Also, the importance of power seems to hold as country strength clearly shows to 
reduce the likelihood of achieving compliance. Moreover, we see that external processes such 
as the member state’s economy also play a significant role in explaining compliance. Lastly, 
the findings indicate that green party support may be a factor pushing a society towards 
compliance, but methodological issues as well as mixed results weakens this conclusion. 
Among the other covariates, it is surprising that the heavily theorised ENGO activity and 
democracy were not supported by the analysis. The compliance pull from international and 
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national environmental organisations thus can not explain the advance towards compliance 
seen in the Montreal Protocol context. 
The above reported results allows me to answer the thesis’ research question, 
concluding that Country strength – population, Economic development, MP-membership – 
length and Regional compliance, and to some extrent, EU-membership – length and Green 
party popularity, are factors that explain member state compliance with the Montreal Protocol.    
These findings add an important contribution to the established literature by pointing 
out that one can not fully understand the difference seen in compliance with the Montreal 
Protocol without taking factors external to the environmental accords into concern. The lack 
of systematic research on national factors has rightly been acknowledged by several IR-
scholars, but despite this awareness few studies include country-specific variables in their 
research on the effect of IEAs on member states. An IR-scholar might contend against such an 
argument that national behaviour is understudied simply because it does not add anything to 
the study on overall compliance patterns. To that I would reply that one can not fully 
understand which mechanisms enable overall compliance without recognising the behaviour 
of the cornerstones in an international agreement, namely the signatory states. It is first when 
member state compliance is properly understood that effective and pertinent policy 
recommendations can be put out into life. Nonetheless, the findings of this thesis should not 
be considered a ‘proof’ against the literature focusing mainly of characteristics of the accords 
and the international environment when explaining compliance. The results add an important 
aspect to the existing literature focusing on institutional variables, but these two aspects are 
not mutually exclusive.  To sum up, this thesis concludes that including state-specific 
processes next to more treaty-induced variables would provide the researcher with a more 
complete picture of the compliance process than could a study only including one group of 
variables. 
 
7.2 Suggestions for further research 
When conducting research on a phenomenon, a goal is to be able to read policy 
recommendations from the inferences made. Yet, carving out new policy directions based on 
my study would at best be ‘risky business,’ as the scope of my study does not allow for 
generalisations. Nonetheless, further research on the mechanisms found to be significant here 
would be of great interest. If such studies should find similar patterns of influence, there 
might be a case to be made for an increased focus on social learning through more deliberate 
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channels, as well as a continued focus on economic as well as technological support. 
Connected to this point is also the quest for more in-depth research on the mechanisms lying 
behind the variables that this study found to be of significant importance. 
One of the great challenges with doing research on IEAs is their multifaceted nature. 
One cannot fully understand state behaviour in the international sphere without taking into 
account the history of the agreement, the protocol framework as well as each member state’s 
qualifications to deal with the issue they have legally bound themselves to. The Montreal 
Protocol serves as a good example here. One important reason for its success was that the 
industry utilising ozone depleting substances had developed new technologies that facilitated 
a more smooth transition to a CFC and halon-free, but still competitively effective, industry. I 
was unable to include such a historical aspect in my statistical analysis even though I knew 
that it is important. This shows the need for continued qualitative research to get the whole 
picture. However, this does not depreciate the importance of statistical analysis as long as our 
units of research are states and our cases are environmental protocols.  
When considering the complex nature of compliance processes, a mixed approach 
might be fruitful. Then, a natural next step could be to compare agreements with differing 
frameworks, to see how this affects compliance rates as well as the covariates under research. 
Are the same mechanisms important in these agreements? In that case, one might argue that 
there are some characteristics that seem to be more important than others for ensuring 
member state compliance with an agreement. If not, a discussion on whether one actually can 
compare country behaviour against different protocols might be necessary.  
 The research done on international environmental governance have been criticised for 
having great biases in their research. A main critique presented previously in this thesis is the 
problem of endogeneity; the fact that when considering regime outcomes, scholars tend only 
to analyse those who are already members to an agreement, rendering a positive bias in the 
findings when regime effects are considered. Thus, it would be interesting to test the effect of 
an agreement on a broader scale, for example through a panel analysis of reduction of 
pollution where also non-members are included. Interesting questions would be whether non-
members also change their habits when an environmental accord is in place, and if so, how 
long it takes before the effects of an international framework trickles down to non-member 
states. 
As already mentioned, the potential for generalisations about how states behave within 
the framework of international environmental agreements, is scarce in this analysis. The lack 
of quantifiable compliance information as well as the young age of most of today’s existing 
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agreements makes quantitative research on a number of protocols hard. This should however 
become easier with time, as more information is gathered and statistical techniques are 
becoming more flexible. Thus, an important step towards a deeper understanding of state 
behaviour in the international realm is more quantitative research on the topic. The extensive 
qualitative research done has been important, but there is little doubt that supplies from a 
statistical approach will be substantial for developing a well-established paradigm on 
international environmental regimes. This should be a scholarly motivation, as understanding 
how members to an agreement act and what makes them comply is a key to securing our 
time’s greatest challenge; saving the environment from man made destruction. 
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APPENDICES 
 
Table 10: Countries included in the dataset 
 Analyses of compliance with the Montreal  Protocol 
Countries 
included in 
the 
analyses. 
 
Font 
indicates 
compliance 
status as of 
end of 2008 
for the 
Montreal 
Protocol:  
 
Regular: 
Non-
compliant 
 
Bold: 
Compliant 
Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, 
Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belarus, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, 
Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, 
Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo Brazzaville, Congo 
Kinshasa, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Djibouti, 
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, 
Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, 
Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Guinea, Guyana, 
Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, Italy, Ivory 
Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Korea (north), Korea 
(south), Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, 
Libya, Lithuania, Macedonia, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, 
Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Moldova, Mongolia, Montenegro, 
Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar (Burma), Namibia, Nepal, The 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, 
Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, 
Poland, Qatar, Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, 
Senegal, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Somalia, 
South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, 
Syria, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, 
Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, 
United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, 
Vietnam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe 
Countries 
excluded 
from  the 
analysis 
because of 
less than 
500 000 
inhabitants 
Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Brunei, Cape Verde, Cook 
Islands, Dominica, Grenada, Iceland, Kiribati, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, 
Maldives, Malta, Marshall Islands, Federal states of Micronesia, Monaco, 
Nauru, Niue, Palau, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, Suriname, Tonga, 
Tuvalu, Vanuatu, Vatican state 
 
Left 
censored 
cases where 
compliance 
existed 
before 
ratification 
Belgium, Denmark, Solomon Islands 
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Table 11: Codebook 
Variable Source Comments 
Country strength United Nations Statistics Division 
(2009), variable population 
Reported into per million 
inhabitants to ease interpretation. 
Inversely squared. 
Economic 
integration 
The World Databank (2010), 
variable merchandise trade as 
percentage of GDP 
Original measure divided by 10 to 
ease interpretation 
Government 
autonomy 
The World Bank Database of 
Political Institutions (Keefer 2009), 
variable checks 
Based on an index of legislative 
and executive indices of electoral 
competitiveness 
Government 
capacity 
United Nations Development 
Programme (2009), Human 
Development Index (HDI) 
Original measure is recoded to 
range from 0 to 100,  
Corruption The World Bank Worldwide 
Governance Indicators (WGI) (The 
World Bank Group 2009a), variable 
control of corruption 
Only available 1996-2008 
Democracy Polity IV Project p4v2008 
(Marshall and Jaggers 2009a), 
variable polity2 
Range: -10 to +10 
Economic 
development 
The World Bank Group (2009b), 
GDP per capita PPP, constant 2005 
US dollars 
Logged. Reported per 1000 US 
dollars 
Legal system La Porta et al. (1999), gathered from 
(Teorell et al. 2009) variable legal 
origin 
Four dummies (fifth as reference 
category) created based on the 
nominal variable legal origin 
MP-membership Based on information from the 
Ozone Secretariat (2009) 
Coded by the author. Inversely 
squared. 
EU-membership 
 
Based on information from Perkins 
and Neumayer (2007) 
 
ENGO-activity Yearbook of International 
Organization, reported by UNDP 
Human Development Report (2002), 
variable Non-governmental 
organizations 
Constant variable, based on 
numbers from 2000. Reported per 
100 NGO in a country. 
Green party 
popularity 
Based on Inter-Parliamentary 
Union’s (2010) PARLINE database 
and Global Greens (2010)  
Coded by the author 
Left-libertarian 
executive 
World Bank Database of Political 
Institutions (Keefer 2009), variable 
execlrc 
Nominal variable execrlc recoded 
into dummy 
Regional 
compliance 
Based on information from the 
Ozone Secretariat (2009) 
Coded by the author. Regions are 
defined using United Nations 
(2000). Logged. 
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Table 12: Schoenfeld tests, run on all models 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Synthesis 
M1 
Synthesis 
M2 
Country 
strength 
0.076 
4.80* 
0.050 
0.90 
0.052 
0.56 
0.053 
2.54 
0.044 
1.67 
C.strength inv. 
squared 
0.056 
0.26 
0.047 
0.26 
0.079 
0.67 
0.072 
0.47 
0.043 
0.17 
Economic 
intergration 
 0.012 
0.02 
0.043 
0.23 
  
Government 
autonomy 
 0.073 
1.29 
-0.013 
0.03 
  
Government 
capacity 
  0.029 
0.07 
  
Democracy  0.011 
0.02 
0.008 
0.01 
  
Economic 
development 
 -0.011 
0.02 
 -0.091 
1.16 
-0.061 
0.48 
Common law 0.032 
0.17 
0.025 
0.10 
0.046 
0.21 
  
French civil 
law 
0.060 
0.59 
0.053 
0.44 
0.047 
0.20 
  
Socialist law 0.047 
0.35 
0.046 
0.33 
0.042 
0.16 
  
German civil 
law 
-0.083 
1.55 
-0.074 
1.20 
-0.137 
1.69 
  
MP-memship 
length 
0.066 
0.44 
0.060 
0.51 
0.095 
1.15 
0.075 
0.64 
0.070 
0.56 
MP-memship 
inv. squared 
0.058 
0.41 
-0.015 
0.03 
0.047 
0.16 
0.102 
1.29 
0.099 
1.15 
EU-memship 
length 
-0.098 
0.86 
-0.048 
0.29 
-0.081 
0.55 
-0.025 
0.05 
 
NGO-activity  -0.016 
0.04 
0.013 
0.02 
  
Green party 
popularity 
0.167 
3.50• 
0.139 
3.07• 
0.221 
3.86* 
0.118 
1.79 
 
Left-lib. 
executive 
  0.140 
1.60 
  
Regional 
compliance 
0.098 
1.06 
0.064 
0.45 
-0.026 
0.05 
0.060 
0.36 
0.066 
0.42 
Global test 10.97 11.62 14.22 3.59 1.11 
The first row in each cell gives information about individual rho-values, chi squared values follow below.  
Significance: *** p<.001 ** p<.01 * p<.05 • p<.10 
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Figure 2: Baseline hazards for the two groups of Montreal Protocol members 
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Figure 3: Cox-Snell residuals, run on the biggest model (Model 1) 
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Models the predictive power of the stratified Cox Model one. If the model fits the data well, the cumulative 
hazard of the Cox-Snell residuals should follow the 45 degree line (because then the residuals should have a 
standard exponential distribution with hazard functions that are equal to 1 for all t (Cleves et al. 2008:213-217). 
The overall fit is found to be good in this model. The variability in the right-hand tail is expected as prior failures 
and censoring leads to reduced effectiveness in the sample. 
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Other tests run on the data 
Residual based checks are run on the data to check for observations with a disproportionate 
influence on the estimated parameters. I use deviance residuals, meaning a rescaling of 
Martingale residuals to make them symmetric around zero, thus avoiding skewed data and 
hardened interpretation. It identified five countries with relatively large dfbeta values across 
several covariates. The question of how to deal with such outliers is heavily debated in the 
literature (Osborne 2002). Some argue that the only methodologically sound thing to do is 
exclude such observations if they turn out to be invalid, whereas others warn against such 
manipulation of the data (Orr et al. 1991). I run a sensitivity test, excluding the identified 
countries with influential observations from the sample and running regressions on Models 1 
and 2. Even though most parameters looked the same, green party popularity is no longer 
jointly significant in Model 1 and 2. Additionally, EU-membership – length is no longer 
significant at the .10-level, and regional compliance reports a stronger effect on the hazard for 
experiencing compliance in Model 2. We see that there is an effect, albeit moderate, of 
excluding the outliers. Nonetheless, I argue for the inclusion of such influential observation in 
the dataset as there is no reason for assuming that these data are invalid.  
 A sensitivity test is run on the three original models, including left-censored countries 
that were excluded from the analysis. In this sample, the left-censored member states are 
coded as having complied with the Montreal Protocol in their first year of observation. The 
rerun of the analysis shows no real changes in Model 1. For Model 2, EU-membership - 
length just slips the .10-level, and thus is not longer considered significant, even though the 
effect was barely significant in the original model as well. Also, German civil law changes 
direction from positive in Model 2 to negative in the rerun model, but is still insignificant. As 
the specification of the legal origin dummies make them fragile for changes, this is not 
surprising. Model 3 still reports an opposite effect on German civil law, and country strength 
and country strength inversely squared just fail to reach the .10-level. All in all, these changes 
to the estimated predictors are considered to be small. 
Another test named Harrell’s C concordance statistics evaluates the predictive power 
of the Cox model on a member state’s likelihood of reaching compliance. Unfortunately, I was 
not able to run this test in STATA because the test could not be used with late entry and time-
varying data.
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Table 13: Pairwise correlations  
Sample: The 
Montreal 
Protocol 
Dem
. 
Gov. 
aut. 
Gov. 
cap. 
Left-
lib. 
exec 
Green  
pop. 
NG
O 
pop. 
EU- 
mem
. 
IEA- 
lengt
h 
Reg 
com
p. 
Ec. 
dev. 
Ec. 
Int 
Corr. C. 
stren
-gth 
Com 
law 
Fr. 
ccod
e 
Soc. 
law 
Ger. 
ccode 
Art.5 
Democracy 1.00                  
Gov. aut. 0.50 1.00                 
Gov. cap. 0.42 0.17 1.00                
Left-libexec -0.27 -0.20 -0.12 1.00               
Green party 0.18 0.13 0.27 -0.01 1.00              
NGO 0.50 0.35 0.67 -0.10 0.48 1.00             
EU-length 0.22 0.14 0.36 -0.03 0.63 0.68 1.00            
IEA-length 0.22 0.10 0.30 -0.10 0.16 0.32 0.20 1.00           
Reg. comp. 0.29 0.18 0.44 0.05 0.22 0.47 0.26 0.42 1.00          
Ec. develop. 0.46 0.19 0.92 -0.14 0.29 0.73 0.39 0.32 0.45 1.00         
Ec. Int  -0.16 -0.17 -0.05 0.18 -0.01 -0.28 -0.02 0.05 0.18 -0.09 1.00        
Corruption 0.51 0.22 0.67 -0.15 0.33 0.76 0.43 0.27 0.50 0.78 -0.12 1.00       
C. strength -0.05 0.23 0.03 0.05 0.18 0.46 0.21 0.19 0.04 0.01 -0.45 0.04 1.00      
Com.law 0.19 0.16 -0.13 -0.09 -0.13 -0.00 -0.12 0.15 0.12 -0.04 -0.08 0.19 -0.01 1.00     
Frenchlaw -0.01 -0.50 -0.09 -0.09 -0.02 -0.04 0.15 0.03 -0.38 -0.06 -0.18 -0.17 0.03 -0.52 1.00    
Socialistlaw -0.30 -0.16 0.07 0.22 -0.11 -0.19 -0.16 -0.27 0.19 -0.09 0.35 -0.24 -0.11 -0.35 -0.46 1.00   
Germanlaw 0.13 0.04 0.18 -0.44 0.45 0.26 0.23 0.08 0.06 0.24 -0.13 0.22 0.24 -0.13 -0.17 -0.12 1.00  
Art.5-mem -0.30 -0.19 -0.63 0.04 -0.29 -0.66 -0.42 -0.13 -0.57 -0.62 -0.01 -0.63 -0.04 0.00 0.34 -0.24 -0.14 1.00 
Correlation coefficients. Pairwise correlations are run on the largest sample from the multivariate analysis of the Montreal Protocol dataset. 
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Table 14: Reported hazard ratios from Green party popularity at various points in time 
Analysis time Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
t = 1 .933 .931 .933 
t = 2 .946 .944 .949 
t = 5 .987 .985 .999 
t = 6 1.001 .999 1.017 
t = 7 1.015 1.013 1.034 
t = 10 1.059 1.057 1.089 
t = 15 1.136 1.135 1.186 
t = 19 
(max value t=20) 
1.201 1.201 1.270 
Function changes 
direction at t =  
 
6 
 
6.1 
 
5 
Hazard rate for Greenseats at analysis time t = exp[ )(21 tββ + ], where 1β is the coefficient for 
Greenseats and 2β is the coefficient for Greenseats*analysis time (Hosmer et al. 2008:116-
120). Hazard ratios is interpreted relative to one, lower values indicating a negative 
relationship and values higher than 1 implying positive connection.  
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Table 15: Change in hazard ratio from a one million increase in population 
1 million added at:  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Final 
Model 
1 million .905 .879 .853 .882 
10 million .500 .406 .328 .417 
30 million .133 .073 .039 .079 
50 million .040 .013 .005 .015 
70 million .010 .002 .001 .003 
90 million .003 .000 .000 .001 
150 million 
(max value 1314 mill.) 
.000 .000 .000 .000 
HR = exp ( )[ ]221 **2 ccCstrengthc ++ ββ  where  1β  is the coefficient for Country strength, 
2β  is the coefficient for Country strength inversely squared and c is the change in Country 
strength at certain values of the variable, in this case one year (Hosmer and Lemeshow 
1999:136). After having found the hazard rate for a squared function, the results are 
inversed 





HR
1
to reflect the interaction. 
 
 
Figure 4: The shape of the hazard for the different models, based on Table 15 
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Table 16: Change in hazard ratio from one additional year as member of the Montreal 
Protocol 
1 year added at: Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Final 
Model 
0 member years 1.090 1.103 1.111 1.057 
1 member years 1.167 1.186 1.228 1.127 
5 member years 1.431 1.423 1.658 1.367 
10 member years 2.012 1.747 2.736 1.886 
15 member years  2.829 1.957 4.516 2.602 
20 member years 
(max observed) 
3.978 2.056 7.452 3.589 
HR = exp ( )[ ]221 **2 cclengthMPc +−+ ββ  where  1β  is the coefficient for MP-length, 2β  
is the coefficient for MP-length inversely squared and c is the change in MP-length at certain 
values of the variable, in this case one year (Hosmer and Lemeshow 1999:136). After having 
found the hazard rate for a squared function, the results are inversed 





HR
1
to reflect the 
interaction. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: The shape of the hazard for the different models, based on Table 16 
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